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Dissertation

MACINTOSH'S CRITICISM OF PERSONALISM

by

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
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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In recent philosophy one of the most important developments has been the controversy among various philosophers about the place, nature, and importance of religion and its relation to philosophy. Douglas Clyde Macintosh, now professor emeritus and until 1942 professor of theology and philosophy of religion in Yale University, has been active in this controversy and has interpreted and defended religion. From the point of view of a critical realist he has developed his objections to other philosophical systems. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine his criticism of personalism.

#### 1. The problem

Much of this criticism appears directly and explicitly in Macintosh's writings. This is especially true of his attack on the epistemological position of personalism. The fundamental arguments in his criticism of epistemological dualism and his own views as a critical realistic monist appear in his two major volumes on epistemology, The Problem of Knowledge (1915), and The Problem of Religious Knowledge (1940). He develops his critical realism also





in several of his articles. His criticism of the epistemology of personalism rests on certain points of direct attack and on the underlying ideas of his own epistemological position. As an epistemological realist Macintosh criticizes the agnosticism of dualism and the dogmatism of both realistic absolute epistemological monism and idealistic epistemological monism.

In Macintosh's criticism of personalism, the realistic attack is not merely epistemological. It also has certain significant implications for metaphysics and religion. Macintosh's investigation of the relation of religion and theology to metaphysics began with the study for his dissertation on The Reaction Against Metaphysics in Theology, published in 1911. His epistemological writings also present many propositions important for his metaphysics and for his criticism of the metaphysics of personalism. He develops his own metaphysics in the chapter on reality in The Reasonableness of Christianity. He indicates some of the points in his criticism of personalistic metaphysics in the chapter on metaphysics in The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought, the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures at the University of Calcutta, delivered in 1928 and published in 1931.

Macintosh has been an active leader in philosophy, theology, and religion. Especially in his writings he has emphasized religious problems and the meaning of





other phases of culture for religion. Many of his articles and several of his books deal directly with religion. The relation of his thought to personalism appears either explicitly or implicitly in almost all of his writings. His application of his religion to social problems is not directly related to his criticism of personalism, although it makes use of his general religious and philosophical thought.

While Macintosh criticizes the religious and metaphysical as well as the epistemological views of personalism, it is in his critical realism that he attempts to unite his thought and state his philosophical views. For an evaluation of his criticism of personalism one must investigate the relation of the basic principles of critical monistic realism to the epistemological, the metaphysical, and the religious views of personalism.

## 2. Previous related treatments

A complete study has never been made of Macintosh's criticism of personalism, although the controversy between him and the personalists has continued over a period of several years. Certain points, for example, the meaning of "monism" in his epistemology,<sup>1</sup> his treatment of theology as an empirical science,<sup>2</sup> and his criticism of one personalistic solution of the problem

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1. Knudson, POP, 101-102. (Abbreviations are interpreted in the bibliography.)

2. Knudson, DOG, 127, 131.





of evil,<sup>3</sup> have been examined; but critical realism and personalism both require a more extensive investigation of the relations between their positions. A significant contribution to this relatively unexplored area was made recently.<sup>4</sup> Bertocci's critical investigations will not soon be surpassed, although they are limited to expounding and criticizing Macintosh's epistemology. A more exhaustive study of Macintosh's criticism of personalism in particular is one of the needs of present philosophy.

Personalism has been examined by critical realists whose philosophical views are similar to Macintosh's.<sup>5</sup> A personalistic examination of Macintosh's criticism of personalism, however, is needed to sharpen further certain issues between these two great schools of American philosophy.

### 3. Organization of this study

The first task in this dissertation, which is directed toward this goal, is to locate Macintosh's thought in relation to certain points in the historical development of realism. The following chapter, "Development of Realism," is designed to do this. Macintosh's realism, however, differs from other systems of realism. In order

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3. Brightman, POR, 266-267, and Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>.

4. See Bertocci, Art.(1943), and Art.(1944). Melzer's dissertation, ECM, contains an exposition of Macintosh's thought and some critical comments about it.

5. See, for example, Ross, PPE.





to bring out certain distinctive features of his thought, Chapter III is devoted to his doctrine of values, his doctrine of the self, the significance of religion for his realism and of realism for his religion, and a statement of the present influence of his thought.

The next important problem is the contrast between personalistic and realistic epistemology. Its empirical method and its epistemological dualism make personalistic epistemology important in this relation. A study of these two characteristics of personalistic epistemology and an investigation of the monistic epistemology of Macintosh's realism prepare for an evaluation of the explicit points in Macintosh's criticism of personalistic epistemology.

The last major part of this dissertation deals with certain metaphysical and religious problems related to Macintosh's criticism of personalism. An idealistic metaphysics is a special target for a realistic critic of personalism. But what is involved in this critic's attack? Macintosh and personalists come closer together in their ideas of a personal God than at any other point. Here the special problem is the relation of their ideas of God to their epistemological and metaphysical views. The differences between their views on the problem of evil emphasize the differences between the metaphysical views of Macintosh and personalists, as well as the





differences between empirical and more rationalistic personalists. These investigations show the distinctive characteristics of empirical personalism and bring the study of Macintosh's criticism of personalism to its summary and conclusions.





## CHAPTER II

### DEVELOPMENT OF REALISM

The purpose of this chapter is to show the relation of Macintosh's thought to certain points in the historical development of realism. "Realism" and "realistic" are used with various meanings. In literary and popular usage they often refer to what is not imaginary or illusory. Calhoun describes this meaning of realism:

... the temper of one who is critical and level-headed, rather than wishful and heedless or visionary in his dealings with life; accustomed to distinguish between fact and fancy, and seeking to be guided, as far as possible, by disciplined inference from fact ... <sup>1</sup>

Although this popular meaning creeps into the thought of many philosophers, metaphysical realism means that the nature of being is not qualitatively like idea, and epistemological realism means that the object of knowledge is not dependent on its being known. In the history of philosophy metaphysical realism appears as an antithesis to idealism. The basic meaning of philosophical realism in metaphysics is that the nature of being is not qualitatively like idea.

Realism has appeared in various forms in the history of philosophy. An acute conflict over realism, in the

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1. In Macintosh (ed.), RR, 195.





sense of belief in the objective reality of universals, occupied a center of philosophical controversy during the heyday of scholasticism. This realism was closely associated with a devout interest in religion and the doctrines of the Church; and such realism still survives. With the subsequent development of the sciences another stream of interest in realism began. It is illustrated by Scottish realism, neo- and critical realism, and modern naturalism. Macintosh's religious philosophy is an example of realism based both on a sincere and profound interest in religion and on an appreciation of the scientific method and insights. The relation of Macintosh's thought to the historical development of realism may be seen by examining certain points about these great expressions of realism.

### 1. Realism of universals

In the Middle Ages one of the problems of philosophy was the controversy over nominalism and realism. Are universals merely names, or are they objectively real? Boethius saw the problem in his day and expressed his view in his commentary on Porphyry:

... genera and species are in individuals, but they are thought universals; and species must be considered to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of individuals unlike in number, and genus the thought collected from the likeness of species.<sup>2</sup>

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2. See McKeon (ed.), SMP, I, 97.





During the Middle Ages the controversy became acute.

Scholasticism and the realism of that period were strongly influenced by the predominant impact of the thought of Plato and Aristotle upon medieval philosophy. The Platonic realists, for example, asserted extreme realism--universals are real prior to things, universalia sunt realia ante res. Although John Scotus Erigena has been called "a momentary spark of light in the medieval darkness," <sup>3</sup> Anselm was the outstanding proponent of Platonic realism. Aristotelian realism is a more moderate realism. It developed especially after the rediscovery of Aristotle facilitated by Arabian philosophy. Aristotelian realism takes the form universalia sunt realia in rebus. This formula finds expression in the idea of the essence of things held by thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. Opposed to both Platonic and Aristotelian realism was the view that universals are merely names. Nominalism, universalia sunt realia post res and hence universalia sunt nomina, was taught and used to interpret the Trinity by Roscellinus and advocated by William of Occam, famous for "Occam's razor"--entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.

This controversy, which sets the stage for the philosophy of the enlightenment, illustrates a peculiar kind of realism, a realism of universals, which is based

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3. Thilly, HOP, 166.





on the influence of Plato and Aristotle and on the relation of reason to the doctrine of the Church, by which the reality of objects of faith was maintained. Although Roscellinus used nominalism to interpret the doctrine of the Trinity, the orthodox dogma was that based on Platonic realism; universals, like the Trinity, were not merely names but were objectively real. The predominant influence of Platonic-Aristotelian thought and interest in the religious and Church dogmas of the period were significant factors in this realism of universals.

## 2. Anti-idealistic realism

Another form of realism is the common-sense philosophy of the Scottish school. Thomas Reid, its most important representative, attempted "to return to the naïve convictions of the plain man."<sup>4</sup> His thought has been regarded as "a reaction against the idealism of Berkeley and the skepticism of Hume."<sup>5</sup> In the conclusion of his Inquiry into the Human Mind Reid advises:

... admit the existence of what we see and feel as a first principle, as well as the existence of things whereof we are conscious ... take our notions of the qualities of body, from the testimony of our senses ... and our notions of our sensations, from the testimony of consciousness.<sup>6</sup>

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4. Macintosh, POK, 213.

5. Philly, HOP, 363.

6. Reid, WOR, I, 433.





This Scottish realism illustrates an attempt to be scientific. It shows the basis of realism in immediate certainty of common sense, provided here by sensation and serving as a criterion of truth. A later "critical" realist, like Reid interested in both religion and science,<sup>7</sup> regards the usage of common language, so "remarkably followed" by Reid, as proving "in the end a will-o'-the-wisp, leading our philosopher whither no discreet thinker will care to follow him."<sup>8</sup>

Anti-idealistic realism in recent philosophy deserves further attention. It is illustrated by the neo-realism of Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperell Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and Edward Gleason Spaulding, and the critical realism of Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James Bissett Pratt, Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars, and C. A. Strong. Modern anti-idealistic realism also includes naturalism in metaphysics--in short, any theory of reality which denies that it is of the quality of idea.

The development of this anti-idealistic realism is closely related to modern science. Neo-realists recognize

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7. See discussion by Bewkes in Bixler and others, NRE, 11. Cf. also Macintosh's statement that science is "simply common sense become sufficiently critical for the more specialized purposes," Macintosh, POK, 325.

8. Macintosh, POK, 216. Cf. keeping "closer ... to the conservative, critical revision of common sense ... characteristic of scientific ways of thinking," *ibid.*, 329.





that the progress of the natural sciences has influenced their metaphysical views directly and profoundly.<sup>9</sup> The development of anti-idealistic realism in its relation to science is evident. Larrabee, in tracing the development of one type of anti-idealistic realism in America,<sup>10</sup> observes that at one period in its history science was without any close relation to the prevailing philosophical tendencies. Anti-idealistic realism became an historical synthesis of science and philosophy. Deism was the previous initial antithetical reaction to the development of the natural sciences in many areas; the collapse of supernaturalism provided the framework for the heyday of this anti-idealistic realism.

But the development of this realism is more significantly related to interest in science. Realists believe that the empirical method of science is realistic. One of the outstanding characteristics of neo- and critical realism and especially of the modern development of naturalism is the stress on the empirical method. Krikorian, for example, asserts that the naturalistic method "in seeking an understanding of the world is the empirical method of science as against allegedly superior

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9. See Marvin in Holt and others, NR, 84. Cf. also Larrabee in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 325, and Perry's assertion that "naturalism derives credit from the triumphs of science, idealism from the loyalties and hopes of religion," Perry, RPT, 39.

10. See his article, "Naturalism in America," in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 319-353.





methods,"<sup>11</sup> and regards "the universal applicability of the experimental method"<sup>12</sup> as basic in his naturalistic method. But the empirical method does not require an anti-idealistic philosophy. The empirical method may be used by idealists as well as by realists and naturalists.<sup>13</sup>

The basic meaning of the empirical method in naturalism is illustrated by the requirement that mind be analyzed as behavior, because "behavior is the only aspect of mind which is open to experimental examination."<sup>14</sup> Contrast with this the method of the empirical personalists who describe experience as consisting of our entire conscious life.<sup>15</sup> Empirical personalists do not minimize the place and the importance of scientific developments; they only refuse to limit all consciousness to and define all experience as the results of any one or even all of the natural sciences. They merely require that the discoveries of every and of all science be related to and interpreted in connection with the rest of science and of all conscious awareness, rather than erected as a standard by which all must be measured. In this respect empirical personalists require the same kind of critical testing of the sciences that Hegel demands of

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11. Krikorian (ed.), NHS, vii.

12. Ibid., 242.

13. For a more detailed discussion of the empirical method in personalism see Chapter IV, *infra*.

14. Krikorian in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 252.

15. See, for example, Brightman, POR, 1.





religion, for example, in his subordination of it to philosophy, especially in the first part of his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.

The empirical emphasis in anti-idealistic realism results from an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of abstract idealism. A naturalist, for example, claims "a willingness, even an eagerness, to face all the facts in any situation with a minimum of distortion by personal desires or prejudices." <sup>16</sup> Herein he gains a distinct advantage over an abstract, rationalistic idealism. But this insistence on impartial and critical consideration of actual experience is a trumpet call already sounded and obeyed by empirical personalists. The validity of "realism" in this sense is derived principally from the meaning which characterizes its use in popular literature, as critical and guided by facts. This, however, is as much a trait of empirical personalism as it is of metaphysical realism.

In fact, personalistic idealists are better equipped than metaphysical realists to avoid the dangers of being "unrealistic" in this sense. The naturalist, for example, accepts natural science and regards it metaphysically: "there is no supernature, no transcendental world. Beyond nature there is more nature." <sup>17</sup> He says that nature is enough, as if applying Occam's razor to all else. But

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16. Larrabee in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 319.

17. Krikorian in *ibid.*, 243.





on what basis does he make this assertion?

Although there is great difference among the realists, the failure to take the idealistic step to a position which recognizes the validity of natural sciences without confining metaphysics to their data alone appears to rest, at least partially, on psychological factors, from which the realist alleges a "realistic" escape. The relation of psychological factors and conditions to logical truth is not yet completely and clearly determined, but this fact does not excuse a confusion of them. Santayana, for example, says that realism is "the union of two instinctive assumptions [that knowledge is transitive and that it is relevant], necessary to the validity of knowledge."<sup>18</sup> By referring to anything as instinctive one does not condemn it; but unless it is more than instinctive, it still lacks verification. Much anti-idealistic realism rests on this basis in its failure to justify its acceptance of natural science as final and in its limitation of itself to a realistic metaphysics.<sup>19</sup>

One of the special problems that metaphysical realists face is the status of values. Among realists

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18. In Drake and others, ECR, 168. Cf. sustaining "our instinctive faith," Trueblood, LOB, 58; common man as "undoubtedly ... a philosophical realist," Trueblood, KOG, 12-13; and Bewkes's idea that a sound "instinct" is to "begin with simple realism," in Bixler and others, NRE, 10.

19. Cf. Macintosh's statement that "the instinctive realistic belief of mankind is ... a realistic epistemological monism," Macintosh, POK, 52; also cited in Bertocci, Art.(1943), 165.





there is wide difference of opinion about the relation of values, especially of religious values, to their methodology. However, all anti-idealistic realists either openly discard or rule out by neglect or redefine the distinctively religious values and ideals and such concepts as purpose, especially the whole conscious person as freely and purposively striving toward self-imposed ideals, to fit their underlying realism. Lepley, one outstanding naturalist, has given an admirable discussion of value but omits practically all reference to religious values.<sup>20</sup> Another naturalist asserts that "a premature naturalism or antiquated religion or both"<sup>21</sup> have been responsibility for much of the difficulty between naturalism and religion. He asserts that naturalism is not hostile to religion and that agnosticism came "from philosophical traditions that were not attached, except by historical accident, to the naturalistic approach."<sup>22</sup>

When the further claim is made that the assertions of naturalism "would remain intact if God were discovered to exist, just as they remain intact when any other existence is discovered,"<sup>23</sup> either the nature of God

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20. Lepley, VOV. See also Brightman's review of it in Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, 1945.

21. Lamprecht in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 17.

22. Ibid., 28. Cf. his review of Macintosh (ed.), RR, in which he says that it "is only an accident of the history of ideas that religious belief has at times seemed to belong peculiarly to idealism," Art. (1933), 246.

23. Lamprecht in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 36.





must be understood naturalistically or the position of the metaphysical naturalists must be modified. Lamprecht inclines toward the former alternative. He explains mind, purposiveness, or "any other thing or event or quality" in the same way in which he "would explain cycloses or wars or northern lights." <sup>24</sup> A God outside of this natural world is for him one of the "deplorable occasions for obscurantism." The religious values which naturalists thus attempt to conserve, while perhaps jeopardized by an abstract idealism, are consistently maintained in empirical personalism without being distorted to fit a Procrustean bed of natural science or any other isolated kind of experience. The naturalists are not the only "open-minded and sensitive" thinkers for whom the religious quest "must forever remain a piece of 'unfinished business'" <sup>25</sup>--eine unendliche Aufgabe.

### 3. Macintosh's religious realism

Throughout its history realism has been associated with religion in various ways. Macintosh is a realist whose thought significantly illustrates one relation between religion and realism. While he is a critical realist, his special interest in religion and the particular form of his religious realism make his religious thought worthy of special attention. In his realism

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24. Lamprecht in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 20.

25. Ibid., 38.



that he understood naturalism as the position of  
the metaphysical naturalists must be modified. I propose  
to include among the former eliminativists, the religious  
naturalists, or "naturalists of the second kind" or  
"qualitatively" in the same way in which he would explain  
epiphenomenalism as a form of naturalism. A good example  
of this naturalist view is for him of the "epiphenomenal  
occasionalism for consciousness." The religious naturalists  
naturalists thus attempt to preserve, this position  
formulated by an abstract idealism, are consistently  
maintained in empirical naturalism almost being  
historical to the phenomenon and of natural science  
or any other isolated kind of experience. The naturalists  
are not the only "post-positivist and scientific" thinkers for  
show the religious naturalists "what is wrong with a view of  
'scientific naturalism' as a scientific naturalism."

### 3. Scientific naturalism

Throughout the history of naturalism has been associated  
with religion in various ways. Naturalism is a position  
whose thought significantly differs from the religion  
between religion and naturalism. While it is a critical  
view, the special interest in religion and the  
particular form of the religious naturalists and the  
thought working of special attention. In this position

there is a combination of many of the central interests and certain fundamental points of realism already observed.

He is a man of deep religious appreciation and sincere respect for the values of dynamic religious faith. This characteristic of his thought gives his realism a certain similarity to the interest in religion basic in the realism of universals. Macintosh also has high respect for science. This makes his realism similar to much in the later development of anti-idealistic realism.

Macintosh's own description of what he means by religious realism provides a good approach to his thought:

Religious realism ... means centrally the view that a religious Object, such as may appropriately be called God, exists independently of our consciousness thereof, and is yet related to us in such a way that through reflection on experience in general and religious experience in particular, and without any dependence upon the familiar arguments of epistemological idealism, it is possible for us to gain either (as some would maintain) adequately verified knowledge or (as others would be content to affirm) a practically valuable and theoretically permissible faith not only that that religious Object exists but also, within whatever limits, as to what its nature is.<sup>26</sup>

This statement, as well as Macintosh's description of his own intellectual development,<sup>27</sup> clearly indicates his rejection of epistemological idealism. His central

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26. In Macintosh (ed.), RR, v.

27. See "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy," in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 277-319.



there is a combination of many of the central interests  
and certain fundamental points of realism already  
observed.

It is a man of deep religious conviction and  
almost respect for the values of spiritual religion.  
This characteristic of his thought gives his  
realism a certain similarity to the interest in religion  
basic in the realism of antiquity. He also has  
high respect for science. This makes his realism similar  
to much in the later development of anti-realistic  
realism.

Realism's own description of what he means by  
religious realism provides a good approach to his thought:

Religious realism ... means basically the  
view that a religious object, such as may  
appropriately be called God, exists independent-  
ly of our consciousness thereof, and is  
not related to us in such a way that through  
reflection on experience in general and  
religious experience in particular, and  
without any dependence upon the feelings  
or emotions of epistemological idealists, it is  
possible for us to gain either (a) some  
world knowledge (epistemological knowledge)  
or (b) the world as it is (in itself) a  
practically valuable and knowable  
object exists but also, although never limited,  
as to what its nature is.

This statement, as well as Realism's description of  
his own intellectual development, clearly indicates  
his rejection of epistemological idealism. His approach

Dr. H. Reichenbach (ed.), *Philosophy*, p. 10.  
Dr. H. Reichenbach, *Philosophy*, p. 10.  
Paris (ed.), *Philosophy*, p. 10.

objection here, like that of many other realists, is to the abstractness he sees in idealism, to its "unrealistic" character.

Much idealism has indeed been abstract, but no kind of thinking is condemned by attacks on its worst forms. In his reaction to Hegel, for example, "I could not accept a timeless Absolute as a satisfactory substitute for the living God of religious faith,"<sup>28</sup> Macintosh discloses his failure to grasp fully the empirical character of Hegel's thought. The assertion that the dialectical method in its Hegelian form "projects a synthesis of supposed contradictions"<sup>29</sup> further shows Macintosh's lack of understanding of Hegel's empiricism. Macintosh's interpretation of Hegel's reference to the owl of Minerva which takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering,<sup>30</sup> to refer to the "decline of religious experience and so of religious revelation in the experiential sense"<sup>31</sup> is another indication of his lack of insight into some of the central issues of Hegel's thought. Macintosh's limited concept of reason<sup>32</sup> is reflected in his criticism of what he regards as an abstract view of reason in the thought of Hegel. Macintosh's rejection of idealism is more fully examined later in this dissertation,<sup>33</sup> but the importance of his revolt

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28. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 295.

29. Macintosh, PRK, 372.

30. Hegel, GPR, 37.

31. Macintosh, PRK, 219.

32. See Chapter VI, *infra*.

33. See Chapter V, *infra*.



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Hegelism's lack of understanding of Hegel's emphasis.  
Hegelism's interpretation of Hegel's reference to the  
end of history which takes the final step from the spheres  
of nature and history, <sup>22</sup> is taken to the "realm of  
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reflected in his criticism of what he regards as abstract  
view of reason in the thought of Hegel. Hegelism's  
rejection of idealism is based on its limited idea of  
this dimension, <sup>25</sup> but the importance of his revolt

20. Hegelism in form (ed.), GAT, I, 325.  
21. Hegelism, 282, 27.  
22. Hegel, 28, 27.  
23. Hegelism, 282, 27.  
24. See Chapter VI, 102.  
25. See Chapter V, 102.

against idealism for his realism is not to be denied.

Macintosh's religious realism, however, cannot be adequately understood by considering it only as a reaction against idealism. His appreciation of values is a positive basis of his realism. The experience of prayer in his early life,<sup>34</sup> for example, illustrates the importance of religious values for Macintosh. Yet he speaks of a reaction against pragmatism in the interest of "the element of truth in the older intellectualism."<sup>35</sup> Seeing this problem, he wrote to G. B. Foster in 1912 as follows:

Are you interested in the new realism? I am, I think it needs criticism, but I believe it has an important contribution to make to theology which its representatives do not begin to suspect. The hopeful movements in contemporary thought seem to me to be a scientific pragmatism, the emphasis on mysticism, the vitalism of recent thinkers ... and the new realism.<sup>36</sup>

Another important factor in Macintosh's religious realism is his interest in science. He recognizes the procedure of science as the best guide for both metaphysics and epistemology.<sup>37</sup> In his Theology as an Empirical Science he attempts to construct a truly scientific theory of divine reality.

While his interest in and approach to the problems of philosophy through values reveal the most rewarding

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34. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 285.

35. See *ibid.*, 302.

36. Quoted in *ibid.*, 304n. (In all cases italics are retained as they appear in the source quoted.)

37. Macintosh, POK, 69.





avenue to the solution of the problems of metaphysics, even Macintosh's use of science and scientific verification limits his thought,<sup>38</sup> much as the realistic interpretation of the empirical method makes science mean realism to naturalists and other realists. When Macintosh proposes the procedure of finding "in any realistic experiential way whatever we can discover about any reality that has the marks of divinity, and then see what can be done toward thinking into unity these different aspects of divine reality,"<sup>39</sup> the question must immediately be decided whether "realistic" is here being used in the literary sense or whether it refers to a metaphysics already determined that limits the scope of "experiential." Furthermore, in his solution of the problem of religious knowledge,<sup>40</sup> for example, Macintosh goes beyond the scientifically verifiable to that which can be at the most reasonable, practically defensible faith.<sup>41</sup> Thus ultimately a leap is made from immediate certainty to faith.

Every experience actually is composed, however, of both an element of that which may be verified and an element of faith. The inclusive, coherent interpretation of all experience requires a recognition of this fact of faith in all experience. One must accept science for

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38. See *infra*, 50, 94.

39. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 314.

40. See Macintosh, PRK, Chapters XX and XXI.

41. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 307.



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limits his thought,<sup>38</sup> much as the scientific investigation  
of the empirical method makes science seem confined to  
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the procedure of finding "in any realistic experimental  
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faith in all experience. One must accept science for

38. See MacIntyre, *Science and Philosophy*, pp. 1-2.  
39. MacIntyre, *Science and Philosophy*, pp. 1-2.  
40. MacIntyre, *Science and Philosophy*, pp. 1-2.  
41. MacIntyre, *Science and Philosophy*, pp. 1-2.

all that it has to offer, yet recognize both the verifiable and the element of faith in even scientific knowledge and refuse to limit verification to what is conterminous with natural science. This means that the distinctly religious experience par excellence, for example, is not absolutely different in verifiability from any other experience. In other words, no monistic epistemology requires that the nature of the object be the basis of verification for the empirical personalists. The test of verifiability is coherence and the inclusive nature of experience itself. Instead of one epistemology for scientific knowledge and another for religious knowledge, the attempt to formulate a coherent epistemology and metaphysics based on all experience is the hope of the philosophical world.

Both realism and idealism have much to contribute to this adventure. A deeper appreciation of realism--of the realism of universals, of anti-idealistic realism, and of Macintosh's religious realism--provides the basis for both a better understanding of Macintosh's criticism of personalism and a more adequate foundation on which to formulate empirical personalism.





### CHAPTER III

#### MACINTOSH'S REALISM IN RELIGION

Macintosh's realism is characterized by certain distinctive features as well as similarity to other historical forms of realism. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate some of the distinctive features of Macintosh's realism.

Two concepts call for special attention, namely, his doctrine of values and his doctrine of the self. Distinctive features of Macintosh's thought also appear in the discussion of two questions about the relation of his religion and his realism, namely, what religion does to his realism and what realism does to his religion. A suggestion of the present influence of his thought brings this chapter on Macintosh's realism in religion to a close.

##### 1. His doctrine of values

Macintosh's entire thought shows his interest in and attempt to explain values. However, when the meaning of his concept of values is investigated, a real problem appears. He says, for example, that ultimate values may be distinguished from instrumental values by immediate experience, by "direct intuition"--"in immediate experience of reality we may ... intuitively perceive



## MACINTOSH'S REALISM IN RELIGION

Macintosh's realism is characterized by certain distinctive features as well as similarity to other historical forms of realism. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate some of the distinctive features of Macintosh's realism.

Two concepts call for special attention, namely, his doctrine of values and his doctrine of the self. Distinctive features of Macintosh's thought also appear in the discussion of two questions about the relation of his religion and his realism. Namely, what religion does to his realism and what realism does to his religion. A suggestion of the general influence of his thought brings into the picture Macintosh's realism in religion to a degree.

## 1. His doctrine of values

Macintosh's entire thought about his realism in and attempt to explain values. Namely, when the meaning of his concept of values is given, namely, a real religion appears. He says, for example, that his realism is not the distinguished from intellectual values by the appearance, by "direct intuition" in himself. The appearance of reality as it is... is immediately perceived

the absolute and abiding truth of a judgment." <sup>1</sup>  
Likewise by right religious adjustment one may gain  
"a solid core of knowledge at the heart of his religious  
thinking." <sup>2</sup> His idea of immediate experience and  
knowledge is part of his monistic epistemology, <sup>3</sup> and his  
emphasis on the immediate experience of values illustrates  
the influence of his epistemology on his doctrine of values.

Macintosh also writes frequently about eternal  
(absolute) values:

... there are ideals which are eternally  
valid, ideals which are valid without regard  
to what the time is, for the reason that  
they are valid at all times. ... Valid ideals  
or values are proper (i. e., either rationally  
permissible or morally imperative) ends of  
pursuit or of realization for some rationally  
conscious beings ... with due regard to what  
is naturally possible and to the comparative  
importance or imperativeness of other valid  
values or ideals.<sup>4</sup>

The validity of these eternal values, however, cannot  
depend on immediate experience; they are independently  
valid at all times.

In fact, Macintosh recognizes that ideals as such  
are not realities or existences but validities or  
meanings; they are not what is "but only what ought to  
be." <sup>5</sup> He refers to the Divine, for example, as not  
existing but as that which "subsists as an eternally

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1. Macintosh, POK, 453.

2. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 258. See  
also Macintosh, Art.(1933)<sup>2</sup>, 301, and Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>,  
532.

3. See Chapter V, *infra*.

4. Macintosh in Roberts and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 242.

5. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 138.







transcendent Ideal." <sup>6</sup> This interpretation of ideals is very similar to the meaning of ideals as distinguished from values by certain personalists. <sup>7</sup> Macintosh, however, does not make a distinction between ideals and values. <sup>8</sup> He speaks of values as he does of ideals, referring to that which does not exist as a reality but is "only what ought to be." His propositions of faith for eternal life illustrate values in this sense. He says that eternal life is "life lived for eternal values" <sup>9</sup> and gives some of these propositions as follows:

... that there are eternal values; that these values are potential in and imperative for personality in general; that the eternal values are actualized in God's character and will, thus constituting the eternal life of God, but that this eternal will of God is not fully realized in the objective world as yet. <sup>10</sup>

Here the concept is clearly of values as absolute, as ideals in the personalistic sense.

Macintosh also refers to values as experiences, as what have been called value-processes. <sup>11</sup> This emphasis

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6. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 143. Note also Alexander's reference to ideas of deity and God as the universe tending toward deity, so that God "as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it," STD, II, 365.

7. See infra, 197; cf. also Brightman, POR, 88-91.

8. See, for example, Macintosh, PRK, 8. This is shown also by the marginal notations in his copy of Brightman, RV. Opposite the definition of a true value as "what is liked, desired, or approved in the light of our whole experience and our highest ideals (15, underlined by Macintosh as indicated) he adds "what ought to be liked."

9. Macintosh, Art. (1938) <sup>1</sup>, 169.

10. Macintosh in Robert and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 241.

11. See Bertocci, Art. (1944), 49.



transcendent ideal. This interpretation of idealism is very similar to the meaning of ideal as distinguished from values by certain personalists. MacIntyre, however, does not make a distinction between ideals and values. He speaks of values as he does of ideals, referring to that which does not exist as a reality but is "only what ought to be." His propositions of value for eternal life illustrate values in this sense. He says that eternal life is "life lived for eternal values" and gives some of these propositions as follows:

... that there are eternal values that these values are potential in and imperative for personality in general; that the eternal values are actualized in God's character and will, thus constituting the eternal life of God; but that this eternal will is not yet fully realized in the objective world as yet.

Here the concept is clearly of values as absolute, as

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MacIntyre also refers to values as experiential, as

what have been called value-propositions. This emphasis

6. MacIntyre in Newton (ed.), 141, 142. He also states MacIntyre's reference to "the life of love and joy as the universal condition toward which we tend" as "an actual existence in which we are living." He also states that we never attain it. 142, 143.
7. See letter, July 27, 1934, MacIntyre, 108-11.
8. See, for example, MacIntyre, 124, 125. What is shown also by the method mentioned in his copy of "The Christian, St. Augustine" on definition of a true value as "that which is loved, desired, or approved in the light of our whole existence and our highest ideals" is, as indicated by MacIntyre as indicated, "what we ought to be." 142.
9. MacIntyre, 141 (1934), 142.
10. MacIntyre in Newton (ed.), 141, 142.
11. See MacIntyre, 141 (1934), 142.

is supported by his empirical method and is illustrated in his representational pragmatism. On one hand, Macintosh criticizes intellectualists for overlooking the relation of all meanings and values to purpose; on the other hand, he objects to the attempt of hyper-pragmatists to confine values to "the multitude of additional special pragmatic meanings." <sup>12</sup> His own idea of experienced values is indicated, for example, in his description of religion as "a kind of adjustment to Reality for the realization of values." <sup>13</sup> By "value" he says he means:

... that special kind of quality which things, persons, or processes have by virtue of their relation to some end-directed process.<sup>14</sup>

Values which are realized or experienced are the values which are empirically significant in Macintosh's realism. These are the values which are really important for the contribution his thought makes to the development of the empirical method.

The relation between these two concepts of value, namely that of absolute values and that of experienced values, illustrates a central problem in Macintosh's realism. Macintosh affirms values in both senses.

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12. Macintosh, POK, 429.

13. Macintosh, PFW, 4.

14. Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 42. Macintosh's idea of value is reflected in the marginal note in his copy of Brightman, RV, 16, that "a more realistic or objective, and less subjective" definition of value is needed, referring to his own POK, 328.





The criticism stands, however, that the empirical and imperfect processes can only be described as "divine-tending" or "ideal-realizing," in the sense of participating in, or being "potentially, the ideal." <sup>15</sup> Experienced values are not absolute values, at least not merely as they are experienced are they absolute values.

Macintosh's concept of revelation illustrates the limited way in which he brings these two ideas of values together. A "special general revelation," he says, is:

... the manifestation or apprehension of absolute, or universally and permanently valid value or values, that is to say, of an ideal or ideals not only objectively valid but worthy of all persons' absolute self-dedication and devotion.<sup>16</sup>

The relation of experienced values to ideals which are worthy of absolute devotion, however, is still a problem. Actually Macintosh's realism leaves unanswered the question, "If there is a monistic intuition of perfect values, what is the status of those values?" <sup>17</sup>

In fact, these two kinds of values are reflected in Macintosh's ideas of fundamental and experimental

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15. Bertocci, Art.(1944), 47.

16. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 25. The notation in his copy of Brightman, RV, 237, also shows Macintosh's idea of value:

Worship is a relationship  
and process.

God is a being, a Reality.

But Brightman includes both under "values."  
(Value is quality).

17. Bertocci, Art.(1944), 47.





religion. Fundamental religion is "aspiration or devotion toward what is felt to be the supreme ideal or value." <sup>18</sup> It is the religion of absolute values. Experimental religion, however, is the empirical experience of "conscious dependence," experienced values. Macintosh's idea of the relation of these two kinds of religion is that "experimental religion at its best ... seeks and must seek to be instrumental to fundamental religion as end." <sup>19</sup> Ideally experimental religion and experienced values are instrumental to fundamental religion and absolute values.

Macintosh's idea of the relation of absolute to experienced values and of fundamental to experimental religion illustrates the kind of unity that characterizes his entire thought. The two concepts of value, for example, do not contradict each other. They are logically consistent, and Macintosh accepts them both. Yet in Macintosh's thought there is nothing to bring them together into any systematic unity. For him the lack of coherence, however, is not objectionable as long as there is consistency. Macintosh's doctrine of values, while bringing out certain distinctive features of his thought, thus illustrates the same loyalty to consistency

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18. Macintosh, PFW, 3. Note also his description of fundamental religion as "devotion to the divine Ideal," GWW, 58.

19. Macintosh, PFW, 3. See also Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 35-36.



religion. Fundamental religion is "exemplified in  
 devotion toward what is felt to be the highest ideal  
 of value." It is the relation of absolute values.  
 Exemplified religion, however, is the practical experience  
 of "constant dependence," experienced values. Reinhold's  
 idea of the relation of these two kinds of religion is  
 that "exemplified religion is the end ... which and  
 that ends to be instrumental in fundamental religion as  
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 values are instrumental to fundamental religion and  
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 example, do not stand apart each other. They are inseparably  
 connected, and Reinhold would not say, let us  
 Reinhold's thought seems to be that the two  
 together into any systematic unity. For the two lack  
 of coherence, however, is not systematic as far as  
 there is consistency. Reinhold's notion of values,  
 while relating and relating these two concepts and his  
 thought, thus illustrates the same unity as consistency

10. Reinhold, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 11.
11. Reinhold, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 11.
12. Reinhold, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 11.
13. Reinhold, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 11.
14. Reinhold, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 11.

and the same failure to appreciate the other aspects of coherence which appear in his epistemology.<sup>20</sup>

## 2. His doctrine of the self

Macintosh's doctrine of the self also brings out distinctive features of his realism. Regardless of how values are explained, a self, a conscious person, is necessary. Without persons there can be no values:

It is vain to imagine that the "values" of individual personality will be conserved, if the individual himself is to disappear and exist no longer.<sup>21</sup>

Macintosh's idea of God, as well as his doctrines of salvation and immortality, illustrates the religious importance of the self. He says that to reduce God to process, for example, is "to give up the idea of God as creatively active subject."<sup>22</sup> His empirical method requires a personal God to explain the experiences of religious values.<sup>23</sup>

The subject of consciousness for Macintosh is a self which is not a mere process. He holds that the self "persists through the process and is that which is aware of the process."<sup>24</sup> Macintosh's empirical method and his appreciation of religious values lead him to conclude that the self cannot be adequately explained

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20. See Chapter VI, *infra*.

21. Macintosh, Art.(1920), 571. Cf. Macintosh's view of immortality, Chapter IX, *infra*.

22. Macintosh, PRK, 377.

23. See Chapter VIII, *infra*.

24. Macintosh in Wieman and other, ITG, 25.





as a mere flux. He believes that there is "more in ourselves at any moment than our activities at that moment." <sup>25</sup> The self is "a continuing self-identical subject which endures through all changing mental states." <sup>26</sup> It is not mere process.

Macintosh's realism is further illustrated in his concept of memory. In memory the self is not passive but creatively active. Its activity, however, is not an activity which imports the past into the present. The activity of memory, rather, creates "representational elements in the content of the present experience which stand for past sense-elements." <sup>27</sup> Macintosh's idea of this "representing" activity of the self illustrates the way in which his empirical method and his attempt to explain experiences of values carry him beyond epistemological monism. <sup>28</sup> Monistically there can be no representation, for representation requires a dualism of the present presentation in or state of consciousness and the idea to which it is referred by a conscious self. If there is no dualism, there is no representation but only presentation. Macintosh's realism is distinctive in his explanation of memory as representation and not merely as presentation.

When Macintosh seeks to bring together the categories

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- 25. Macintosh, ROC, 252.
  - 26. Macintosh, PRK, 377.
  - 27. Macintosh, POK, 313.
  - 28. See Chapter IV, *infra*.





of activity and substance and to explain the self as "a moderate, not too one-sided activism,"<sup>29</sup> however, his idea of the self illustrates another distinctive feature of his realism. Macintosh seeks to be a critical realistic monist not only in his epistemology but also in his metaphysics. He regards metaphysical dualism and both materialistic and idealistic (or mental) monism as inadequate and attempts to formulate a critical monism in metaphysics.<sup>30</sup> His description of the self as a moderate activism reveals his unsatisfactory metaphysical dualism.<sup>31</sup> To the extent that his doctrine of the self results from his empirical method and his unbiased attempt to explain experience, however, it is both religiously adequate and scientifically permissible. The doctrine of the self on which Macintosh's religious thought actually rests and which is important when freed from his epistemological and metaphysical views is a personal self as "a reality which is not reducible to its states and activities."<sup>32</sup> The self of Macintosh's empirical method and religious faith is "a unitary self,"<sup>33</sup> although monistic epistemology and dualistic metaphysical realism do not require or support this doctrine of the self. The unity of the self is not a

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29. Macintosh, ROC, 252.

30. See *infra*, 141.

31. See Chapter VII, *infra*.

32. Macintosh, PFW, 264.

33. See Brightman, Art.(1938), 138, and Art.(1939)<sup>1</sup>, 133-138.





datum of the immediate experience of epistemological monism but requires reference, which is epistemologically dualistic. A conscious unitary self also is not to be explained adequately for the experiences of religious values, for example, by regarding it as the activity of something "less than mind and more than matter."

### 3. What religion does to his realism

Other distinctive features of Macintosh's realism appear in the relation of his realism to his religion. Macintosh has described his own position as "realistic religious epistemology and metaphysically defensible empirical theology."<sup>34</sup> In his thought the influence of religion on his realism is seen in his empirical method and his idea of a personal God. There is nothing in realism that would require either of these characteristics of Macintosh's thought. Yet Macintosh's empirical method and his idea of a personal God make his religious realism distinctive and show the influence of religion on his realism.

Certain influences of realism on his religion also distinguish his thought. He believes that realism is a philosophical explanation of the objective God of his religious faith and of the compatibility of his religion with science. Each of these contributions of religion and of realism to Macintosh's religious realism merits

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<sup>34</sup>. Macintosh, Art.(1940), 158.





special attention; each reveals distinctive features of Macintosh's realism in religion.

Although one may represent realism as empirical without giving special attention to the experiences of religious values, the particular form of empiricism in Macintosh's religious realism is one of its distinctive features and perhaps one of the most far-reaching contributions of his thought to modern philosophy and religion. For Macintosh empiricism does not mean a confined sense-experience philosophy. His empiricism is much like the empirical method of modern personalism.<sup>35</sup> Macintosh believes that empiricism requires an examination of all kinds of experience, including experiences of religious values, and an attempt to explain all experience as reasonably as possible. Any theory which arbitrarily neglects any kind of experience is dogmatic. Its conclusions are applicable only in those areas to which the neglected experiences have absolutely no relation. Macintosh, however, believes that no experience is so abstract that such dogmatism may be regarded as knowledge. In fact, his view is that religion "does not necessarily involve anything essentially antagonistic to science." <sup>36</sup>

His view of the empirical method as including experiences of all values is a distinctive contribution of religion in his religious realism. Without religion,

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35. See Chapter IV, *infra*. Cf. Macintosh's description of religious realism, cited *supra*, 18.

36. Macintosh, PFW, 4.





realism contains nothing that requires it to be so broadly empirical. Macintosh says that it was in order to be better fitted to deal with intellectual problems of religion that he resolved "to specialize in both natural science and philosophy."<sup>37</sup> He recognizes the influence of his early interest in religion throughout his entire thought and turns to religious realism as a scientific interpretation of his religious faith. The interrelation of all values and Macintosh's idea of a personal God as "a causal Factor also in relation to us and our values"<sup>38</sup> illustrate the importance his empirical method has for his religion. Macintosh's empirical method contributed to his realism by religion, at least in large part, is one of the distinctive features of his realism in religion.

Another contribution of religion to Macintosh's realism is the idea of a personal God. There is nothing in realism as such that leads to belief in a personal God. However, for Macintosh religion and his empirical method support his concept of a personal God. The relation of this idea of God to epistemological and metaphysical realism creates certain problems,<sup>39</sup> but the idea of a personal God is a distinctive feature of Macintosh's realism. Much of the importance of realism

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37. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 290. See *ibid.*, 277-319, especially 289-290. Cf. also *supra*, 20.

38. Macintosh, PFW, 200.

39. See Chapter VIII, *infra*.





in Macintosh's teaching career results from his combination of realism and the idea of a personal God. His emphasis upon right religious adjustment is related to his idea of God as personal and as adequate for worship. The idea of a personal God, which shows the influence of religion on Macintosh's realism, is also closely related to his interest in and contribution to the development of liberal, evangelical theology.<sup>40</sup>

#### 4. What realism does to his religion

For Macintosh realism has also had a significant influence on his religion. His description of his early intellectual development shows his dissatisfaction with idealism.<sup>41</sup> In his criticism of personalism his rejection of the mind of God as "a carry-all in which things can exist as ideas when not so existing in the minds of men" <sup>42</sup> illustrates Macintosh's opinion that the idealistic view of God is inadequate. Macintosh believes that realism gives religion an objective God. He describes his monistic realistic epistemology in religion as follows:

... a theory according to which the Divine may be both directly experienced or in a broad sense of the word perceived, and yet

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40. See Macintosh in Roberts and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 238-254. Cf. Macintosh, Art.(1940)<sup>3</sup>, and Art.(1940)<sup>4</sup>, especially 219. Cf. also his remark about Cell's The Rediscovery of John Wesley, Art.(1935), 387, and his reference to the Methodist tradition, Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 399.

41. See his article in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 277-319.

42. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>5</sup>, 651. Cf. infra, 73.





remain a Reality which does not depend for its existence upon its being thus experienced and recognized by us.<sup>43</sup>

He believes that realism makes his religion objectively valid as well as subjectively satisfying. These distinctive features of Macintosh's realism raise questions about the relations of subjectivity to objectivity and of metaphysical to epistemological realism, which are further investigated later in this dissertation.<sup>44</sup>

Another contribution Macintosh believes his realism makes is that it renders his religion scientific or at least correlates religious thought with scientific method. Theology as an Empirical Science illustrates his attempt to give a scientific description of religious beliefs and practices in the form of scientific laws. Some of these "laws" are especially well stated and are especially valuable for practical religious living. Notice, for example, his law of the development of Christian character:

On condition of continued cultivation of the right religious adjustment, especially when it is so constant and whole-hearted as to lead to the permanent health and healthful activity of Christian life, and when the individual has adequate information for right conduct, God the Holy Spirit produces in him the Christ-like or Christian character, with its habitual readiness and equipment for right action.<sup>45</sup>

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43. Macintosh, PFW, 210.

44. See Chapters VI and VII, *infra*.

45. Macintosh, TES, 149-150.





For Macintosh, scientific theology is possible only if there is monistic realism, although it is not clear that scientific method is necessarily or even usually monistic in epistemology. He believes that dualistic epistemology lacks the essential certainty which he seeks to affirm for his scientific theology and his religious beliefs.<sup>46</sup> His idea of God and his scientific description of religion, however, indicate more clearly the importance of the empirical method than the necessity for any realism or any monism. These distinctive features of Macintosh's realism are significant for his criticism of personalism because they show how his realism is so empirical that, at many points, his method and his results are more personalistic than realistic.

##### 5. His present influence

These are some of the distinctive features of Macintosh's realism in religion, which is becoming quite influential today. Macintosh has been described as "the leader in the attempt to construct a theology of religious experience."<sup>47</sup> He has also been called "one of the most highly respected and influential of American philosophers of religion."<sup>48</sup>

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46. See, however, Chapter VI, *infra*.

47. Miller, *Art.*(1938), 472.

48. Brightman, *Art.*(1941), 53.





The evidence of his influence has not yet appeared extensively in the published writings of other scholars, but it is nevertheless significant in both philosophy and theology. In philosophical circles Macintosh's extensive criticisms of other philosophical positions cannot be overlooked by thinkers whose views differ from his. For this reason almost no philosophical position has completely escaped the influence of his thought.

Macintosh's realism in religion has also a wide influence in theological circles. This influence appears less in the writings of theologians than in the preaching and the religious thought that have been affected by Macintosh's realism. His influence in the world of religion is indicated in print, however, for example, by H. Richard Niebuhr's presentation of The Meaning of Revelation to him and Frank Chamberlain Porter, and by the contributions Macintosh has made to various religious journals and to volumes of religious articles, such as Religious Realism (which he also edited) and Liberal Theology. The Nature of Religious Experience, a volume of essays published and presented in honor of his sixtieth birthday, also shows the present influence of his realism in religion.

Macintosh's extensive influence is due to two





principal ways in which his distinctive realism has been expressed. He has been influential both as a teacher and as a writer. Since he came to Yale University in 1909 his thought has influenced a great number of students. Although few complete disciples of Macintosh's thought have appeared, the thinking of almost all of his students has been significantly affected by his teaching. The lesson he is said to have taught so well has been described as "not any system of theology but the ability to think clearly and logically about religious problems." 49

Macintosh's present influence is due also to his extensive writing, in the form of both books and articles that have appeared in various philosophical and religious journals. One of his books, The Reasonableness of Christianity, and his recent article on theology and metaphysics 50 have been translated into German. Several of his books were first presented as lectures.

Although his style sometimes obscures his meaning, 51 the importance of Macintosh's thought is now being recognized. As the significance of the various features of his distinctive realism become more apparent, his influence will become even more extensive. The influence

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49. Miller, Art.(1938), 472.

50. See Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>1</sup>. Cf. Macintosh, Art.(1943).

51. See McGilvary's review of The Problem of Knowledge, Art.(1916), especially 624, which is cited in Melzer, ECM, 1.





of Macintosh's realism in religion today and the extensive influence his thought will certainly have during the next few decades make the further investigation and evaluation of his criticism of personalism especially imperative.





## CHAPTER IV

## PERSONALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Macintosh's thought brings two central features of personalistic epistemology into sharp focus. One is the concreteness and the empirical method of personalism. It should be noted that the difference in emphasis on and interpretation of the empirical method by various personalists has resulted in differences in their ideas of God and their treatments of the problem of evil, for example. The second central feature is personalistic epistemological dualism. In the first feature, Macintosh and many personalists are closely related; in the second, there is sharp contrast.

## 1. The empirical method

"Empirical" like "realistic" has had many meanings in the history of philosophy. Its best known development is perhaps the British empiricism of which Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are pre-eminent exponents. For these men, empiricism was closely associated with the emphasis on sense-experience. Locke, for example, held that all the material for reason and knowledge comes from experience.<sup>1</sup> His opposition to "nativism"<sup>2</sup> is clearly shown in the

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1. See Locke, *WOR*, I, 32.

2. See also Stetson and Baldwin in Baldwin (ed.), *DPP*, I, 321.





chapter in his Essay on Human Understanding entitled "No innate principles in the mind." The importance of sense-experience in Berkeley's empiricism, also, is evident,<sup>3</sup> and Hume's statement that "the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation"<sup>4</sup> is familiar. Historians have called attention to a more positivistic tendency of empiricism in later British thought.<sup>5</sup> Mill's description of matter as the permanent analysis of sensations is reflected even in his posthumous Three Essays on Religion, where, for example, he says that matter is "a mere assumption to account for our sensations."<sup>6</sup>

Kant also used the word "empirical" (empirisch) and struggled with its relation to the space-time world.<sup>7</sup> Eucken lists Kant's distinction between "Empirie" and "Erfahrung" with the distinction between "Phaenomena" and "Erscheinungen" in referring to his contribution to the development of philosophical terminology.<sup>8</sup>

Alexander's statement that "the mind is the highest finite empirical reality we know"<sup>9</sup> illustrates the wide meaning "empirical" has come to have in recent philosophy. James's pragmatism also has been "empirical" in its emphasis on experience. His "radical empiricism" is a postulate, a statement of fact, and a generalized

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3. See, for example, Berkeley, WOR, I, 257.

4. Hume, ENQ, 17.

5. For example, Thilly, HOP, 516-517.

6. 202.

7. See, for example, Kant, KrV, A520-521 (B548-549).

8. Eucken, GpT, 148.

9. Alexander, STD, II, 245.





conclusion, which result in the view that:

The directly apprehended universe needs ... no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.<sup>10</sup>

"Empirical" may also be used to describe the thought of Hegel. Theodor Haering has called Hegel the "empiricist of consciousness."<sup>11</sup> In this sense, an empiricist is:

... one who explores every nook and cranny of the spiritual life, individual and social, logical and historical, aesthetic and religious, relating it to every experience of physical nature.<sup>12</sup>

This use of "empirical" as referring to all conscious awareness, without limiting it to sense-experience, to any immediate experience, or to practical consequences of a certain kind, is its vital meaning for personalistic epistemology. The relation of this empirical method to personalism is recognized by certain contemporary personalists.<sup>13</sup> The distinctly empirical has been described as a search for "the most reasonable interpretation of presumptive knowledge drawn from the various realms of human experience."<sup>14</sup> This meaning, without limitation to any previous theory or to any one realm of experience, is illustrated by Trueblood's use of "empirical" in

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10. James, MOT, xiii. See also Will in Runes (ed.), DOP, 90.

11. In an address at Boston University on October 1, 1929. See also Haering, HWW, passim. Cf. Schilling, ERH, especially 132-139; and Brightman, Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>.

12. Brightman, Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 276.

13. For example, see Brightman, POR, 1-8, and Brightman in Wieman and Meland, APR, 321-322.

14. Bertocci, EAG, 3.





The Logic of Belief.<sup>15</sup> This use maintains the etymological meaning of "empirical": ἐμπειρία -- experience (opposed to ἀπειρία --without experience).

Historical, however, a sharp distinction has appeared between empiricism and rationalism. Although the importance of both reason and experience is recognized in the development of modern personalism, a difference in approach and emphasis makes the distinction between rationalistic and empirical personalism important. This distinction does not mean that empirical personalism is irrational, or even non-rational, nor that rationalistic personalism fails to consider experience.<sup>16</sup>

The empirical method has certain important results, which the more rationalistic or aprioristic method,<sup>17</sup> illustrated, for example, by different personalistic solutions of the problem of evil, lacks. The empirical method does not mean disregarding reason. Reason is itself a phase of experience. Reason not only may be experienced; also it enters in all experience in the dialectical nature of the empirical method. However, the constant emphasis on experience in empirical personalism produces a concreteness and a more complete checking of theory by practice, which is often lacking in the

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15. See Brightman, Art.(1942), 443.

16. Cf. Bowne's "transcendental empiricism" discussed, for example, in his PER, 104-107. Cf. also emphasis on a "critical synthesis of empiricism and rationalism," Macintosh, PFW, 9, and his assertion of no "absolute apriority," POK, 364; Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 708.

17. See emphasis on "the aprioristic theory of knowledge," Knudson, POP, 96.





more abstract results of the rationalistic or aprioristic method.

One of the contributions personalists have made has been their insight into the fallacy of abstraction.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, a suspicion of the empirical method<sup>19</sup> has resulted in a less empirical approach and a more restricted interpretation of the empirical method which characterize the thought of certain personalists. Their conclusions often need closer relation to experience.

Macintosh's thought emphasizes the consequences of this distinction between different kinds of personalism. He, for example, seeks to examine empiricism critically. From "its recourse to experience for knowledge" he gains his empirical method for theology:

... to seek verification for the hypotheses of faith in religious experience, and to refute the teachings of tradition in so far as they are incompatible with the facts of experience.<sup>20</sup>

An emphasis on experience characterizes his entire philosophy. He intends this emphasis as an abrogation not of reason but only of abstract rationalism and dogmatism. In fact, he says that historic religion has progressed toward spirituality and reasonableness

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18. See Bowne, TTK, 251-259, and cf. Knudson's frequent reference to abstraction as "the universal fallacy" in his lectures.

19. See, for example, Knudson's statements about Macintosh's empirical method in theology, *supra*, 3.

20. Macintosh, PFW, 267.





by "combining the valuational with the empirical test." <sup>21</sup> Scientific religion he describes as becoming "more and more rational while remaining vitally experiential." <sup>22</sup> He objects to idealism because it proceeds "without the aid of experience." <sup>23</sup>

Although there may be a real question about the logical meaning of "empirical" for Macintosh, <sup>24</sup> his interpretation of empirical method shows the need he believes all knowledge has of considering all kinds of experience impartially. His hope in a sufficiently broad appeal to experience <sup>25</sup> reveals his appreciation of religious experience in more than a narrow, restricted sense as religious or metaphysical dogmas.

Other scholars have also wondered why theologians have not appealed to the kind of empirical evidence used to support scientific beliefs, especially since that evidence is so abundant and since such empirical evidence "has been the real basis of belief in actual practice." <sup>26</sup> The goal of scientific method in religion is to practice "the habit of examining the data rather than the habit of arriving at conclusions on the basis

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21. Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 38.

22. Macintosh, PFW, 6.

23. Macintosh, POK, 471. Cf. his reading of Hegel (POR, I, 229) as thinking that his age was one "which must content itself merely with being told there is a God," Macintosh, PFW, 36.

24. See Bertocci, Art.(1944), 47.

25. Macintosh, PFW, 149-150.

26. Trueblood, LOB, 197.





of a priori considerations." <sup>27</sup> Empirical personalism rests on an impartial examination of all data; it requires that the data be not limited to any single kind or occasion of experience.

Macintosh's recognition of a wide range of values <sup>28</sup> is relevant to empirical personalism. He believes that the procedure of "abstract" science is defective because "it refrains from appealing to all possible sorts of intuition." <sup>29</sup> The empirical method of personalism is characterized by the fact that experiences are not limited to conscious awareness of any single kind or kinds of experiences or of objects. It is unbiased; whatever experiences are relevant to the domain under consideration are "allowed to speak for themselves." <sup>30</sup>

Experiences of values, for example, show that the categories of the space-time world <sup>31</sup> alone are not adequate to interpret all the facts of experience, as Kant himself recognized. Although spatial experiences of the physical world are important, empirical personalists require that one recognize whatever categories are most adequate to interpret rationally awareness of all kinds of objects. Immediate experience, including all value-claims, has true value only when tested and

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27. Trueblood, KOG, 28.

28. See Macintosh, POK, 448, and Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 26.

29. Macintosh, POK, 489.

30. Brightman, Art.(1926), 252.

31. See Kant, KrV, A80 (B106).





interpreted. This interpretation is true only if the claims of all kinds of immediate experience are recognized. Basing knowledge on the acceptance of any one kind of value-claims in total disregard of all other kinds overlooks the importance of the unexamined claims. This procedure also makes the kind of immediate experience that is accepted dogmatic and thus invalidates it. The blind acceptance of either experiences of existential objects or of religious experiences results in dogmatism.

Empirical personalists strive to avoid "narrowness in the selection of evidence," which Whitehead, for example, called "the chief danger of philosophy."<sup>32</sup> The primary demand of the empirical method in personalism is critical examination of all experience and impartial testing of all value-claims. This interpretation of empirical method requires the criterion of coherence. Although some critical thinkers fail to give sufficient attention to coherence, coherence is the most empirical, as well as the most empirically adequate, criterion of truth.<sup>33</sup> Stated in the form of Hegel's dialectical method, the criterion of coherence and the empirical method mean that any experienced value-claim is acceptable as a true value only when it is aufgehoben,

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<sup>32</sup>. Whitehead, PAR, 512.

<sup>33</sup>. See *infra*, 120-121.





"dead and risen again," tested by its relation to the whole of experience, to all value-claims, which likewise are tested in relation to this and every other value-claim. Immediate experience is the touchstone of all knowledge and truth,<sup>34</sup> not because it is immediate but only after it has been tested and is concrete, when it is a part of the whole of experience interpreted as rationally as possible. The aim is the most reasonable understanding of experience.<sup>35</sup>

The empirical method of personalism does not deny the activity of consciousness in knowing,<sup>36</sup> but only is an assertion that the necessity of experience for knowledge may not be overlooked. Empirical content and empirical variety both need consideration. Dogmatism results unless all value-claims are recognized and tested as critically as those claims which are accepted as true values. The appeal to scientific method is valid only if there is impartial consideration of all kinds of value-claims.

The importance of coherence in the empirical method of personalism is emphasized by Macintosh's use of the empirical method in theology. He describes his formulation

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34. Macintosh, POK, 439-440.

35. See Brightman, Art.(1932)<sup>1</sup>, 145.

36. Cf. the recognition of the activity of mind by Berkeley, for example, in Berkeley, WOR, I, 258. See also Knudson, POP, 95-96, and Macintosh's recognition of the relating activity of the thinking subject, Macintosh, POK, 167n.





of the empirical science of theology as distinguishing:

... those elements of theological theory which could be regarded as verified (as science counts verification) from other elements of a merely pragmatically justified faith or of "invincible surmise," subjectively assured and speculatively permissible.<sup>37</sup>

The issue for the empirical method of personalism depends on the meaning of verification.<sup>38</sup> If empirical verification is limited to any particular kind of experience, the results are as dogmatic as the failure or refusal to consider all kinds of value-claims.

Empirical personalists require that verification "as science counts verification" needs itself to be critically tested and verified in relation to nonscientific experience before it may be accepted as fully valid and true. The evidence supported by "scientific verification," as well as that which is subjectively assured and speculatively permissible, needs to be coherent. It must be tested in relation to all experience and to every other kind of experience before the empirical personalist accepts it as valid and true knowledge.<sup>39</sup>

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37. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 250. Cf. "scientific in the same empirical sense in which the sciences descriptive of objective reality are scientific," Macintosh, PFW, 225-226; cf. also Eucken's "noological method," Macintosh, Art. (1913)<sup>2</sup>, 315.

38. See Brightman, POR, 116-122, 234, 485-487.

39. Note Macintosh's distinction of faith as subjective certitude from religious revelation and religious knowledge as "the verifying experiences and the verified judgments," in Wieman and Meland, APR, 331.





This kind of verification is an essential part of the empirical method that is the most adequately empirical. One of the reasons for the great difference of opinion among scientists about the meaning of scientific method is a provincial concept of their method of verification. For example, the astronomer formulates theories that require verification by tests which are quite different from the tests by which the botanist verifies his theories. Yet each declares that his is the scientific method. If verification means critical testing by whatever data of experience are appropriate to the nature of one's problems without overlooking the importance of any other relevant data, there is no reason to limit scientific method to the physical universe. In fact, psychologists have long stressed the importance of considering the personal factors (such as the investigator himself) in all scientific research.

When these factors are taken into consideration in the experience of "drawing upon God," for example, the empirical method in a religious experiment is not so different from the empirical method in the physical sciences. However, this meaning of empirical method is often overlooked when the data are religious:

If anyone believes that ... "drawing upon God" ... bears any resemblance to the





reproducible, simplified, controlled situation characteristic of a scientific experiment, in which the causal factor is isolated and dealt with regardless of any will to believe --if anyone believes this, I am reduced to silence.<sup>40</sup>

But religious experiences can be excluded from empirical data only for an adequate reason. In this case, the distinction between what is acceptable as scientific and what is not scientific needs to be made clearer. An arbitrary rejection of all religious data reveals a dogmatic partiality which scientists would never tolerate in their scientific investigations. Facts are facts whether sensory or religious, and no relevant datum should be ignored.

In an empirical personalistic epistemology all truth claims must be considered in relation to knowledge; no single kind can be ruled out arbitrarily. Every claim merits attention. Religious data have as valid claims as scientific (sensory) data and must be considered as a source of knowledge. The empirical method of personalism requires at least the initial possibility that all kinds of value-claims may be true values. Further, it requires an acknowledgement of the empirically observable fact of interpenetration of all values.<sup>41</sup>

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40. Otto in Wieman and others, ITG, 271.

41. Note how this is illustrated in Macintosh's idea of spiritual religion, Art.(1926)<sup>4</sup>, 270.





Although his concept of experience is limited logically by his idea of verification,<sup>42</sup> Macintosh's interest in the various values, reflected, for example, in his stress on "our most critical estimate of values in general,"<sup>43</sup> is in harmony with this emphasis of empirical personalism. Religious experience indeed "is not some experience wholly separated from other experiences,"<sup>44</sup> but is like all other experience in its nature as conscious awareness and in its systematic relations to other experiences. The failure to recognize the importance of experience for all religion and philosophy and to check one's theories constantly by reference to all experience is a shortcoming of much philosophy. An adequate empirical personalism strives to guard against this fallacy.

## 2. Dualism in personalism

The place of experience in knowledge is warranted in personalistic epistemology only by virtue of a second factor which contrasts sharply with Macintosh's monistic realism. This factor is the dualism of personalistic epistemology.

Epistemological dualism is the theory that, in the moment of knowing, mind or idea is "not [numerically]

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42. See Macintosh, PRK, 6, 187, 313. Cf. also *supra*, 50, and *infra*, 90-91.

43. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 198.

44. Trueblood, LOB, 198.





identical with" <sup>45</sup> its object, but separate and distinct from it. An analysis of the knowledge situation reveals that, while experience may be immediate, no experience can be knowledge until and unless there is mediation. In knowledge there is a dualism between what is immediately present and what is epistemologically other than the subject's immediate awareness. The dualist recognizes immediate experience, <sup>46</sup> but refuses to call it knowledge. In other words, immediate experience is only experience and not knowledge until it is critically organized and tested. This process of organizing and testing involves reference both to the whole of organized knowledge and to standards, neither of which may be immediately present as any immediate experience.

For this purpose an important distinction has been made between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. <sup>47</sup> The first may be monistic, but even here there can be no knowledge until there is testing (which is dualistic). Knowledge by description requires reference directly and is immediately dualistic.

The importance of dualism for all knowledge is also illustrated in the distinction between "Situations Experienced" and "Situations Believed-in." <sup>48</sup> A "Situation Experienced" is immediate but not knowledge. A "Situation Believed-in" is never immediately

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45. Brightman, ITP, 78.

46. See supra and Bertocci, Art.(1943), 167.

47. See Brightman, ITP, 83-84, and Art.(1944).

48. Brightman, POR, 347-349.





experienced but is always epistemologically dualistic in relation to the present consciousness of the experiencing subject. Even in self-knowledge the knowing idea is not more than a part of the self known. There is always a dualistic reference even in that situation. The partial identity of the knowing subject with the situation experienced requires reference to the whole self, which is not at that time present in experience but only a "Situation Believed-in." The self may indeed be directly experienced, but it can be known only indirectly.<sup>49</sup>

As soon as any immediate experience is referred to or related or criticized or verified, it is no longer immediate but a "Situation Believed-in." All knowledge is epistemologically dualistic, since it necessarily involves such processes. For example, the testing of truth by "acting upon the idea, being guided by it, in adjusting one's self to the reality in question,"<sup>50</sup> is itself epistemologically dualistic, regardless of how immediate it may be from a psychological standpoint. The test of acting means reference to what is not now immediately present as consciousness. A definition "adequate for all possible purposes"<sup>51</sup> also can never

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49. See Brightman, Art.(1944), 696.

50. Macintosh, PFW, 184.

51. Macintosh, POK, 489.





be immediately known but must always refer to what is epistemologically other than immediate awareness of the definition. Thus it, too, is dualistic. The only immediacy possible is the subject's own, uncriticized (raw) awareness of the particular time-span of a single experience; and this has not reached the level of knowledge.

Epistemological dualism is based on an attempt to understand all experience as adequately as possible without violating the data of any experience. Epistemological dualists seek to determine what is "the knowledge value" <sup>52</sup> of immediate experience by considering all the data, without prejudging whether this knowledge value must be limited to immediacy itself. In other words, the subjective residence of ideas does not preclude their objective reference, any more than being at home precludes plans for travel. As soon as this question is raised, however, epistemological monism is replaced by epistemological dualism. Although a process may be psychologically immediate, <sup>53</sup> the epistemological dualism which enters as soon as any immediate experience is evaluated or criticized is not affected by this immediacy.

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52. Bertocci, Art. (1943), 168.

53. See Knudson, POP, 102. Cf. Macintosh's view of apperception as "nothing but an extremely facile interpretation," Macintosh, POK, 342. See also Melzer, ECM, 45.





Epistemological faith is "conviction apart from or in excess of proof," by which knowledge is possible through the interpretation and organization of "the original sensa" of all experience.<sup>54</sup> Such faith is exercised in reference both to God and to objects in the physical world; it is necessary for any reference whatever. The thought, however, that only objects in the physical world can be truly objective for dualism is "sheer prejudice."<sup>55</sup> Values, as well as sensa, require the objective reference of epistemological faith. The recognition of the subjective factor in all knowledge does not necessarily mean a denial of objective factors, and even those who may assert that it does make exception to their subjectivism, at least in "positing ... the existence of the other persons with whom to argue the point."<sup>56</sup>

Dualism, however, requires a critical search for the best possible interpretation of all experience. It is an attempt to avoid both the "sheer prejudice" of regarding only physical things as objects and the equally dogmatic assumption that only what is subjective can be epistemologically real, and thus worthy of metaphysical investigation. In fact, epistemological

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54. Trueblood, LOB, 58. Cf. Santayana's "animal faith," for example, Santayana, SAF, 107. Cf. also Martineau's "natural trust," discussed in Bertocci, EAG, 11-12.

55. Trueblood, LOB, 61.

56. Trueblood, KOG, 17.





dualism, the theory that idea and object are numerically and existentially separate, is entirely compatible with the assertion of the reality and knowledge of the objective world, and even more naturally compatible than any form of monism. There is a mutual existential otherness of idea and object in epistemological dualism regardless of any degree of qualitative metaphysical likeness or psychological immediacy they may have. The objective world exists independent of us; we "do not make it but find it." <sup>57</sup> The nature of this objective order is the special problem of metaphysics; epistemological dualism only asserts that it is there. Epistemology declares that it is; metaphysics defines what it is.

This assertion of the existence of the objective world independent of the mind of the knower is epistemological realism,<sup>58</sup> although epistemological realism may be either pansubjective or panobjective. Much of Macintosh's argument is for epistemological realism, but his attack on personalism so relates to his monistic epistemology and its metaphysical implications that his thought cannot be reduced to a simple epistemological realism. In their references to and assertions of the fact that things do not pass

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57. Knudson, POP, 103. Cf. truth of a judgment "'found,' discovered in immediate experience," Macintosh, POK, 453.

58. Trueblood, LOB, 59.





out of existence when the knower is no longer conscious of them and that they are "discovered not created" by the knower, personalists and Macintosh are in perfect agreement. As soon as Macintosh asserts his epistemological monism or permits his realism to become metaphysical, however, the differences reappear.

The metaphysical implications of Macintosh's realism in relation to personalistic metaphysics are the subject of a later chapter in this dissertation. One may explain the metaphysical implications of personalistic dualism in epistemology and the parallelism of thought and thing theistically by regarding an intelligent Being as the source of all reality.<sup>59</sup> The idea of God and the problem of evil make the importance of empirical personalism even more apparent in the later chapters of this dissertation.

The purpose of this chapter, however, has been to emphasize two factors in personalistic epistemology, namely, empirical method and dualism. Macintosh agrees with empirical personalists in the following respect. First, empirical method may not be limited to sense-experience. Secondly, knowledge is rationalistic and abstract unless closely related to experience.<sup>60</sup> Thirdly, empirical method requires that all experiences

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59. Knudson, POP, 114.

60. Note what Macintosh calls "the secret of Paul's religious independence," for example, Art.(1910)<sup>4</sup>, 364.





and value-claims be considered. In contrast to Macintosh, empirical personalists also hold, first, that any experience is knowledge only when tested and interpreted coherently with the rest of experience, secondly, that any testing of truth requires reference which is dualistic, thirdly, that the subjective residence of knowledge does not preclude its objectivity, and fourthly, that the dualist may "find" an objective independent reality which he does not make.

These points become clearer in the examination of Macintosh's realistic epistemology and the evaluation of his case against dualism in the following two chapters of this dissertation.





## CHAPTER V

## MACINTOSH'S REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Macintosh's realistic epistemology is of major importance for his criticism of personalism. An appreciation of the full impact of this epistemology requires not only a statement of his monism but also an examination of his development of it and a consideration of certain difficulties in his monism. Such an investigation is the purpose of this chapter.

## 1. Statement of his monism

In stating his position Macintosh accepts the phraseology of the Committee on Definitions at the American Philosophical Association meeting in 1911 and identifies his thought with epistemological monism and realism.<sup>1</sup> The "characteristic" meaning of his view is:

... that the real object and the perceived object are at the moment of perception numerically one, and that the real object may exist at other moments apart from any perception.<sup>2</sup>

In stressing his critical position, as opposed to an "epistemological monism and dogmatic realism," he affirms that:

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1. Macintosh, POK, 13.

2. Ibid., 211.





... the object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at the moment; and also that this same object may exist unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, while part of what is independently real is not immediately perceived and while all that is independently perceived is not necessarily independently real, Macintosh believes that "enough of the immediately experienced is independently real ... and enough of the independently real immediately experience" <sup>4</sup> for his thought to be a form of epistemological monism and realism.

He accepts the position of neo-realists about immediate awareness of independent reality but regards their doctrine of external relations very unsatisfactory. He seeks to show that "for the experienced object and the independently real object to be numerically the same, it is not necessary that they be qualitatively, even in normal perception, absolutely identical." <sup>5</sup>

In other words, the neo-realistic assertion that what is perceived is numerically or existentially identical with independent reality is true because of

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3. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 701. See also Macintosh, POK, 310-311.

4. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>1</sup>, 233.

5. Macintosh, POK, 309.





an objective factor--"continuity of physical energy and of certain teleological functions other than our own." <sup>6</sup> There is also a subjective factor, Macintosh believes, in the identity of physical objects, by which physical objects possess certain qualities when perceived that they do not have when not perceived. For Macintosh this subjective factor is purpose. His doctrine of primary and secondary and especially of tertiary qualities is based on this concept of purpose. Yet the epistemological position from which he attacks personalism he asserts is monism:

... there can be affirmed (at least partially, i. e., to some extent) a numerical oneness, an existential identity between the object as perceived and the object as independently real.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. His development of monism

Macintosh develops this critical monism by an extensive investigation of the other major systems of thought. He examines epistemological dualism and the various forms of idealistic and realistic monism, as well as rationalism and empiricism, intellectualism, intuitionism, and pragmatism. Although the following chapter of this dissertation contains an evaluation of Macintosh's attack on dualism, a consideration of the

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6. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 703. See also Macintosh, POK, 312.

7. Macintosh, PRK, 5.





relation of his monism to epistemological dualism, which is one of the first steps in his development of monism, is imperative.

His principal objection to dualism is that it, he believes, is agnostic:

If what is immediately experienced is never independent reality, and independent reality is therefore never immediately experienced, how can the subject of the immediate experience ever know any independent reality? Any absolute dualism in epistemology is foredoomed, it would seem, to agnosticism.<sup>8</sup>

This "fundamental" conviction about the agnosticism of dualism is related, as Bertocci recognizes,<sup>9</sup> to Macintosh's idea of knowledge as absolute certainty and direct immediacy. Macintosh believes that the logically inescapable agnosticism of dualism and the equally inescapable solipsism of idealistic monism<sup>10</sup> drive the philosopher to realistic epistemological monism, because actually "we do seem to have knowledge or else a very good substitute for it" instead of agnosticism.<sup>11</sup>

The epistemological position of dualism raises an insoluble problem for him. Macintosh believes that

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8. Macintosh, POK, 14. Cf. his statement that dualism is "uncurably agnostic," and "leaves its task unfinished," Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 137. This is shown also by the two words "But dualism" in the margin of Macintosh's copy of Brightman, FOG, 123, where the statement is made that "our search ... has led ... into the presence of God."

9. Art.(1943), 165.

10. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 702.

11. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>1</sup>, 225.





such a problem indicates the underlying falsity of dualism:

But the insoluble epistemological problem is surely not the true one; it must surely be due to a confusion of thought, to a faulty analysis of the nature of consciousness and the knowledge-relation. ... its solution can be accomplished only in its dissolution.<sup>12</sup>

This emphasis and the general method of Macintosh's treatment point to the conclusion that his realistic monism results from an attempt to discover some alternative by which, as Bertocci says, "his assumption that 'ideal' knowledge is attainable" may be saved from the fate of agnostic dualism.<sup>13</sup> In fact, Macintosh concludes his examination of the thought of those dualists who he believes admit their agnosticism by declaring that the problem is "to discover some better alternative" if "it should turn out that agnosticism is necessarily involved in the dualism." <sup>14</sup>

However, his development of monism involves also an examination of the thought of the dualists who deny their agnosticism and even of "the new 'critical realism,' endeavoring to save a fundamentally dualistic realism from agnosticism," <sup>15</sup> a position which he believes has failed in its "primary undertaking."

Although Herbart, for example, appears to have

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12. Macintosh, POK, 9.

13. Art.(1943), 166.

14. Macintosh, POK, 34-35.

15. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>1</sup>, 228.





escaped the agnostic clutches of dualism, Macintosh sees that his initial absolute dualism of reality and appearance keeps him from any "legitimate escape from agnosticism at all." <sup>16</sup> Schopenhauer likewise attempted to escape the agnosticism of this epistemological dualism "founded on confusion and defended by fallacy," <sup>17</sup> but Macintosh believes that Schopenhauer's assertion of all reality as will lapses into dogmatism. Volkelt's view of "an irreducible minimum of valid representation of the transsubjective" demonstrates to Macintosh the unsatisfactoriness of Volkelt's dualistic epistemology, which thus was "not 'without presuppositions.'" <sup>18</sup> Macintosh believes that Kuelpe also left the real problem of epistemological dualism unanswered and assumed that objective reality "is represented in consciousness, without having ever been presented there." <sup>19</sup> Macintosh believes Russell was swinging from absolute dualism to absolute epistemological monism because "he saw no other way of escape from an almost total agnosticism with reference to the physical world." <sup>20</sup>

In the thought of Troeltsch Macintosh sees an emphasis much like his own doctrine of religious

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16. Macintosh, POK, 44.

17. Ibid., 59.

18. Ibid., 66.

19. Ibid., 70.

20. Ibid., 243.





knowledge, in which divine reality is directly and immediately experienced.<sup>21</sup> Macintosh's critical intuitionism, however, requires him to recognize among the things presented "a factor which makes for righteousness in and through us, according as we relate ourselves thereto in a certain discoverable way." <sup>22</sup>

Macintosh brings out a fundamental part of his own realism also in evaluating Lovejoy's arguments. He believes that Lovejoy's arguments are valid in relation to "the absolute epistemological monism of the new realists," but defends his own critical position that "the experienced object and the independently existing thing may be numerically identical, even if to some extent qualitatively different." <sup>23</sup> The question of the relation of mediacy and mediation in knowledge is raised by Macintosh's charge that the principal weakness in Lovejoy's thought is that he overlooks the possibility that mediate knowledge may be possible only because there is immediate knowledge.<sup>24</sup> This is a crucial point in Macintosh's epistemology that brings up a special problem about mediacy and immediacy.<sup>25</sup>

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21. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>2</sup>, 278.

22. Ibid., 289.

23. Macintosh, POK, 56.

24. Ibid., 56.

25. Cf. infra, 77-78 and Chapter VI.





Another important point in the development of Macintosh's realistic monism is the relation of epistemology to metaphysics. He properly recognizes that epistemology must hesitate to prescribe any conclusions to metaphysics, that is, any conclusions about the nature of reality, for metaphysical conclusions do not "so manifestly lie within the province of a theory of knowledge," <sup>26</sup> although epistemology may decide on the possibility of metaphysics. In the thought of Ladd he sees the metaphysical implications of a dualistic epistemology illustrated. Ladd's repudiation of the agnosticism of epistemological dualism, however, Macintosh believes, "foredooms his theory inevitably ... to a dogmatism as absolute but as unnecessary as that dualism whose undesirable consequences it attempts to remedy." <sup>27</sup> In fact, Macintosh believes that the metaphysics of dualism must necessarily be thus dogmatic. He concludes that the application of an epistemological monism based on verification by immediate experience means that "the only metaphysics possible for the epistemological dualist is dogmatics." <sup>28</sup> But he finds dogmatism, any view of reality not based on experience (immediate experience, for him), is as

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26. Macintosh, POK, 7.

27. Ibid., 8.

28. Ibid., 71. Cf. also his statement that there "is no pathway to absolute idealism save that of speculative dogmatism," Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>3</sup>, 9.





objectionable as agnosticism.

In the development of his monism one of his principal objections to epistemological idealism is that idealism is dogmatic. After describing epistemological idealism as holding that "the real object cannot exist at other moments than the moment of perception, or of some other conscious experience," or independently of such experience,<sup>29</sup> Macintosh casts mystical idealism aside as self-refuting.<sup>30</sup> He also charges that psychological idealism--"things are ideas in the mind, or in consciousness ... they depend for their existence upon their being in the mind, or ... in the conscious relation to some subject"--is pure dogma.<sup>31</sup> Applying this psychological idealism to religion he understands it to mean that "God, the Divine Reality ... is nothing more than the subjective idea of God in consciousness."<sup>32</sup> He sees this subjective idealism illustrated by the identification of God with the God-idea created by mere wishful thinking, which may be either injurious (Feuerbach) or beneficial (Lange) illusions, or which may exercise a regulative, moralizing, consolidating influence (Leuba). Religion may be "a free form of human idealism" valuable for sustaining aspiration

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29. Macintosh, POK, 13.

30. Ibid., 80.

31. Ibid., 94.

32. Macintosh, PRK, 47.





and hope (Bender), with dogmas primarily concerned with conduct instead of pure reflective knowledge (LeRoy) or God just regarded as if, als ob, he were the father of men (Vaihinger). Psychological idealism in religion also includes, Macintosh believes, religious humanism and psychiatric interpretations of religion by thinkers like Freud, Adler, and Jung.<sup>33</sup>

In his monistic realism Macintosh understands logical idealism as related to dogmatic psychological idealism. He regards logical idealism as the universally acceptable contents of consciousness:

... finding reality in what is not merely private feeling, but in that which, while made up of particular experiences, is shot through and through with universally acceptable and even necessary ideas, it claims to be objective, rather than merely subjective.<sup>34</sup>

The height of dogmatism for Macintosh is the synthesis of logical and psychological idealism. He compares it to telling one lie to support another, for he believes both psychological and logical idealism are based on a mistaken analysis which makes skepticism logically inevitable.<sup>35</sup>

He divides objective idealism into concrete and abstract idealism depending on the actual presence of the reality in some experience. He separates concrete

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33. See Macintosh, PRK, Chapters IV-IX.

34. Macintosh, POK, 127. Cf., however, Macintosh's correctives of possible "undue subjective" of faith, in Wieman and others, ITG, 178.

35. Macintosh, POK, 128.





idealism also into monistic and pluralistic idealism. If the idea (all reality) is present in one all-inclusive experience, the idealism is monistic; if it is divided "among many mutually exclusive and ultimately real experiences," it is pluralistic and may be called personal idealism.<sup>36</sup>

The original dogma of psychological idealism he believes makes absolute or monistic idealism defective. Macintosh finds the "typical procedure" demonstrated in Watson's substitution of "subjective universality, universality-in-subjectivity, for true objectivity," resulting in "a virtual denial that we ourselves as finite individuals have any real existence." <sup>37</sup>

Macintosh believes that Bradley's thought reveals the "untenability of monistic or absolute idealism on rational grounds." Bradley's thought also illustrates, Macintosh believes, an unending regress, because Bradley failed to eliminate "the fallacious idealism from his premises." <sup>38</sup> Macintosh sees in Hocking's thought also the absolute idealistic interpretation of the physical world, which he believes results from an original, unnecessary dogma.<sup>39</sup>

Macintosh believes that pluralistic or personal idealism shows the disintegration of logical-psychological

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36. Macintosh, POK, 128.

37. Ibid., 140.

38. Ibid., 152.

39. Ibid., 164-165.





idealism into mere psychological idealism,<sup>40</sup> hence, at least social, if not individual subjectivity.<sup>41</sup> From the point of view of the individual, however, he sees that pluralistic idealism results from an emphasis on non-solipsistic subjectivism and absolute idealism from a non-pluralistic subjectivism.<sup>42</sup> Macintosh sums up his application of monism to these two forms of objective idealism in a way that makes the defects of both "sufficiently obvious" (for the critical realist):

... while singularistic idealism saved the idea of a single world or universe at the expense of reducing all minds to one, pluralistic idealism manages to save the reality of many minds only by positing as many totally distinct worlds, as many universes, as there are minds aware of a world.<sup>43</sup>

He objects to the pluralism of personalism or personalistic idealism because he believes that without any reality other than persons one can conclude only that "either there must be only one person or else the universe can not be a single world."<sup>44</sup> Macintosh sees in Lotze, for example, a tendency toward a realistic doctrine, although the physical world is regarded as idealistic "in relation to the whole number of selves and 'self-like' beings."<sup>45</sup> Macintosh's recognition of a "realistic" epistemology from the point of view

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40. Macintosh, POK, 181-182.

41. Ibid., 128-129.

42. Ibid., 183.

43. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>1</sup>, 226.

44. Ibid., 227.

45. Macintosh, POK, 184.





of the individual and this idealistic interpretation of the physical world "in relation to the whole number of selves and 'self-like' beings" illustrates Macintosh's confusing interpretation of all idealism as if it were epistemological idealism and his failure to consider metaphysical idealism seriously. This confusion shows a problem in his development of critical monistic realism illustrated by his interpretation of a similarity between Leibniz and Lotze:

Like the philosophy of Lotze ... the system of Leibniz seems at once a dualistic realism (in relation to the individual) and an idealistic epistemological monism with reference to the physical (in relation to the more or less fully conscious monads).<sup>46</sup>

Macintosh's presentation of personal idealism as a stage in the disintegration of absolute idealism into subjective, psychological idealism<sup>47</sup> reaches its climax in his suggestion that one of the alternatives open to personal idealism is the idea of God "as a carry-all for things as ideas." Macintosh also criticizes the idealistic interpretation of cause in relation to God and rejects it because it "presupposes the validity of idealism, and must share in the insecurity of its foundation."<sup>48</sup> But the personalistic idea of God needs not be compared with Macintosh's

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46. Macintosh, POK, 184-185.

47. See *ibid.*, especially 187-192.

48. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 311





thought here; that is done in Chapter VIII of this dissertation.

Macintosh, however, believes that there is in idealism a natural tendency toward realism. He sees it especially in the Platonic Ideas of what he calls logical idealism.<sup>49</sup> Although for Plato reality was Idea, Macintosh finds a tendency of logical idealism to become logical realism in the doctrine that Ideas are independent realities, and "not a construct of human thought, but its discovery."<sup>50</sup> He describes this as abstracting from an abstraction:

... when the abstractness of logical idealism is abstracted from, the basis is laid for the doctrine that some (or all) logical ideas are objective realities; indeed, such a disguised logical idealism already practically amounts to logical realism.<sup>51</sup>

By the comparison of his critical monism to the various forms of dogmatic, abstract idealism Macintosh believes that he shows the weaknesses and defects of idealism.

He also compares his monism to realism and criticizes its dogmatism. He describes dogmatic realism as the monism which cancels conscious or perceptual content of knowledge of an object by interpreting "the real object to be nothing in addition to the independent reality."<sup>52</sup> Macintosh believes Reid's position tends toward his own view of consciousness

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49. See supra, 70. Cf. also infra, 104.

50. Macintosh, POK, 84.

51. Ibid., 202.

52. Ibid., 72.





as "psychical activity," <sup>53</sup> but he thinks Reid's attempt to follow the common language led him astray.<sup>54</sup> Since new realism may result from applying the principles of psychological idealism to the subject as well as to all other objects, Macintosh believes new realism may be described as "the supposed cure of the intellectual disease of psychological idealism by its homeopathic treatment." <sup>55</sup> He believes Dewey is not a realist but only "a disguised psychological idealist," <sup>56</sup> whose doctrine that "the object is what we seem to find it" reveals the "trail of the subjectivistic--or, we might even say, solipsistic, serpent." <sup>57</sup> Boodin's pragmatic realism is regarded as "a more bona fide realism" than Dewey's, but Macintosh believes that Boodin's doctrine of the status of secondary qualities is an example of "the incompatibility of realism with pragmatism as a theory of reality." <sup>58</sup>

In his attempt to be critical, Macintosh objects to the natural realistic doctrine of secondary qualities as a "mere dogma, untenable on critical grounds." <sup>59</sup> He charges that both English and American neo-realists are dogmatic also in their interpretations of consciousness,

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53. Macintosh, POK, 214.

54. See supra, 11.

55. Macintosh, POK, 220.

56. Ibid., 226.

57. Ibid., 227.

58. Ibid., 247.

59. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 31.





although the English were strongly influenced by spiritualistic philosophy and the Americans by naturalistic and materialistic philosophies.<sup>60</sup>

The problems of neo-realism illustrate for Macintosh the importance of a careful examination of perception, even of "exceptional and difficult" cases, which should not be treated with but scant attention.<sup>61</sup> He criticizes neo-realists as dogmatic about the extent that they believe independent reality is presented in knowledge. He recognizes the importance of the experience of independently existing physical objects,<sup>62</sup> but is critical of the "extent" to which the qualities of these objects exist independently.

Macintosh believes the neo-realists are dogmatic, not critical, also about the externality of all relations, and that their views are very unsatisfactory because they "fail to mention any adequate criterion by which ... a particular relation is ... external."<sup>63</sup> By being critical he hopes to avoid both the dogmatism of natural realism and the "sophisticated absurdity" of subjective idealism.<sup>64</sup> The facts of the varying sense qualities, of illusions, and of similar contents of perception<sup>65</sup> make a critical realistic monism

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60. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 309. See also Macintosh, POK, 291-292.

61. Macintosh, Art.(1927)<sup>2</sup>, 158.

62. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 310.

63. Macintosh, POK, 302.

64. Ibid., 167. See also Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 30.

65. Macintosh, POK, 250-251.





necessary, Macintosh believes. In answer to these demands he offers his views.

### 3. Some difficulties in his view

One of the central characteristics of Macintosh's critical realistic monism is his idea of the primacy of immediate knowledge. In his development of monism he raises the question, "May it not be that there is mediate knowledge, because, and only because, there is first immediate knowledge?"<sup>66</sup> He illustrates his point by calling attention to one's power to predict the stages of a process when the first part of it is experienced:

Indeed, in countless instances we come to be able to predict the later stages of a process of which we have immediately experienced but the beginning. Again, we are often practically certain that a process of which we have immediately experienced only the beginning and the end has been essentially identical with what at other times we have had under our immediate observation throughout its entire course.<sup>67</sup>

These illustrations, however, are not epistemologically monistic. Prediction is reference to experience which is not now immediately present. Macintosh's illustration also depends on reference to consequences of a previous experience, which were not present even at the time of that experience, any more than the consequences of

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<sup>66</sup>. Macintosh, POK, 311.

<sup>67</sup>. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 702. Cf. Macintosh, POK, 439.





the present experience are now immediately present. In fact, both prediction and consequences are dualistic in their reference beyond present immediate consciousness. This illustration is a better example of the necessary dualism of all knowledge than of the primacy of immediate knowledge and epistemological monism. Immediate experience is not knowledge. It is more reasonable to say that only by mediation is any knowledge possible than that "the immediate knowledge has made the mediate knowledge possible." 68

Macintosh, however, seeks to salvage truths from both absolute idealism and neo-realism to establish his own critical realistic monism. With the neo-realistic doctrine that the perceived object is existentially identical with independent reality in perception he combines the dualistic affirmation that reality has certain qualities only when perceived. Macintosh holds that these are the sense-qualities. Thus he affirms some qualities of a physical object as "independently real and others as dependent upon its being sensed." 69

Macintosh's doctrine of qualities as primary, secondary, and tertiary--those qualities "placed in the object, not by sense, but by purposive, through

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68. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 702, and Macintosh, POK, 311.

69. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 36.





purely psychical, activity of the subject" <sup>70</sup>--is also quite significant. Macintosh seeks to be critical in his classification of the qualities of material things:

... as primary, involved in the transformations of physical energy which takes place in space and time independently of human experience; secondary, belonging to things as experienced through the senses; and tertiary, the cognized meanings belonging to things as known, judged about. <sup>71</sup>

Relations for Macintosh also are of three kinds, corresponding to primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities. Primary relations are independent of their being sensed; secondary exist through being sensed; and tertiary are established by thought and for its purpose.

Macintosh's meaning of "tertiary," which was first used by Santayana, <sup>72</sup> does not coincide with "value," for not all tertiary qualities for Macintosh are values. In fact, he even divides values into primary, secondary, and tertiary, depending on whether they are independent of consciousness, dependent on feeling consciousness, or dependent on thought alone. <sup>73</sup> Macintosh means by "empirical intuition," for example, "an immediate awareness of independently existing objects, qualities, relations, and values." <sup>74</sup> His description reflects

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<sup>70</sup>. Macintosh, POK, 328.

<sup>71</sup>. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>5</sup>, 653.

<sup>72</sup>. See, for example, Santayana, LOR, I, 142-144.

<sup>73</sup>. Macintosh, POK, 328.

<sup>74</sup>. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 33-34.





a very wide meaning of "value." For him values must include those experiences which are independent of voluntary thought as well as those which depend wholly on thought.

This classification can apply only to the existence of values. However, Macintosh needs to explain the relation of the existence and the experience of values more clearly than he does. How is a self to recognize as its own those values which obtain "independently of consciousness," and what more can one experience of tertiary values than is dependent on feeling consciousness? Is there something qualitatively different involved? Do values "which depend upon thought alone" surpass the values of thought which are experienced by consciousness? On the other hand, how can any experience be a value without some reference to thought? These problems recall the previous discussion of Macintosh's doctrine of values <sup>75</sup> and set it in direct relation to the problems of his development of monism.

Another significant problem in Macintosh's thought is the relative importance and place of epistemology. The neo-realists minimize it, although Macintosh recognizes that "all the while their own philosophical discussions are mainly epistemological." <sup>76</sup> Idealism,

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75. See Chapter III, supra.

76. Macintosh, POK, 334.





however, he believes makes epistemology a permanent propaedeutic after the manner of the quack physican:

... it first administers a drug which makes the patient's ailment chronic, thus making its own further services seem permanently indispensable.<sup>77</sup>

Macintosh's critical epistemology is supposed to help the thinker through the crisis in developing his philosophy, and then relegate the problem to the past. But in epistemology one must remember, as Bertocci points out, that "what the ultimate nature of primary qualities are" is incidental.<sup>78</sup> A confusion of metaphysics and epistemology creates serious problems. Macintosh seeks to hold a nonagnostic, undogmatic monistic epistemology that he believes continues "the practical certainty characteristic of the point of view of common sense and common science."<sup>79</sup> The inadequate examination of the concept of certainty in epistemology also has far-reaching consequences for his metaphysics.<sup>80</sup>

Another difficulty is the relation of monism to pragmatism. Macintosh realizes that although the standard of usefulness should be accepted, if the meaning of truth has any practical value "obviously not every sort or degree of practical value can be taken as an indication of truth."<sup>81</sup> At the same time

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77. Macintosh, POK, 334.

78. Art.(1943), 170. Cf. Knudson, POP, 100.

79. Macintosh, POK, 335.

80. See Chapters VI and VII.

81. Macintosh, POK, 431.





he claims that representation, for example, can justify itself only in the direct presentation, but if certainty and direct presentation are the essential qualities of truth and knowledge, how is there any difference between different sorts or degrees of practical value?

Furthermore, mere immediacy offers no criterion by which to determine what representations are "sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment."<sup>82</sup> If intuition frequently has, or may have, "more certainty than truth" and practice sometimes has "more truth than certainty,"<sup>83</sup> the identification of truth and certainty cannot be complete. If one attempts to be critical, also, he must be a dualist; he is no longer a monist. Yet Macintosh asserts that "the measure of reassurance" from a theory of reality compatible with the validity of spiritual values has some "philosophical significance."<sup>84</sup> What he strives for is an intellectually adequate or logical certainty, which may be described, he believes, as "intellectual readiness for definitive action,"<sup>85</sup> but his thought logically leaves even the knowledge of the existence of God subject to the nature of the

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82. Macintosh, POK, 445.

83. Ibid., 454.

84. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 203.

85. Macintosh, POK, 494.





results it produces.<sup>86</sup>

These difficulties illustrate some of the problems raised by Macintosh's realistic monism and its application, especially to epistemological dualism, various forms of idealistic monism, and less critical kinds of realistic monism. The examination of the epistemology of Macintosh's realism reaches its climax and completion in the following chapter of this dissertation, which is an evaluation of Macintosh's case against dualism.

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86. See Bertocci, Art.(1944), 54.





## CHAPTER VI

## MACINTOSH'S CASE AGAINST DUALISM

Macintosh's case against epistemological dualism may be evaluated by considering three problem logically raised by his monistic epistemology: Is the certainty lacking in dualism necessary? Is idealism subjective? Is dualism irrational? Macintosh's attack on personalistic epistemology rests on an affirmative answer to each of these questions. The purpose of this chapter is to examine and evaluate these affirmations.

1. Is the certainty lacking in dualism necessary?

The importance of certainty in Macintosh's thought has already been emphasized. The present task is to examine critically the question "Is the certainty lacking in dualism necessary?" Macintosh's affirmative answer is the basis of the assertion that epistemological dualism leads to agnosticism and that his own monistic realism is more acceptable because it offers certainty.

Macintosh has recently described knowledge as "adequate and adequately critical (i. e. logical) certitude."<sup>1</sup> In the further statement that knowledge is "subjective certitude critical enough to become

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1. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 212. See also Macintosh, PRK, 1.





objective certainty" <sup>2</sup> Macintosh's problem is clearly what makes certitude critical. As in his earlier investigation of certainty where logical certainty is emphasized as "sufficiently critical psychological certainty" provided that "'sufficiently critical' be taken seriously enough," <sup>3</sup> here also Macintosh moves, by means of criticizing subjective certitude, from certitude, which is always merely subjective, to certainty, the objective quality desired. Throughout his thought, and especially in his criticism of dualism, this is an essential step. It immediately raises a question, however, about his basic epistemological monism. "Critical" implies both a criterion and the application of this criterion to that which in the moment of criticism cannot be epistemologically identical even with the idea of the object. In criticism immediate identity with the object itself is still more impossible. Even the criterion (or criteria) of the critical epistemological monist must refer to a duality--the criticism and the idea criticized.

This dualism is implied in Macintosh's criticisms of extreme monistic realism, of monistic mysticism in religion, in his distinction between imaginal intuition and perceptual intuition, and in his demand that the

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2. Macintosh, PRK, 1. Cf. the "subjective certitude of intuition is not to be taken as infallible. It ought to be tested, as far as possible, by its value and by the facts," Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, APR, 331.

3. Macintosh, POK, 460.





former be checked by the latter.<sup>4</sup>

Macintosh finds mysticism at its best in the mystical experience which is cultivated for "greater subjective certitude and impressiveness ... in what can already or otherwise claim to be amply verified and thus virtually known." <sup>5</sup> Here mysticism is continuous with worship for him. However, he disagrees with noncritical monism in religion. He wishes to check its vagaries <sup>6</sup> and to distinguish his own religious certitude from the certitude "of the more pronounced and distinctive type of mysticism." <sup>7</sup> He believes that the degree of subjective certitude cannot make the mystic's assurance knowledge. Knowledge requires "empirical verification in the world of normal inner and outer human experience." <sup>8</sup> He believes that the entire content of extreme monistic realism in religion is neither to be accepted uncritically as valid knowledge nor to be completely rejected. When a critical monistic realist argues or distinguishes, however, he logically leaves the epistemological identity of idea and object and the kind of certainty on which Macintosh bases his objection to dualism.

Other difficulties in the immediate certainty of

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4. Macintosh, PRK, 33.

5. *Ibid.*, 38.

6. Macintosh, Art.(1907)<sup>2</sup>, 605.

7. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 179.

8. Macintosh, PRK, 38.





Macintosh's epistemological monism emerge in his thought about knowledge both of physical things in space and of other selves. Since there can never be an immediate experience of the mental processes of other persons, for example, monistic knowledge here can be "no greater than our best (dualistic) inference from behavior."<sup>9</sup> Macintosh's admission that "certain elements of appreciation and of interpretation"<sup>10</sup> are needed and that mediate knowledge is "a part of the machinery of apperception"<sup>11</sup> represents a step beyond the immediate certainty of epistemological monism, for these "elements" at least imply that which is not completely present in the identity of the knowing process. Although Macintosh seeks to keep the amount of necessary mediation as small as possible, any and all mediation is dualistic and gives no more certainty than any other dualism.

Macintosh objects to the dualism which makes a perceptual intuition of reality impossible, however, because "there could be no certain knowledge that it was the truth."<sup>12</sup> The relation of this certainty to immediate experience is central in Macintosh's thought. He emphasizes experiment as the sole source of truth<sup>13</sup> because he thinks it gives this certainty, although he

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9. Bertocci, Art.(1944), 52.

10. Macintosh, PRK, 8.

11. Macintosh, POK, 350.

12. Ibid., 460. See also Bertocci, Art.(1943), 165.

13. See supra, 45-46, and Macintosh, POK, 482.





admits that there may be intuitions which are not truth. There is no doubt of either the crucial place of certainty in Macintosh's thought or his charge that epistemological dualism lacks certainty.

But the certainty which dualism makes impossible, Macintosh insists, is that which springs from "immediate knowledge of independent reality in normal perception." <sup>14</sup> This, however, is not the kind of certainty on which his attempt to construct a "critical monism" is based, for "immediate knowledge of independent reality in normal perception" has nothing to do with "a readiness to act irrevocably, given the appropriate situation." <sup>15</sup>

Such certainty may appear to continue "the practical certainty characteristic of the point of view of common sense and common science," <sup>16</sup> but close examination reveals that the certainty of monistic epistemology based on immediate experience and "(... intellectually adequate) certainty (i. e. intellectual readiness for definitive action)" <sup>17</sup> have no necessary relation to each other. Man's decisive action for any ideal (of which immediate experience is impossible because it is an ideal referring to what does not yet exist) is evidence for the necessary distinction between these

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14. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>3</sup>, 702.

15. Macintosh, POK, 459.

16. Ibid., 335.

17. Ibid., 494.





two kinds of certainty. The practical certainty which is basic for moral living is not limited to any epistemological theory nor to "immediate knowledge of independent reality in normal perception."

Indeed, practical immediacy is "not the immediacy and directness which is supposed to forestall agnosticism."<sup>18</sup> Agnosticism as a theory of knowledge has no logical relation to this practical certainty. The certainty which Macintosh sees as related to agnosticism and dualism is not logically changed by being shared.<sup>19</sup> Only practical certainty is strengthened in this way.

Although Macintosh criticizes dualistic epistemology for lacking the certainty of immediate experience, the kind of certainty essential in his philosophy is the certainty which is practical instead of that which is epistemologically immediate. Practical certainty makes dynamic action possible. In addition, Macintosh believes the certainty which is sufficient for all purposes should be considered. One of the two kinds of logical certainty he recognizes is the certainty illustrated by judgments "fully verified in immediate perceptual experience." The other kind is illustrated by judgments in which "such direct perceptual verification is, for

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18. Bertocci, Ar. (1943), 171.

19. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 178.





some good and sufficient reason, unnecessary." 20

The central place of practical certainty in Macintosh's thought indicates that even for him immediate certainty is less important than his criticism of dualistic epistemology suggests.

His ideas of verification and of representational pragmatism bring these two kinds of certainty into sharp contrast. The pragmatic criterion is, he believes, "constantly superior to the mystical." 21 Macintosh's idea of verification is illustrated in his praise of Bergson's positive emphasis on "the necessity of immediacy." Macintosh proceeds to assert, however, that "properly selected concepts, properly used, in addition to immediacy, mean an enrichment of knowledge." 22 It should be observed that as soon as a critical monist speaks of "properly selected concepts" and admits a distinction between truth and "the spontaneous judgments which emerge out of immediate experience," 23 he is no longer an epistemological monist basing knowledge on immediate certainty. If completely verifying perceptions are "often either temporarily or permanently unattainable by human beings, or else not important enough to be sought at the necessary

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20. Macintosh, POK, 460.

21. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>4</sup>, 380.

22. Macintosh, POK, 404.

23. Ibid., 454.





expense of something else," <sup>24</sup> the intuitionl certainty of immediate experience has been replaced by something else.

Macintosh's recognition of the importance of practical certainty and of the impossibility of complete, certain verification leads one directly to his idea of representational pragmatism. Macintosh's idea of "essential" pragmatism is that the real test of truth is "a test of working." This test make speculation problematic until its results are "verified in the experiences of life." <sup>25</sup> Macintosh's essential pragmatism resembles Kant's pragmatic faith--"a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends." <sup>26</sup> Macintosh's description of his pragmatism as the attempt to "universalize the procedure of the experimental sciences," which is to represent reality "sufficiently for all purposes which ought to be recognized," <sup>27</sup> illustrates Macintosh's attempt to base his monism on science. Macintosh's method, however, is that of refusing to believe that "every sort or degree of practical value can be taken as an indication of truth." <sup>28</sup> He distinguishes between

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24. Macintosh, POK, 454.

25. Ibid., 409.

26. Kant, CPR, 462 (A824, B852).

27. Macintosh, POK, 449.

28. Ibid., 431.





essential pragmatism, which "finds the criterion of truth in its function," and the pragmatism which "identifies truth with its function." <sup>29</sup> Macintosh is "critical" and rejects extreme forms of pragmatism.

He calls his own pragmatism representational; an idea is true when it represents the immediate experience, when it "will do practically as well at least as further experience of the thing in stimulating and controlling action in adjustment of that thing." <sup>30</sup> The idea serves as "a substitute for," but cannot exclude, immediate experience or perception which "can make good its claims only if there can be and is direct presentation." <sup>31</sup>

However, the idea cannot be epistemologically identical with the direct presentation. Representation, like all mediation, is dualistic and therefore must lack the certainty of immediate experience. The distinction between the pragmatism which makes function a criterion of truth and that which identifies it with truth is based on Macintosh's idea of purpose.<sup>32</sup> The function of the idea depends on the purpose of the judgment. But purpose also is dualistic. It is not immediately experienced; it is not epistemologically monistic in present perception. The critical monist, however, even

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29. Macintosh, POK, 422.

30. Ibid., 445.

31. Ibid., 439.

32. See supra, 78-79.





distinguishes that purpose which ought to be considered in making a judgment from the purposes which may be considered.<sup>33</sup> Here again there is an epistemological dualism, for Macintosh does not believe that that which ought to be is completely identical with present experience. If it were, there would not be representational pragmatism; there could be neither representation nor purpose. Although Macintosh's value-knowledge may appear to be a form of epistemological monism and immediate certainty, the so-called experience of an "ought-value" is knowledge not because it is immediate but because it is a value, because it is criticized and related to purpose. The representational pragmatic definition of truth illustrates each of these cases of dualism:

What is taken as truth is representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is really true must be representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment.<sup>34</sup>

In this representational pragmatism Macintosh truly has "lost his monism and his birth certificate for sure objectivity."<sup>35</sup> For the certainty of immediate experience a critical practical certainty is substituted.

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33. Macintosh, POK, 452.

34. Ibid., 444-445. Yet "a change in the 'ought'" explains why truth is not merely relative, Macintosh, Art.(1912), 181.

35. Bertocci, Art.(1943), 171.





Representation makes immediate experience of independent reality epistemologically distinct from what is thought to be monistically present.

Macintosh's idea of verification and his representational pragmatism are important also in his religious thought. His idea of revelation, for example, illustrates how subjective certitude must be tested:

... while the merely subjective certitude of faith or intuition may, if it happens to be true, be conceded to be insight, it is the objectively tested and validated certainty that a reality which is divine in its spiritual value and religious functioning has been discovered and can presumably be discovered in essentially the same way by others, that is alone entitled to be called revelation in the full sense of the term.<sup>36</sup>

Macintosh rejects the idea that the entire content of valid religious beliefs are scientifically verifiable.

What is desirable he says is a fusion and mutual supplementation of pragmatism and mysticism:

If pragmatism is to be saved from an ignoble utilitarianism, it must learn to appreciate and use as a fundamental norm the values experienced in vital personal religion. And if mysticism is to be anything but a form of spiritual dissipation it must submit all its insights and values to the tests of practical life.<sup>37</sup>

He asserts that religious beliefs are composed of "an element of reasonable, practically defensible faith and an element of speculative surmise," as well as "a nucleus of scientifically verified (or at least

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36. Macintosh, Art.(1938)<sup>2</sup>, 458.

37. Macintosh, Art.(1911), 146.





verifiable) religious knowledge." <sup>38</sup> He believes that most theological beliefs are based on "more or less assured intuition and faith, rather than fully verified knowledge." <sup>39</sup> Here again complete certainty of immediate experience of independent reality is replaced by practical certainty, which is dualistic in being "sufficiently critical" and lacks immediate perception.

Macintosh does not seriously seek for absolute and monistic certainty in his religious epistemology.

Practical certainty, which implies purpose and epistemological dualism, takes the place of immediate monistic certainty:

Most of the defensible interesting propositions of theology must remain, I readily admit, in such form and with such certainty as they can have in a normative theological science based upon a critical philosophy of values, or in a metaphysical theology integrated into a general philosophical system.<sup>40</sup>

His departure from the certainty of epistemological monism is also illustrated in his formula of his positive pragmatic faith:

We have the moral right to believe as we must in order to live as we ought--if we can (logically and psychologically), and, more particularly, if we do.<sup>41</sup>

The transcendent aspects of God (which are religiously the most important) also illustrate Macintosh's departure

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38. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 307.

39. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 214.

40. Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 393.

41. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 140.





from monistic certainty in religious knowledge. This is emphasized by the development of his argument against epistemological dualism in religion. His statement of the position of dualistic realism and the lack of certainty in the dualism of the traditional arguments, and the argument from value, either aesthetic (Balfour) or moral (Kant, Rashdall, Sorley, Bailie), shows that Macintosh believes that the logical consequences of dualistic epistemology are religious agnosticism. He blames a fundamental dualism for Mansel's assertion that the divine cannot be experienced,<sup>42</sup> for Spencer's view that the Divine Personality can neither be affirmed nor denied,<sup>43</sup> and for Schleiermacher's anthropocentric theology.<sup>44</sup> The conclusion that these hypotheses "stand in need of objective, empirical verification if they are to be recognized as being, to any extent, in the full sense of the world, religious knowledge"<sup>45</sup> illustrates the lack of certainty which Macintosh objects to in the religious agnosticism of epistemological dualism.

Although he criticizes Croce for rejecting religion because it "undertakes to deal with the transcendent whereas all reality is immanent,"<sup>46</sup> Macintosh believes in both immanent and transcendent aspects of God. Actually

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42. Macintosh, PRK, 231.

43. Ibid., 235.

44. Ibid., 239.

45. Ibid., 242.

46. Ibid., 157.





Divine Reality is "very largely" transcendent for him.<sup>47</sup> In religious perception there are divine processes and a divine factor apart from religious consciousness and appreciation which "exist without being wholly dependent upon such consciousness and appreciation for their reality."<sup>48</sup> The critical monistic realist does not assert the same certain and immediate knowledge of these transcendent aspects, which are at most only partly immanent, that he seeks to maintain of the completely immanent aspects of divine reality. Here, too, he sacrifices the kind of certainty which he finds lacking in dualism.

Of these "persistently transcendent phases of divine reality" certain knowledge is not possible,<sup>49</sup> for these objects can only be subjectively assured and are no more than objectively reasonable matters of faith and intuition. Neither the strength of the conviction nor the adequacy of the critical certitude of object is ever great enough to render them objectively certain. In other words, the transcendent aspects of God can never be treated with epistemologically monistic certainty. At best, they are like the Divine of the religious agnostics, which needs "objective, empirical

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47. Macintosh, PRK, 229.

48. Ibid., 174.

49. Ibid., 357. Cf. also his statement that "for the knowing of the transcendent, representative ideas are required," Macintosh, Art. (1913)<sup>1</sup>, 37.





verification ... to be ... to any extent, in the full sense of the word, religious knowledge." 50 Macintosh recognizes that immediate certainty of these aspects is impossible.

Thus Macintosh has a dualism of the part of divine reality that is immediately experienced and that part which is never present within immediate religious experience.<sup>51</sup> This may not be the same as an epistemological dualism of idea and object, but it logically implies one. Here, too, Macintosh has accepted less than immediate certainty, and he has done it without actually endangering his belief in the transcendent aspects of divine reality.<sup>52</sup> This means epistemologically a distinction in the certainty of those aspects of divine reality which can be immediately experienced and that of those which cannot. Now, if the lack of certainty, for example, is an essential objection to all epistemological dualism, why is it not an equally valid objection to belief in these transcendent aspects of divine reality? Are not the criteria by which all interpretation has taken place and the right religious adjustments been made just as uncertain logically as these transcendent aspects of divine reality? Is not Macintosh's admission of this point which lacks certainty another recognition that

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50. Macintosh, PRK, 242. Cf. supra, 94-95, 96.

51. Ibid., 357.

52. Cf. ibid., 291.





even for him life is not actually based on immediate certainty but on reasonable probability (or practical certainty)?

Macintosh's critical monistic realism, then, is logically no more certain than epistemological dualism. The monistic thinker implicitly sacrifices the certainty he so strongly insists on as soon as he attempts to be critical, and he explicitly sacrifices it in his representational pragmatism and in the religious area, in his idea of the transcendent aspects of divine reality.

The dualist neither demands nor claims immediate certainty but attempts to maintain a coherent epistemology that makes religious knowledge as reasonable as any other scientific knowledge. The dualist recognizes that we do not live by the method of rigor and vigor, of admitting nothing that can be doubted.<sup>53</sup> With the scientist, he admits that we are not guided by certainty "in nine-tenths of the most important affairs of daily life."<sup>54</sup> While epistemological dualism may lack the immediate certainty which Macintosh demands, this kind of certainty is both logically contradicted and explicitly abandoned by the critical monist himself. The degree and kind of practical certainty required by life is actually amply provided by the dualistic epistemology

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53. See Bowne, *THE*, 17, and *TTK*, 371.

54. Huxley in Shapley and others, *TOS*, 20.





of personalism.<sup>55</sup>

## 2. Is idealism subjective?

Another charge Macintosh makes against rival systems of philosophy is that they are dogmatic. The metaphysics of dualism is dogmatic, he believes, because dualism lacks immediate certainty. Although he does distinguish idealism from dualism, Macintosh's criticism of idealism raises a question related to dualism--"Is idealism subjective?" Macintosh's criticism of dualism rests on an affirmative answer to this question about idealism. While all dualism may not require idealistic metaphysics, Macintosh's interpretation of idealism as necessarily subjective, as denying objectivity, is basic for his criticism of dualism. If all idealism is subjective, there can be no epistemological dualism. Macintosh believes all idealism is subjective, and thus his criticism of idealism is an essential part of his attack on dualism.

If Macintosh did not hold that all idealism is subjective, there might be reference to objective reality and hence epistemological dualism. Macintosh's interpretation of idealism as the denial of objectivity is thus important for his case against dualism and an

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55. See discussion of knowledge as certain or as heuristic, Brightman, POR, 194. Cf. Caldecott's view of personalism as an empirical method aiming at practical certainty, PREA, 80-86. Cf. also Brightman, Art.(1922), 257.





evaluation of Macintosh's criticism of idealism is imperative.

Macintosh is basically an epistemological realist, although he seeks to be a metaphysical realist in some respects. His central assertion about the problem of knowledge is that the objective world exists independently of the knower, that the knower does not create it but finds it.<sup>56</sup> Since he considers all idealism to be subjective, he accepts epistemological realism and argues against all kinds of idealism. Much of his thought may be understood as a search for the objectivity which he believes idealism lacks.

In religious knowledge, for example, he attacks psychological idealism, logical idealism, and what he calls logical-psychological idealism,<sup>57</sup> much as he objects to the various forms of idealism in general knowledge.<sup>58</sup> He sees each kind of idealism as inferior to his own realism. His interpretation of the dilemma of the empiricists, for example, illustrates the problem idealism raises for him:

If all the reality we can know is the immediate content of our consciousness, we are obviously shut up to a choice between subjectivism and agnosticism.<sup>59</sup>

He is an epistemological realist who thinks all doctrines

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56. Cf. *supra*, 58-59.

57. Macintosh, PRK, Part II.

58. See Chapter V, *supra*.

59. Macintosh, PFW, 46.





which regard the objective world as dependent on or of the nature of consciousness alone make knowledge subjective, and thus are impossible.

Macintosh is a realist who welcomes the idea of the "Given" and "the personal realism and theistic realism to which Mr. Brightman already subscribes [and] ... a realism of the physical universe, mechanical and super-mechanical" as a possible "first step toward his conversion ... from traditional personalism to realism." <sup>60</sup> One of his statements about personalism illustrates Macintosh's failure to consider arguments for metaphysical idealism and his almost exclusive concern with epistemological realism and epistemological idealism:

Personalism maintains not only that persons, divine and human, are real, but that nothing else has metaphysical reality; and in order to prove this, it has resorted to artificial arguments.<sup>61</sup>

These applications of his epistemological realism show the importance of a critical examination of Macintosh's objections to idealism and a careful investigation of whether all idealism is subjective for an evaluation of his criticism of dualism.

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60. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 307. Note also Macintosh's marginal notation in his copy of Brightman, RV, 171, in which he replies to the view of theistic personalism as "the most comprehensive philosophy of religious values" by adding "theism, not necessarily theistic personalism, if personalism be defined as on page 167."

61. Macintosh, PFW, 263.





Macintosh's central objection to idealism is illustrated by the "vitiating" initial error in "the dogma of psychological idealism"--that "I know only my own ideas." <sup>62</sup> Underlying this objection to all forms of idealism is his interpretation of this position, which he believes is the basic assumption of all idealism, to mean that there is no objective reality. The idealistic doctrine, which he sees danger of accepting uncritically, is that "the object is, in toto, a creation of the thought activity of the subject." <sup>63</sup> Although he believes that Drake's escape from epistemological dualism is only verbal, <sup>64</sup> he would agree with Drake in charging that the subjectively-minded thinker is "shut in, according to his theory, to 'ideas,' i. e. to mental substitutes for outer objects." <sup>65</sup> Macintosh believes that the view that a thinker knows only his own ideas means the denial of all objectivity and that idealism is thus incompatible with epistemological realism. Personalistic epistemological dualism, however, requires that idealism is not thus necessarily subjective, but that one's ideas may refer to what is both epistemologically distinct from his present awareness and metaphysically independent (in quantity) and objective to consciousness.

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62. Macintosh, POK, 129.

63. Macintosh, PFW, 142.

64. Macintosh, Art.(1927)<sup>1</sup>, 132-133.

65. Drake in Drake and others, ECR, 3.





Macintosh is so interested in maintaining independent objective reality that any form of idealism appears dangerous to him. He thinks, for example, that logical idealism rests on selecting what is universal and necessary in psychological idealism and regarding it as true.<sup>66</sup> His objection to this form of idealism is that it is an abstraction from the reality under consideration and that it suffers, therefore, from the original fallacy of psychological idealism, although it tends to pass from logical idealism to logical realism.<sup>67</sup> Of all the forms of idealism, he prefers logical idealism (although it is abstract), for he believes that psychological and mystical idealism are especially subjective.<sup>68</sup> He sees Husserl as one who fell "into the error of logical idealism," and "abstracted from the abstraction" placing himself "at least on the verge of logical realism as well."<sup>69</sup> Hegel's assertion that "no judgment can be really true" Macintosh believes results from "taking mere identity of idea with reality as the sole criterion and definition of truth ... with the help of the idealistic interpretation of reality."<sup>70</sup> Macintosh is an epistemological realist who objects to all the idealistic interpretations of reality because

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66. See supra, 70.

67. Macintosh, POK, 89. See also supra, 74.

68. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 28.

69. Macintosh, POK, 203.

70. Ibid., 374.





he believes that all idealism is subjective, that it denies objectivity.

He believes that Bradley is an exception who detected the logical fallacy of idealism and refused to make the "subject-matter in any case a mere product of thought." However, Macintosh thinks that even Bradley remained in the clutches of subjective idealism:

... he retained the idealistic doctrine of the necessary internality of ... all relations ... as established by and dependent upon the process of human thought.<sup>71</sup>

The only hope Macintosh see for the Absolute of both Bradley and Bosanquet is in recognizing a reality of which some Being could have an adequate experience. Macintosh believes that this kind of self-consistent philosophy, however, is unattainable "so long as the fundamental dogma of idealism, that reality is idea or experience, is retained." <sup>72</sup> Macintosh holds that this same fallacy is the basis of the "provisional subjective idealism" which led Royce to develop "a solipsism of the Absolute Self, as the only logical escape from a solipsism of the finite self." <sup>73</sup>

Macintosh's defense of epistemological realism against all forms of idealism shows his distrust of any theory that regards reality as idea or experience,

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71. Macintosh, POK, 376.

72. Ibid., 159.

73. Ibid., 386.





whether or not it recognizes that reality is independent of the individual's consciousness. His epistemological interpretation of all idealism and his failure to consider the metaphysical arguments for idealism result in his treating idealism "rather cavalierly" in many places and his making "short work" of thinkers like Bradley and Royce without greatly strengthening "the general argument" of some of his writings.<sup>74</sup>

The comparison of his thought to various forms of idealism leads Macintosh to discover epistemological realism in the thought not only of contemporary personalists but also of other idealists. Macintosh sees, for example, a combination of realism and idealism in the thought of Eucken. The idea of "an independent Spiritual Life" is realistic (epistemologically), but the denial of independent physical reality (of metaphysical realism) leads Macintosh to conclude that Eucken's philosophy is "still in some sense idealistic,"<sup>75</sup> although the basic interest in "spiritual realism" may not be "really so incompatible with physical realism as Eucken seems to suppose."<sup>76</sup>

Macintosh sees in Boodin's thought also an attempted

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74. MacIntosh, Art.(1926), 206.

75. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 315.

76. Macintosh, POK, 209.





realism in the clutches of idealism. Boodin's realism means "reference to an object existing beyond the apperceptive unity of momentary individual consciousness." <sup>77</sup> This is epistemological realism, although one would have to overlook the epistemological dualism of all reference to regard it as epistemological monism.<sup>78</sup> The interpretation of all idealism to mean epistemological idealism is an identification of metaphysics with epistemology which Macintosh fails anywhere to justify. Boodin's empirical idealism creates a special problem for Macintosh's realistic view. Macintosh thinks Boodin must mean in some of the places where he uses "objective" a frank expression of subjectivism, unless he means existent "independently of our own contexts of significance." <sup>79</sup> But this is the meaning of epistemological realism, regardless of the metaphysical view of the nature of reality. The assertion that the nature of reality is idea has no necessary relation to its existence independent of the knowing subject, especially in the sense of denying the possibility of such existence.

Also the charge of social subjectivism <sup>80</sup> shows Macintosh's identification of metaphysical with epistemological idealism. But epistemological realism is not altered by multiplying the number of knowing

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77. Macintosh, POK, 228.

78. Supra, 55-56.

79. Macintosh, POK, 229.

80. Supra, 71-72.





subjects, nor is it necessarily removed by positing a supreme knower. The object, regardless of its metaphysical quality, may be found, not made, by an infinite number of knowers either human or divine, without its existence being identical with any or all the knowing subjects. Even an attempt to identify the objective world with a form of divine or social subjective epistemological monism does not remove the epistemological dualism.

The necessary subjective residence of all knowledge, indicated, for example, in the "completely human subjectivity of all our knowledge" to which Macintosh objects in the thought of Lotze,<sup>81</sup> does not preclude objectivity and thus logically mean solipsism. Actually the experienced fact of resistance to his will leads the idealist to believe that his ideas refer to objective reality and to regard his idealism as objective instead of merely subjective.

Furthermore it is no more logically necessary to conclude that this subjectivity of knowledge denies objective reality than it would be to say that experienced sense-qualities are merely subjective because they are the products of the sensing activity of a conscious subject. However, Macintosh believes that these sense-qualities, although produced subjectively,

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81. Macintosh, POK, 47-48.





exist objectively.<sup>82</sup>

Logical-psychological idealism as the "introduction of logical idealism into psychological idealism in order to transform subjective idealism into an idealism that shall do full justice to objectivity"<sup>83</sup> is an illustration of Macintosh's view of all (metaphysical) idealism as solipsistic, as epistemological idealism opposed to his own realism. Indeed, one must "always be on his intellectual guard ... when he meets the phrase 'nothing but.'" <sup>84</sup> However, one needs to be even more on his guard lest he interpret theological ideas which are said to represent divine reality, for example, as therefore "nothing but copies" of it. The fact that they are ideas does not necessarily mean that they are merely subjective and cannot refer to objective reality.

This view that metaphysical idealism means antirealism in epistemology is the basis of Macintosh's charge that logical-psychological idealism is a dogmatism with the fallacies of both forms of the idealism which it combines.<sup>85</sup> The subsequent interpretation of this idealism to mean that "things cannot exist apart from knowledge" and yet that "the world of knowledge may

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82. Macintosh, PFW, 213.

83. Macintosh, POK, 206.

84. Macintosh, Art.(1940)<sup>1</sup>, 152.

85. Macintosh, POK, 127. Cf. supra, 70.





exist apart from any actual knower" <sup>86</sup> and the assertion that one must "choose between 'my experience' (subjectivism) and unexperienced 'experience' (abstractionism)" <sup>87</sup> also indicate that Macintosh interprets all idealism as denying the existence of all reality which is epistemologically independent of the subject. The "reductio ad absurdum" of idealism reflects his idea of idealism as necessarily subjective:

If we assume that the object is, through and through, the construct of the subject, either there is only one subject because the objective world is only one, or else there are many objective worlds, one for each subject, because the subjects are many. <sup>88</sup>

Macintosh's investigation of idealism as a form of monism and as distinct from dualism in his two major writings on epistemology also shows his idea that all idealism is epistemological monism, although in The Problem of Religious Knowledge Macintosh seems more inclined to consider personalism as a form of dualism than as epistemological idealism <sup>89</sup> and fails to make an extensive examination of absolute idealism in religious knowledge.

The subjectivism of idealism has long been a problem of philosophical speculation. Perry, for example, says that subjectivism cannot be abolished

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86. Macintosh, POK, 197.

87. Ibid., 208.

88. Macintosh, PFW, 142.

89. See Macintosh, PRK, Parts II and IV.





but "must ... be retained as a 'Durchgangstadium' on the way to a complete idealism." <sup>90</sup> Macintosh's position is clear in his demand that idealists remember that "the German idealistic movement from Kant to Hegel is ... a way of escape from the Humian sceptical psychologism" and that idealism can never "disown its subjectivistic ancestry." <sup>91</sup> But ancestry determines neither value nor truth. Truth requires a critical investigation of all the problems, both epistemological and metaphysical.

The various meanings of "subjective" adds to the confusion. Macintosh regards the subjectivism of idealism as indicative of its essential weakness, of the "insecurity of its foundation." <sup>92</sup> In his criticism he charges that personal idealism is especially objectionable because it is the "most subjective type of psychological idealism." <sup>93</sup> However, all knowledge must actually be subjective in belonging to a conscious self. Macintosh's emphasis on experience <sup>94</sup> also shows that he recognizes the importance of the subject. The dualistic epistemology of personalism <sup>95</sup> indicates that idealistic metaphysics needs not necessarily deny

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90. Perry, PPT, 163.

91. Macintosh, POK, 128.

92. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 311.

93. Macintosh, POK, 189.

94. See supra, 45-46.

95. See Chapter IV, supra.





objectivity. "Subjective," meaning related to the subject, must be distinguished from "subjective" as a denial of metaphysical reality or as meaning epistemological idealism.

Many thinkers have regarded idealism as objective. Berkeley, for example, considered the problem and concluded that idealism is not subjectivism in his Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.<sup>96</sup> The requirement of a conscious subject and the subjective residence of all knowledge do not mean the denial of objectivity; idealism does not require that knowledge is not objective in its reference. Both objectivity and the nature of the object can be determined only by examining experience and attempting to formulate the most adequate explanation of all consciousness, of all truth claims. Bradley's conclusion that it is idle to repeat, "I want something," unless it can be shown that "the nature of things demands it also"<sup>97</sup> reflects his recognition of this truth, even within the limits of his logical system. In fact, he distinguishes between appearance and reality by applying the criterion of what is consistent and intelligible:

Anything the meaning of which is inconsistent and unintelligible is appearance, and not reality.<sup>98</sup>

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96. See Bradley, WOR, I, especially 442-485.

97. Bradley, AAR, 510.

98. Ibid., 76.





An evaluation of Macintosh's case against dualism leads one to the conclusion that it is arbitrary to consider idealism as necessarily subjective, as requiring that all idealism is epistemologically monistic. Metaphysical idealism need not deny the objectivity of reality; in fact, in its personalistic form metaphysical idealism requires the objective reality of the object. Metaphysical idealism is a theory of the nature of reality which affirms its objectivity and denies only nonmental reality. Epistemological idealism, however, is a theory about the objectivity of reality which identifies the existence of objective reality with the idea of it. Epistemological idealism, as Macintosh would agree, logically means some form of subjectivism. Actually this is the kind of idealism to which he is opposed, and in contrast to which his thought may be regarded, in part, a search for objectivity.

If the existence of objective reality is identified with the idea of it, indeed there can be no objective reality. This is epistemological idealism. Metaphysical idealism only requires that the nature of the objective reality is qualitatively like consciousness, not that objects cease to exist when the thinker's idea of them no longer is a part of present consciousness. Epistemological idealism does not necessarily require metaphysical idealism; in fact, it makes metaphysical idealism in





the personalistic form impossible. Epistemological idealism says nothing about the metaphysical quality of the object. Metaphysical idealism does not require epistemological idealism either. Metaphysical idealism is a theory about the quality of objective reality, which, in fact, is made less acceptable by combining epistemological with metaphysical idealism. Metaphysical idealism is not necessarily subjective. It does not preclude the possibility of epistemological dualism.

However, all knowledge is subjective in the sense of its concrete relation to a knowing subject. Idealism is not subjective as a theory of the existence of objective reality, but all knowledge is subjective in the sense of being related to a conscious subject.

### 3. Is dualism irrational?

The third question, "Is dualism irrational?" raises two problems. One is the relation of dogmatism and irrationalism to dualism. The other concerns irrationalism in Macintosh's thought.

Although Macintosh's charges of fundamental dogmatism are directed toward various forms of idealism and especially of realism, the impact of the whole discussion and the organization of both The Problem of Knowledge and The Problem of Religious Knowledge





suggest that he thinks that dualism is also distinctly irrational because of its agnosticism, because it lacks immediate certainty and logical necessity. His discussion of dualism in religious knowledge ends with an examination of reactionary irrationalism, which is rooted, he believes, in the subjective foundation of man's "feelings and appreciations."<sup>99</sup> In addition, Macintosh believes that this agnosticism shows the irrationalism of dualism. He seeks to transcend this difficulty by the certainty of his own critical monistic realism.

The relation of agnosticism to dualism has already been examined.<sup>100</sup> The absolute certainty lacking in dualism was found to be replaced even in Macintosh's thought by practical certainty. The tendency toward irrationalism in the subjectivity of idealism, which Macintosh regards as solipsistic, grows out of a failure to distinguish precisely between epistemological and metaphysical idealism, between subjective as a denial of all objectivity and subjective meaning related to a subject.

That dualism is inclined toward irrationalism in another sense, however, is not denied. In asserting that no immediate experience is, qua immediate experience,

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99. Macintosh, PRK, 326.

100. Supra, 84-100.





rational knowledge the dualist leaves his philosophy open to this charge of irrationalism. Dualism requires that each hypothesis about the object be tested by reason. In this respect dualism is neutral; it does not provide immediately certain knowledge. It makes all knowledge dependent on reason. Reason is not abstract and separate from experience. Reason is a part of experience in the sense that reason may be experienced and in the sense that no experience may be interpreted or adequately understood without being related to reason.

Immediate experience gives only truth-claims, not certain truth. In immediate experience there are only value-claims, although each carries the claim to be a true value. No truth is possible as truth until immediate experience has been tested and evaluated, until immediacy has been supplemented by mediation. For the dualist all experience "always points beyond itself" and its testimony "is always subject to tests by further and more critical experience." <sup>101</sup> This explanation of experience may be, to an epistemological monist, indicative of the irrationalism in dualism. But for the dualist it means only that the nature of experience and reason require continual development; knowledge is ever-increasing growth of both reason and experience.

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101. Brightman, POR, 415.





The real question, then, is not whether dualism is completely free from all irrationalism but whether dualism is more or less irrational than monism. This makes an examination of irrationalism in Macintosh's monism, for example, essential.

Macintosh's attempt to avoid irrational dogmatism is shown in his treatments of epistemological problems. He discovers that the realist Riehl assumed that "something different from and independent of consciousness exists," <sup>102</sup> and that Montague's realistic epistemological monism is "entirely a matter of faith," of believing what "there is sufficient reason for disbelieving." <sup>103</sup> Macintosh therefore rejects absolute realism because of its "undue dogmatism" about the extent that reality is independent of consciousness.<sup>104</sup>

He also finds as "unwarranted dogmatism" in neo-realism; for example, the interpretation of consciousness by both English and American neo-realists he believes is "a new dogmatism in opposition to the dogmatism of idealism." <sup>105</sup> This dogmatism of the neo-realistic position leads neo-realists to treat both ideas and truth "in very cavalier fashion." <sup>106</sup> Macintosh believes that both neo-realism and the new mysticism

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102. Quoted from Der philosophische Kritizismus, in Macintosh, POK, 31.

103. Macintosh, POK, 289.

104. Ibid., 309.

105. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 309.

106. Macintosh, POK, 395.





are uncritical and "ultra-dogmatic." 107

He opposes the irrational dogmatism also in idealism. Macintosh believes that "supposing that because the mind is active in perception it must be supposed to construct that which is perceived" is an error as dogmatic as irrational dogmatism in realism.<sup>108</sup> He criticizes, for example, Bradley's metaphysics as both dogmatic and logically untenable<sup>109</sup> and believes that the first thesis of Hocking's dialectical system "is an unnecessary dogma." 110

Macintosh's own critical realistic position results from his attempt to avoid the dogmatic irrationalism of both realism and idealism and also the irrational agnosticism of dualism.<sup>111</sup> He thinks that realistic epistemological monism, for example, escapes "the dilemma of absolute solipsism [resulting from epistemological idealism] or absolute agnosticism [resulting from dualism]." 112 Macintosh believes that his realistic monism "is free" from the "fallacies, the subjectivisms, and abstractionisms of idealism in its various forms and the fallacies and final agnosticism of dualism." 113 He regards his realism as a "critical synthesis of certain

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107. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 310.

108. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 31.

109. Macintosh, POK, 151.

110. Ibid., 164-165. See also Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 36.

111. Cf. Bertocci, Art.(1944), 52.

112. Macintosh, POK, 312.

113. Ibid., 310.





mutually harmonious elements" of the naive realism and the modern school of critical realism.<sup>114</sup> He seeks also to avoid a morphological or structural dogmatism of knowledge by critically recognizing the truth in both conception and perception.<sup>115</sup>

His "activistic empiricism" is an attempt to recognize the activity of the mind in rationalism and yet be empirical and scientific.<sup>116</sup> This is the basis of Macintosh's doctrine of secondary and tertiary qualities.<sup>117</sup> Secondary qualities result from creative sense-activities and tertiary qualities from creative thought-activities.<sup>118</sup> This same idea also leads to his doctrine of relations as internal or external relative to "this or that purpose." <sup>119</sup>

Another synthesis is illustrated by his idea of representational pragmatism. At the heart of both intellectualism and pragmatism Macintosh finds what he calls representationalism. Thus he regards his representational pragmatism as "a 'higher synthesis' of intellectualism and pragmatic anti-intellectualism." <sup>120</sup> He believes that his position substitutes a soluble problem for the "insoluble, artificial problems of

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114. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>1</sup>, 229.

115. Macintosh, POK, 338.

116. Ibid., 365. See also Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>.

117. Cf. supra, 78-79.

118. Macintosh, POK, 365.

119. Ibid., 380.

120. Ibid., 443.





current epistemological and intellectualist logic,"<sup>121</sup>  
and is a further synthesis of intuitionism and  
representational pragmatism.<sup>122</sup>

Macintosh's presentation of his own thought as a  
synthesis of this kind leads to the question of his  
eclecticism. At the close of The Problem of Knowledge  
he expresses the fear that he may not "have been, in a  
possible sense of the term, eclectic enough."<sup>123</sup> He  
has been praised for being in some of his writings:

... a philosophical eclectic, with quick  
intellectual sympathy, and an uncommon ability  
to appropriate, assimilate, and utilize the  
best of some of the systems which he rejects  
as such.<sup>124</sup>

The ability to see and accept the truth in the views  
which one rejects is indeed commendable. Macintosh  
also does well in attempting to maintain "internal  
consistency and fidelity to facts."<sup>125</sup> However, there  
is a central difference between mere consistency and  
coherence. Macintosh strives for the first; his lack  
of the second illustrates his somewhat limited, abstract  
concepts of reason and coherence, a possible irrationalism  
in his thought.

His own discussions of coherence suggest a part of  
the reason why his thought lacks coherence. For example,

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121. Macintosh, POK, 446.

122. Ibid., 453.

123. 496.

124. MacIntosh, Art.(1926), 206.

125. Macintosh, POK, 496. Cf. his emphasis on "a  
self-consistent system," in Runes (ed.), TCP,  
218.





he speaks of coherence as follows:

... correspondence simmers down to mere coherence, the sticking together in some way of subject and predicate, both being thought of as mere ideas, and the cohesive substance being a compound of the categories, themselves a special sort of ideas.<sup>126</sup>

His position as a realist may lead him to hold that there is truth inaccessible to the realm of ideas, but as soon as he has any idea of this truth or as soon as his "objective reality" has any relation at all to any idea (even to the idea of it as objective reality), reason requires not merely a lack of contradiction but also a positive unity of thought and explanation that is as inclusive as possible. Coherence<sup>127</sup> adds to consistency the ideals of inclusiveness<sup>128</sup> and system. Personalistic epistemology is an attempt to give a coherent explanation of knowledge.

Macintosh's reference to "systems" also illustrates his rejection of this ideal of coherence. He says, for example, that Bradley's "splendid system" fails to solve the problem of truth and reality,<sup>129</sup> without even questioning whether it was the systematic nature of

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126. Macintosh, *Art.* (1912), 169. Cf. also Macintosh, *POK*, 373. See also the marginal note in his copy of Brightman, *RV*, where reference is made to coherence as "our ideal," "the Supreme Court of Reason." Macintosh comments: "Not mere coherence of hypothesis, but verification in agreement with impersonal reality." (Brightman, *RV*, 23.)

127. See Brightman, *POR*, 126-129. Cf. also his classroom discussion of coherence on October 28, 1941.

128. For discussion of the inclusiveness of the empirical method of personalism see *supra*, 47-49.

129. Macintosh, *POK*, 381.





Bradley's thought or the failure of Bradley's system to "appreciate the theoretical value of practical considerations, as well as the practical value of theory" that made Bradley's idealism unsatisfactory. There is nothing about systematic unity and coherence that actually makes either of these, or any other, values irrelevant. Coherence is the demand for an inclusive, consistent system in explaining experience. Macintosh's reference to "systems of conclusions" <sup>130</sup> also suggests his idea of "system" as abstract, nonempirical, and not inclusive of all experience. The lack of systematic unity in his critical monism is a serious shortcoming of Macintosh's thought. To the extent that life and reason require coherence rather than mere consistency Macintosh's monistic realism is inadequate and irrational, although where he actually uses coherence his thought is fruitful with many valuable suggestions.

His rejection of coherence is thus an internal as well as an external criticism of Macintosh's thought. In the epistemology of his monism the kind of immediate certainty which is implicitly lost by his critical position is explicitly denied of the transcendent aspects of divine reality. This logical difficulty is especially apparent in his assertion of the "overlapping" of the transcendent and those other aspects of divine

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130. Macintosh, POK, 468. Cf. "any system as a whole," Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 203.





reality which, he believes, may be immediately experienced:

There is, however, a partial identity or over-lapping of the divine as immediately experienced and the divine as independently real.<sup>131</sup>

Overlapping and "harmonization" <sup>132</sup> in religious perception imply a unity. But this unity is not given by mere consistency and epistemological monism. Is the "unitary divine reality," which is partly transcendent and partly immediately and certainly perceived, known monistically? Has not the critical monistic realist rather become dualistic and had to turn to coherence rather than mere consistency to meet the demands of reason and of his faith?

The unity of divine reality cannot itself be a datum of immediately certain monistic knowledge, if some aspect of the reality cannot be immediately and certainly known. Nor can the relation of the transcendent and immediately experienceable aspects be known immediately. Logically, the epistemological monist, as long as he remains a monist, is in the position one critic charged of Kant's idea of the self:

... no sooner had Kant exorcized the ego as a knowable soul from his system, and swept and garnished the place which it had occupied, than five other egos returned to the place

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131. Macintosh, PRK, 178.

132. Ibid., 170.





left empty. For Kant tells us of the empirical ego, bound by the chains of causation; and of the ego as the transcendental unity of apperception, which is neither cause nor effect, neither substance nor attribute, but only a logical point of reference; and of the ego as a thing-in-itself, unknowable; and of the ego as a transcendental ideal, the goal of knowledge; and of the moral ego, which posits its own freedom. This is a real bedevilment of the situation.<sup>133</sup>

The epistemological monist faces a similar confusion, for example, if he, as a monist using only consistency and not coherence, tries to unite the different aspects of divine reality.

This lack of systematic unity in critical monism, clearly expressed by Macintosh's doctrine of the transcendent aspects of divine reality, reveals that mere monism lacks coherence and therefore is more irrational than dualism. Consistency alone is not enough. Only by applying coherence, and not mere consistency, can there be the needed "synthesis of the valuational and the existential in theology" which Macintosh seeks,<sup>134</sup> for example, and religious and general epistemology be brought together.

Reason's demand for coherence is recognized, and the failure to provide it indicates irrationalism in Macintosh's thought. The distinction between immediate

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133. Lyman, Art.(1924), 128-129. Cited in Knudson, POP, 73n.

134. Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 24-25.





certainty and the relation of the knower to the transcendent aspects of divine reality implies either a breakdown of the sufficiency of monism or a change in the nature of reason. Mere consistency and knowledge as immediately certain in epistemological monism have failed here. The need for one to be as reasonable as possible <sup>135</sup> is an implicit recognition of coherence, of as much consistent system and inclusiveness as possible.

The charge that dualism is irrational, raised especially by Macintosh's discussion of religious knowledge, has led to the discovery that in his own treatment of dogmatism and in his interest in consistency Macintosh has overlooked the other essential ideals of coherence and that his thought is more irrational than dualism.

Is the certainty lacking in dualism necessary? Is idealism subjective? Is dualism irrational? This examination of these questions involved in Macintosh's case against dualism reveals that even Macintosh's thought is not based on immediate certainty, which he criticizes dualism for lacking, that it is arbitrary to conclude that all idealism is subjectivism (is epistemological idealism), and that epistemological dualism is less irrational than monism. Metaphysical and religious implications of Macintosh's criticism of personalism are now the important problems for investigation.

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<sup>135</sup>. Macintosh, PRK, 358.





## CHAPTER VII

## THE IDEALISTIC METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALISM

Macintosh's criticism of personalism reveals not only his monistic epistemological realism but also certain implications of his epistemology and his realism in metaphysics. The idealistic forms of personalism are a special target for critical realists. Brief statements of the idealistic metaphysics of the personalism under consideration and of Macintosh's objection to this position suffice to introduce the problem. The answer empirical personalists make to this objection, however, requires a more detailed examination of Macintosh's metaphysics and reveals more fully the implications of the idealistic metaphysics of personalism.

## 1. The personalistic denial of nonmental reality

The metaphysical position of personalism illustrates the philosophy of the "lover of intellect and knowledge" described by Plato in the Timaeus (46) as holding that "the only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul." <sup>1</sup> Bowne also has described the metaphysical position of personalism:

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1. See Jowett (tr.), DOP, II, 27.





Only the definite and only the active can be viewed as ontologically real. ... Metaphysically considered, being is self-centred activity. ... Things exist only in their activities, and have no being apart from them.<sup>2</sup>

But when Bowne went ahead to state that things are "concreted formulas of action" <sup>3</sup> and to define the nature of a thing as "that law or principle which determines the form or character of its activity," <sup>4</sup> Bowne became more rationalistic than empirical, for a law is a construct of reason rather than a datum of experience. He stated the idealistic metaphysics of personalism, however, very precisely:

It finally appeared that the world of things can be defined and understood only as we give up the notion of an extra-mental reality altogether, and make the entire world a thought world; that is, a world that exists only through and in relation to intelligence. ... It [this view] is idealism, as denying all extra-mental existence and making the world of objective experience a thought world which would have neither meaning nor possibility apart from intelligence.<sup>5</sup>

The personalistic denial of the extramental and substantial reality of things is continued by Knudson, for example. He holds that "the only satisfactory way to escape the materialistic or atheistic conclusion" is by denying the "realistic thesis that matter and material things are metaphysically real." <sup>6</sup> He

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2. Bowne, MET, 17, 25, 31.

3. Ibid., 31.

4. Ibid., 39.

5. Ibid., 422-423.

6. Knudson, POP, 374.





believes that asserting the phenomenality of matter is the best way to "keep the physical in its place and prevent it from tyrannizing over life as a whole." <sup>7</sup>

If one is to "let the realistic camel's nose into the tent of faith," <sup>8</sup> there is danger, he believes, that faith may be destroyed.

As Macintosh recognizes, personal idealism is the doctrine "that 'persons only are real' ... and that nothing impersonal exists." <sup>9</sup> The empirical meaning of the fact that "the personalist recognizes no extramental impersonal reality" <sup>10</sup> may be seen in the hypothesis that physical energy is "the active will of the cosmic mind," <sup>11</sup> is qualitatively like what is experienced.

## 2. Macintosh's objection

While other representatives might be selected to illustrate the idealistic metaphysics of personalism, these are sufficient to show the personalistic denial of extramental reality. Macintosh objects to this denial. For example, he grants that religion must be personal and metaphysical, but cannot see why it needs to be "personalistic in the sense that there is no reality except what is personal." <sup>12</sup> Why, he asks, "should we be asked to believe that is the last analysis there is

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7. Knudson, POP, 375.

8. Ibid., 376.

9. Macintosh, PFW, 145n.

10. Brightman, Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>, 461.

11. Brightman, POR, 232.

12. Macintosh, Art.(1926)<sup>2</sup>, 320.





nothing real except persons?"<sup>13</sup> The idea that nothing except persons has metaphysical realisty seems to him to be supported only by artificial personalistic arguments.<sup>14</sup> He is repelled by "the seemingly unnecessary and unprovable dogma that persons are the only realities."<sup>15</sup> He criticizes the idealistic metaphysics of personalism because of its thesis that nothing impersonal exists "except as ideas dependent upon the thought activity of persons."<sup>16</sup>

Macintosh's rejection of the idealistic metaphysics of personalism is clear in this brief survey. A more complete explanation and comparison of his view with personalistic metaphysics appear in the answer of empirical personalists to his objection.

### 3. The answer of empirical personalists

In comparing Macintosh's and the empirical personalist's metaphysics questions about both methodology and conclusions arise. Special problems about methodology include the relations of theology to metaphysics, of the subjective to objective factors in metaphysical knowledge, and of reason to one's metaphysics.

Macintosh recognizes the importance of metaphysics and regards it as one of the two main parts of all philosophy; criticism or the philosophy of values is

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13. Macintosh, Art.(1924), 1370.

14. See supra, 102.

15. Macintosh, Art.(1926)<sup>2</sup>, 316.

16. Macintosh, PFW, 145n.





the other.<sup>17</sup> In this respect, he agrees with the personalistic demand for metaphysics--"it is only a metaphysically interpreted experience that can serve the purpose of theology."<sup>18</sup>

Although early in his philosophical studies Macintosh recognized the revolt against metaphysics in theology,<sup>19</sup> he does not seek to establish a theology without metaphysics. In fact, in his dissertation, reality is explained as an object to which adjustment is made:

The moment ... [one] can no longer regard God as Object to which he adjusts himself, that moment the God-idea ceases to exercise its function in the religious life.<sup>20</sup>

Macintosh also speaks of entering "into a metaphysical home of our own."<sup>21</sup> In the revolt against metaphysics in theology he sees a quest not for anti-metaphysical or non-metaphysical theology but for greater certainty. He believes that Augustine's reaction, for example, was "in the interest of religious certainty."<sup>22</sup> In the first part of his dissertation Macintosh concludes that the desire to regain religious certainty has "animated the movements antagonistic to traditional metaphysics."<sup>23</sup>

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17. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 129. Note that Macintosh holds also that "there can be no adequate metaphysics without theology," Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 316.

18. Knudson, DOG, 195.

19. See his dissertation, RMT; cf. his article in Runes (ed.), TCP, 197-219.

20. Macintosh, RMT, 84.

21. Macintosh, PFW, 204.

22. Macintosh, RMT, 18.

23. Ibid., 56.





The distinction between this practical certainty and the kind of certainty lacking in dualism has already been seen.<sup>24</sup> The certainty with which empirical metaphysics must be compatible is not immediate certainty but practical certainty. Macintosh associates the reasonableness of Christianity with this practical certainty:

... if ... the theology referred to can enrich the doctrinal content of empirical metaphysics where it most needs to be supplemented, and can add to its certainty by furnishing progressive verification of some of its most important theories in practical religious experience, the argument for the reasonableness of Christianity will be more than sufficient.<sup>25</sup>

The basis of Macintosh's metaphysics in common experience is illustrated also by his realism. He describes his (personal) realism, for example, as "the doctrine of the ultimate, permanent reality of persons, human and divine, [which] is really derived from common experience."<sup>26</sup> He criticizes forms of both mysticism and new realism because they are dogmatic "and a fantastical departure from critical common-sense."<sup>27</sup> In fact, his idea of "the real problem before the philosopher" is to combine the ethical and religious values of theistic personal idealism, the common sense of realism, and certain insights of functional

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24. See Chapter VI, *supra*.

25. Macintosh, ROC, 250-251.

26. Macintosh, PFW, 264.

27. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 140.





psychology contained in the best pragmatism.<sup>28</sup>

Macintosh's eclectic attempt to bring together these different emphases characterizes his metaphysics, as well as his epistemology.<sup>29</sup> He describes his "new metaphysics" as:

... a rational synthesis of the well-established results of the recognized sciences, together with such metaphysical inferences as may be logically drawn from critically established values, and such elements of empirical theology as may have fulfilled the conditions of scientific verification.<sup>30</sup>

He describes his metaphysical method as "a synthesis of the general results of a scientific investigation of reality with such inferences as can be logically drawn from critically validated values."<sup>31</sup> In comparing his thought with Coe's, for example, he expresses his idea of the relation of metaphysics and values:

There may be, and I believe there is, a place for drawing metaphysical inferences from the validity of certain values, but clearly all such inference should be brought within strict logical limits, and in any case it would be well to verify scientifically whatever can be thus verified and to distinguish carefully between fully verified judgments and other elements of reasonable belief, such as postulates on the basis of values.<sup>32</sup>

Macintosh's attempt to emphasize both synthesis and sense-experience is illustrated in his critical monism, which he believes is a synthesis of the rational and

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28. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>5</sup>, 656.

29. See Chapter V, supra.

30. Macintosh, PFW, 272.

31. Ibid., 230.

32. Macintosh, Art.(1927)<sup>3</sup>, 206-207.





empirical procedures "in a truly scientific method,  
i. e., a method related to the discoveries of religious  
 experience as the recognised physical and other  
 objective sciences are related to the discoveries of  
 sense-experience." 33

This explains further the relation of theology  
 and metaphysics. Instead of being either opposed or  
 separated, they "are meant for mutual assistance." 34

Metaphysical theology he believes is:

... a reasonable synthesis of empirical  
 religious knowledge and religiously essential  
 faith with our pertinent knowledge and with  
 the implications of critically established  
 values.<sup>35</sup>

Theology as reasonable and spiritually necessary faith  
 is a part of metaphysics, of reasonable belief about  
 reality. Theology as verified religious information  
 must harmonize with the other scientific information  
 on which empirical metaphysics is based. This means  
 that the development of science does not exclude and  
 is not excluded by religion.<sup>36</sup> The Christian idea of  
 God and religious experience should help one "put into  
 practice and profit by the best scientific information." 37  
 Macintosh's ideal of a real theocracy is illustrated

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33. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 144-145.

34. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 219.

35. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>3</sup>, 447.

36. See Macintosh's article, "Theology in a  
 Scientific Age," in Yale University, ECS,  
 135-162. See also Hocking, SIG, and my review  
 of it, Morgan, Art.(1945).

37. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 218.





where this happens with full liberty of conscience.<sup>38</sup> Metaphysics as this kind of synthesis of all empirical sciences he believes must work for peace and harmony with the scientific theology based on critical evaluation.<sup>39</sup>

Macintosh's view of both the importance of metaphysics for theology and of the essential harmony between theology and all other empirical sciences is similar to much in the view of empirical personalists, although his synthetic concept of metaphysics is another illustration of his interest in consistency, at least consistency with scientific facts, instead of coherence. His synthesis is consistent, but it lacks the inclusive, systematic nature of coherence. This means that Macintosh's consistency does not necessarily lead him "further from the strait and narrow path of truth," as he warns that consistency and system may if one's philosophy happens to be fundamentally unsound otherwise.<sup>40</sup> However, consistency alone does not carry one far along the path to truth, although it may not lead him away from the path to truth. Indeed, consistency is necessary for there to be truth, but it is inadequate as the sole criterion.

But just as Macintosh actually used more than consistency in his constructive epistemology, so

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38. See Macintosh in Krumbine (ed.), POR, especially 100-119.

39. Macintosh, ROC, 249.

40. Macintosh, Art.(1922)<sup>2</sup>, 96.





consistency is likewise inadequate in his metaphysics. His failure to recognize the need for supplementing consistency with the other aspects of coherence results in metaphysical difficulties, just as it causes confusion for him in epistemology.

The answer of empirical personalists to Macintosh's objection to the idealistic metaphysics of personalism also calls attention to another point in Macintosh's metaphysical methodology. The relation of subjective to objective factors of knowledge is an important problem throughout Macintosh's thought. It has already been examined in his epistemology. Revelation, as the "discovery of dependable reality,"<sup>41</sup> is metaphysically based on both subjective and objective factors. The subjective is necessary for the objective to be apprehended; the objective has to be manifested to the subjective.<sup>42</sup> In divine revelation also there must be both subjective and objective, both discovery and revelation.<sup>43</sup> In this respect, perception of divine reality is similar to perception of reality in general. In agreement with the subjective idealists, for example, Macintosh admits that every perceived object must be "related to the perceiving subject during perception."<sup>44</sup>

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41. See *supra*, 58. See also Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 306.

42. See Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 24.

43. *Ibid.*, 30-31.

44. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 311.





Revelation is a fact whether this relation is recognized or not. However, Macintosh believes that the subjective factor is limited; before one undertakes to share his subjective convictions, one should consider what is theoretically possible. Only what knowledge "does not entitle us to say may not be" may be asserted.<sup>45</sup>

Here Macintosh's loyalty to consistency appears again; the epistemological character of his realism is also shown in his opposition to romanticism. He believes that the testing of subjective intuitions of faith by philosophical and scientific tests of value and truth should result in logically justified or justifiable conclusions.<sup>46</sup> In Eucken's thought Macintosh sees the "realistic" revolt against rationalistic idealism and materialism.<sup>47</sup> However, when Macintosh makes a distinction between ontologizing and psychologizing, depending on whether the moment is one of faith and action or one of doubt,<sup>48</sup> the real influence of the psychological factors in Macintosh's thought appears. Although he makes this distinction in his early writings, the influence of psychological factors on his metaphysics persists through his whole thought. Actually there is nothing that can logically make the moment of faith and action ontological and the moment of doubt necessarily

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45. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 57.

46. Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, APR, 331-332.

47. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>6</sup>, 64.

48. Macintosh, RMT, 84.





merely psychological. Both are psychological in their relation to the acting subject, and objective reality may be discovered in either a moment of doubt or one of faith. Doubt and faith both must be tested before being acceptable either as revelation or discovery of reality.

Macintosh's idea of the relation of action and faith also confuses the problem. Action results from doubt actually as well as from faith, although the patterns of action may be different. The source of an idea in a moment of doubt does not necessarily mean that the idea cannot refer to ontological reality and be ontologically real. Nor does the origin of an idea in a moment of faith and action guarantee the ontological truth to any idea. No immediacy, but only mediation--critical testing and relation to all experience--can be a safe guide to ontological reality. The answer of empirical personalists to Macintosh's objection to their idealistic metaphysics points out that the result of basing objectivity on psychological conditions of subjectivity is an insufficient methodology for arriving at metaphysical truth. Macintosh only partially frees his thought from these subjective and psychological fetters.

Another important point in Macintosh' metaphysical methodology is the relation of reason to metaphysics.





Macintosh revolts against the interpretations of the essence of Christianity by both the Hegelians and the Ritschlians. Neither, he believes, can be "wholly satisfactory."<sup>49</sup> To defend Christianity by showing the truth of its religious values is inadequate, he believes. The defense of Christianity merely because of its reasonableness also is not enough.<sup>50</sup> Empirical personalists agree with Macintosh's objection to the latter, for example, because that interpretation makes Christianity lack relation to experience and values.

This is a valid criticism of much Hegelianism, although not so clearly true of the thought of Hegel himself, who had a more adequate view of reason.<sup>51</sup> Empirical personalists agree with Macintosh in revolting against a philosophy based on the assumption that "the real must be perfectly rational."<sup>52</sup> This rationalistic assumption tends to distort perspective and to produce abstract conclusions. Like Hegel, empirical personalists strive to be concrete. By considering all experience and things in their actual, living relations they search for the most adequate interpretation of experience. Empirical personalistic thinkers do not assume, for example, that "complete knowledge and perfect morality

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49. Macintosh, ROC, 11.

50. Ibid., 10-11.

51. Note, for example, the view of reason illustrated by the discussion in Hegel, VPG, 543-578.

52. See Macintosh, ROC, 264.





constitute the only really existing world." 53 The explanation of metaphysical reality as idealistic and the denial of nonpersonal reality may be the most reasonable interpretation of all experience without being an assertion that reality is completely rational.

But the acknowledgement that experience may include nonrational factors does not excuse one from seeking the most adequate explanation possible. There may be characteristics of experience which the empirical personalist cannot consistently explain as completely rational, but the place of a reasoned self-defense in religion,<sup>54</sup> for example, illustrates the demand that practical living makes that one attempt to find as reasonable an explanation as possible for even these kinds of experiences. One needs to seek, for example, the most reasonable explanation of those events which cannot be explained completely in terms of general laws but which are "to some extent being creatively determined at the time." 55 To give up the attempt to explain any part of experience as reasonably as possible merely because all experience is not completely rational is to acknowledge ultimate defeat in the attempt to explain any experience and to fix an impassable gulf between immediately certain "knowledge" and religious faith, for example, an abyss into which both scientific and

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53. See Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>2</sup>, 321.

54. Macintosh, ROC, 1.

55. Ibid., 272.





religious knowledge sooner or later disappear. The attempt to give a reasonable explanation of all the facts of experience is a daring, bold adventure,<sup>56</sup> but it is the only hope for any knowledge.

This attempt empirical personalists make to formulate as reasonable an explanation of all experience as possible brings one to an examination of Macintosh's metaphysical conclusions. The basis of Macintosh's criticism of idealistic personalism, in his view that the personalistic denial of extramental reality means epistemological idealism, has already been seen.<sup>57</sup> Macintosh's realism-- "there is a physical reality which is also independently real, and not mere idea or content of consciousness for some conscious subject" <sup>58</sup>--is a revolt against epistemological idealism, but his realism is not merely epistemological. Macintosh is a realist not only in asserting that there is objective reality; his doctrine of the nature of objective reality is also realistic.

However, Macintosh does not state his metaphysical realism as clearly and as extensively as his epistemological realism. One recent critic of Macintosh's thought has concluded, in fact, that Macintosh's critical monism "evidently gives no inkling of the nature of the Object as a metaphysical agent." <sup>59</sup> Although Macintosh

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56. See Brightman, Art.(1937), 169. See also Macintosh, PFW, 40.

57. See Chapter VI, *supra*.

58. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 305.

59. Bertocci, Art.(1944), 52.





does emphasize the moral and religious qualities of objective reality and although he is "critically" reserved in his rejection of materialistic and immaterialistic monism and of metaphysical dualism,<sup>60</sup> the statements of his critical epistemological realism and his discussions of metaphysical problems reveal metaphysical realism.

In stating his epistemological realism, for example, he strives to keep the door open for metaphysical realism:

... the experienced object and the independently existing thing may be numerically identical, even if to some extent qualitatively different.<sup>61</sup>

This attempt to maintain a qualitative difference in combination with a numerical identity confuses one about what Macintosh believes is the metaphysical nature of objective reality.

The qualitative difference between the experienced object and the independently existing thing, even though the amount of difference may be small, shows the influence of epistemological realism on Macintosh's metaphysical realism. By his recognition of minds and of conscious experience of value, for example, Macintosh rejects a thoroughgoing metaphysical realism, but he does not free himself completely from metaphysical realism. He has

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60. See, for example, Macintosh, TES, 249-251.

61. Macintosh, POK, 56. See supra, 67.





been cited as an illustration of those trained minds which "cling tenaciously to the extramental and substantial reality of things." <sup>62</sup> The qualitative difference between the experienced object and the independently existing thing can only mean that Macintosh thinks that the object as experienced is different, to some extent, from its nature as independently existing (although numerically identical with it). Since he asserts this qualitative difference, the nature of independent reality must to some extent be qualitatively different from the object as experienced. Even if independent reality is described as essentially mental, the assertion in Macintosh's general epistemology that it is "to some extent" qualitatively different must mean that there are two different kinds of reality, namely, consciousness and that which is to some extent different from experience. This is a qualitative, metaphysical dualism.

Macintosh's realism is also reflected in the assertion that one's theory should make room for "an experiential (spiritualistic) philosophy of reality including but transcending all human experience." <sup>63</sup> In other words, since the nature of objective reality is to some extent different from the experienced object, this qualitative difference shows Macintosh's realistic

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62. Knudson, POP, 374.

63. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>1</sup>, 135.





metaphysical dualism, although the dualism becomes merely relative dualism in the light of Macintosh's view of a "common denominator." <sup>64</sup>

While epistemological realism may not require a metaphysical realism, Macintosh's doctrine of primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities illustrates his metaphysical as well as his epistemological realism. Any description of qualities which begins with conscious experience (a purposive process which presupposes the objective validity of purpose <sup>65</sup>) and removes from it the qualities resulting from purpose as tertiary and the qualities derived from sense-experience as being secondary <sup>66</sup> leave primary qualities which are different in nature from any mind at least that may be known. Whether the metaphysical nature of these primary qualities is more accurately described as mental or as material is a separate question. Macintosh's concept of the nature of primary qualities at least is realistic; he believes that they are qualitatively different from any mind ever experienced.

His rejection of the immaterialistic view of the nature of reality and his attempt to formulate a more critical monism indicate that he does not regard physical

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64. See *infra*, 148.

65. See Brightman, *Art.*(1938), 139.

66. See Macintosh, *Art.*(1910)<sup>5</sup>, 653, and POK, 328. See also *supra*, 78-79.





reality as completely of the nature of mind.<sup>67</sup> At the same time, Macintosh's emphasis on reality as morally and religiously adequate must not be overlooked. The reign of law, for example, in spite of events which are "being creatively determined at the time," is adequate for man's needs and to teach him the dependability of God.<sup>68</sup> Whatever else Macintosh may believe about objective reality, he believes that the world of physical energy is God's physical body, God's world,<sup>69</sup> although he does not believe that God is completely immanent.

Macintosh's idea of God will be considered further in the following chapter. It is sufficient here to remember that for Macintosh God is not matter, but mind, a conscious personal Will. Macintosh believes that the creativity of the evolving universe and the rational, mathematical order of events are "complementary aspects of one and the same divine Being."<sup>70</sup> For him, physical and religious realism at least belong together.<sup>71</sup> Although he believes that his initial realistic position is similar to Hocking's, Macintosh insists on being empirical and asserting that one may not know at the beginning that Reality as a whole is Absolute Mind.<sup>72</sup>

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67. See especially Macintosh, ROC, Chapter XIII. Cf. Calhoun's "obdurate environmental factor," in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 197.

68. Macintosh, ROC, 272.

69. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 43.

70. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 65.

71. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>1</sup>, 33.

72. Ibid., 42.





In fact, Macintosh's view of the nature of reality shows in many respects, beyond his recognition of the adequacy of nature for religious and moral living, little direct relation to his great spiritual insights and ideas of God and religion, for example. Metaphysics might almost be described as specialized and abstract. The attempt to be critical has led to a series of statements which do not logically contradict each other or the facts of science and which are consistent with his religious insights. They also tend to reflect the common-sense basis of his realism.

Macintosh's explanation of the physical universe as the physical body of God likewise shows his realism:

God may be thought of as having formed the physical universe as his body and the law-abiding processes of nature as his bodily habits (that is, as the persisting outcome of past creative activity), somewhat as man, on a smaller scale and to a more limited extent, has gradually by his conscious activity built up some at least of his bodily habits.<sup>73</sup>

Although Macintosh seeks to keep his metaphysics consistent with his idea of God, the description of laws of nature as bodily habits reveals his attempt to find some concretion of activity into a pattern no longer purposively dynamic but almost physically automatic. Note his explanation of habit and creative activity:

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<sup>73</sup>. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 305.





I am quite willing to consider the suggestion that, as much of what we call "our own" unconscious habitual activity was in an earlier situation consciously originated, so also cosmic habit may have been consciously and even teleologically originated "in the beginning" and at various times since the primordial beginning; but this does not necessarily mean that each and every subsequent instance of physical causation involves conscious, personal creativity at the time.<sup>74</sup>

Macintosh believes that Butler's view "that many processes in the cosmic organism are analogous to habits consciously formed but unconsciously followed" is preferable, for example, to Hartshorne's panpsychism.<sup>75</sup> Although the relation of mind to body is not treated as an explicit "problem" by Macintosh, his views are suggested by his ideas of habit and the relation of evolution to creative activity.<sup>76</sup> He does suggest that "with a non-material view of mind and an activistic interpretation of sensation and perception" one should be able "to accept interaction with less 'difficulty' than would be involved in believing that all matter is psychical and that all mind is physical and even material."<sup>77</sup> However, when he turns to a common denominator "less than mind and more than matter" and suggests that

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74. Macintosh, Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 48-49.

75. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>3</sup>, 448.

76. Macintosh's idea of the relation of creativity to evolution is expressed in one of the numerous illustrations in his still unpublished volume, A Plain Man's Soliloquy.

77. Macintosh, Art.(1927)<sup>1</sup>, 136.





cosmic process partakes of a "certain primordial rationality, or order" which develops "into actuality our own potential rationality," <sup>78</sup> the problems of habit-formation and of the nature of responsibility for cosmic habits bring up the problem of evil which is considered later in this dissertation.

Macintosh's reference to a cosmic body with an indwelling mind <sup>79</sup> likewise is not only anthropomorphic but also illustrates, like the common-sense realism of Reid,<sup>80</sup> for example, the importance of physical terminology. Although the relation of the ideas of centers and fields of force to a religiously significant concept of God may not immediately be clear, Macintosh's appeal to the interpretation of energy as activity is certainly not contradictory to the best insights of modern physics,<sup>81</sup> nor to personalism either.<sup>82</sup> Macintosh does not hold a static, atomistic concept of matter. His view is consistent with the most developed insights of science. It is the concept of matter in an activistic form; Macintosh uses it to explain "the abiding effect

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78. Macintosh, Art.(1940)<sup>2</sup>, 50.

79. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 66.

80. See Chapter II, supra. Cf. Macintosh, POK, 213-214. Note, however, Macintosh replies to Bewkes's article, "Common Sense Realism," in Bixler and others, NRE, that "so far as I can recall or discover, I have not been influenced by Thomas Reid, at least directly, at a single point," Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 386.

81. See, however, Melzer, ECM, 39n. Cf. Compton, Jeans, Eddington, etc. Note that Macintosh says "our most scientific view of matter" is that it is "something which affects other things," Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>1</sup>, 40.

82. See Bowne, MET, Part I.





of the past work of God" as qualitatively different from "his present creative work." <sup>83</sup> He expresses this as the body and past works of God. It indicates his dualistic realism in metaphysics.

His metaphysical realism is also revealed by his further explanation of mind and matter. He wishes to accept neither the dualistic affirmation of both mind and matter nor a monistic metaphysics which reduces either to the other. However, Macintosh's suggestion that matter and psychical activity are forms of reality <sup>84</sup> has a striking similarity with the famous doctrine of Spinoza in his Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata that mind and matter, substantia cognitans and substantia extensa, are two of the attributes of one and the same substance.<sup>85</sup> In fact, Macintosh himself asks if mind and matter may not "both be reduced to a common denominator," <sup>86</sup> which is "more than matter or physical energy on the one hand, and yet something less than mind on the other." <sup>87</sup> The similarity to Spinoza's thought is illustrated especially by the suggestion that the mental and the material are "activities--although differing activities" of reality, or "activities and their products." <sup>88</sup> Macintosh, however, seeks to deny parallelism, because

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83. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 305.

84. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 158.

85. See Spinoza, WOR, II, 86-87.

86. Macintosh, ROC, 254.

87. Macintosh, TES, 251.

88. Macintosh, ROC, 254-255.





he believes that man is a free agent and consciousness a causal factor in his bodily behavior.<sup>89</sup>

Thus Macintosh's metaphysics is an activistic, qualitatively dualistic realism. Both mind and matter are active, but mind acts in certain ways and matter in certain other ways.<sup>90</sup> His activistic explanation may "soften down" the contrast between mind and matter, but the assertion of extramental reality makes his explanation of mind and matter still a metaphysical dualism. This kind of activistic, qualitatively dualistic realism, indeed, may point toward the creative element in emergent evolution<sup>91</sup> and toward man's responsibility in bringing the world to its highest possibilities,<sup>92</sup> but it fails to establish more than a metaphysical dualism, and possible parallelism, between the activities of mind and those of matter.

Thus the dualism of mind and matter is removed only to return as a dualism of the activities of mind and the activities of matter. Macintosh seeks to state a non-contradictory metaphysics, and his activistic concept of all reality succeeds only in removing the dualism of mind and matter one step farther. Indeed, Macintosh has abolished the first dualism and still "remained upon

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89. Macintosh, ROC, 258.

90. Macintosh, PFW, 240.

91. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>1</sup>, 233.

92. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 43.





essentially the same common-sense basis." 93

While this metaphysical activistic dualism may appear more religiously adequate than the old dualism of mind and matter, it actually leaves the metaphysical foundation of religion in the same dilemma. An active nonmental reality means a qualitative metaphysical dualism just as certainly as passive nonmental reality. Either interpretation of extramental reality shows an acceptance of some dogma regarding experience. If the empirical method means an impartial examination of all experience, both of reason in the activity of one's will and of the consciousness of the physical world (including his own physical body), no empirical basis is discovered for and no real advantage is gained by regarding reality as "more than matter ... and ... less than mind." The experience of mind is actually not adequately explained by less than mind; referring it to something less than mind as its cause makes it less than the mind that is experienced at least. Also matter is not empirically explained as an activity of something more than matter and less than mind and to some extent qualitatively different from experience.

Unless one departs from the only kind of reality he ever experiences, he can never claim knowledge of nonmental reality. A doctrine of extramental reality

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93. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 150.





may possibly be formulated as a set of logically consistent statements, but it cannot be a concrete, adequate, coherent interpretation of experience.

The attempt to defend a qualitative dualism which supports extramental reality is less empirical than the attempt to formulate a metaphysics which does not assert that there is something qualitatively different from all that one experiences. The assertion that there is extramental reality is actually a leap to what is qualitatively different from all experience. The refuge of nonmental reality may be regarded as a better explanation of experience than loyalty to the only kind of reality which can be experienced, but this refuge itself is not empirical. Empirical personalists believe that one is both more empirical and more reasonable if he refuse to resort in this refuge and if he seeks to base his metaphysics on the kind of reality that he does experience. While Macintosh seeks to be monistic in his theory of knowledge and strives to develop his general epistemology, at least, on the basis of immediate certainty, empirical personalists point to the dualism involved in all reference and deny epistemological monism. While Macintosh admits a metaphysical dualism and affirms extramental reality, empirical personalists hold a qualitatively monistic metaphysics and believe





that experience may be explained more adequately if one does not take refuge in extramental reality.

This is the answer empirical personalists make to Macintosh's objection to the idealistic metaphysics of personalism. Macintosh's idea of God and his criticism of the empirical personalistic solution of the problem of evil now remain to be considered. They emphasize certain distinctive features of empirical personalism in the concluding section of this dissertation on Macintosh's criticism of personalism.





## CHAPTER VIII

## THE IDEA OF GOD

The idea of God is important in Macintosh's criticism of personalism not because of his attack on the personalistic idea of God but because of the relation of his idea of God to the realistic monism in his criticism of personalism. Macintosh's view of the nature of God actually is like the personalistic idea of God in many respects. The discussion of Macintosh's idea of a personal God in the first part of this chapter shows this similarity. The second part of this chapter considers problems raised by the relation of a personal God to Macintosh's epistemology and metaphysics, to his monism and his realism.

#### 1. Macintosh's idea of a personal God

Macintosh's idea of God shows his fundamental empiricism. Any idea of God, personal or impersonal, is dogmatic and arbitrary unless it is related to experience. Although personalists may reject Macintosh's monistic epistemology and his dualistic metaphysics, empirical personalists agree with his assertion that experience is not to be neglected in formulating one's idea of God. Theology necessarily is the intellectual





expression of experience, a product "of personal appreciation of experienced religious value." <sup>1</sup> An essential proposition of empirical personalism is that truth about God, for example, can be found only by an empirical approach, in which reason and experience are not separated and one or the other treated abstractly, but in which "reason is a function of experience and experience is a movement toward rational totality." <sup>2</sup> Macintosh and empirical personalists agree in starting with religious experience and religious values, for example. The similarity in their ideas of God shows the effect of this empirical approach.

Macintosh's idea of revelation also illustrates his empirical method at work. A religious intuition often emerges "as an effect of overt religious experience and the discovery of a divinely operating reality." <sup>3</sup> Macintosh would purge the old theological meanings from the concept of revelation and blaze a new approach which recognizes that those who are surest of God's goodness and most keenly aware of evils, for example, may and often do consciously experience "a divine power lifting them above these evils." <sup>4</sup> In his idea of revelation he refuses to follow the path of Barth, for Macintosh believes that revelation in both religion and

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1. Macintosh, PFW, 178.

2. Brightman, Art.(1937), 155.

3. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 31.

4. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 312.





sense-experience "is not a different process from discovery." <sup>5</sup> Revelation itself is an experience of discovery, of discovering Divine Reality and Power. For Macintosh the divine initiative already exists as a condition. The important thing in revelation is discovery. To the Christian, for example, the potential revelation in Christ becomes a living reality only as it is "discovered by us anew." <sup>6</sup>

The place of experience in relation to his idea of God leads Macintosh to emphasize God as spiritually experienced. The spiritually experienced God is the God of which the religious person can "be more scientifically certain" than one can be of "the cosmological God of speculative surmise." <sup>7</sup> Macintosh agrees with Mathews that "a metaphysically exact definition of God is ... 'less basic' than 'personal relations with personality.'" <sup>8</sup> His emphasis on the relation of God to experience and moral idealism has been criticized because it leads to the "inevitable outcome" of leaving God out altogether. <sup>9</sup> For Macintosh, however, it means that God as the power that gives victory over sin when man fulfills certain

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5. Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, APR, 329.

6. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 37. Note that Macintosh believes that the fate of Christianity "is not bound up with the actuality of any one reputed fact of history," Macintosh, Art.(1911,1912), 372.

7. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 257.

8. In Macintosh (ed.), RR, vi. See also Mathews, GIG, passim.

9. Wieman in Wieman and others, ITG, 206.





conditions is "an existent, accessible, and scientifically knowable reality." <sup>10</sup> His argument for both the existence and the nature of God is based on experiences of religious values. He considers both the existence and the nature of God as empirical problems.

Macintosh defends his idea of God as being an idea of the God who has actually operated in religion. Not an abstract God supported by arguments but a realistic view of God is "of crucial importance for religion." <sup>11</sup> He rejects the charge of wishful thinking and distinguishes between "wishful" and "hopeful" thinking. He believes that his belief in God is hopeful, because it is reasonable; it is practical and theoretically permissible, possible both logically and practically. <sup>12</sup> When God is regarded as adequate to justify moral optimism and the experience of moral optimism is regarded as valid, Macintosh argues, the metaphysical proposition that God exists is undeniable. <sup>13</sup> Since such a belief is both logically and psychologically possible and the experiences of religious values support it, Macintosh believes that the Christian, for example, has "the moral right to believe that the personal God he needs, a God great enough and good enough for his worship and trust, actually exists." <sup>14</sup>

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10. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 257.

11. Ibid., 294.

12. Ibid., 136.

13. Macintosh, PFW, 200.

14. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 181.





From the existence of God Macintosh proceeds to his idea of the nature of God, although does not always treat these two ideas, related as they are in his thought, in the same order. In his idea of the nature of God also experience is a vital factor for Macintosh. The God that experience demands is not an abstract, argument-supported God. From experience Macintosh gains his definition of God as "that ... with reference to which we are absolutely dependent." <sup>15</sup> The aim of his Theology as an Empirical Science is to formulate a scientific set of laws about the "dependable and presumably universally accessible divine reality in and through religious experience." <sup>16</sup> He believes that religious experience at its best verifies his minimum definition of God:

... a Dependable Factor which makes a desirable difference in human experience on condition of a certain religious attitude which may be called "the right religious adjustment." <sup>17</sup>

This concept of a discovered Dependable Factor is used as a step in Macintosh's attempt to state in scientifically acceptable manner what God is by means of critically examining and testing experience, especially religious experience.

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15. Macintosh in Newton(ed.), MIG, 139.

16. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 306. Note also his definition of God as "the Object of religious dependence and Source of religious deliverance," in Wieman and others, ITG, 295.

17. Macintosh, Art.(1926)<sup>2</sup>, 318.





Experience is the means by which he also seeks to describe the nature of God more fully, For example, the God of experience is not infinite "in any sense of the word that would involve self-contradiction." <sup>18</sup> The important thing for Macintosh is that God not be finite "in any objectionable" way, that God be great enough for religious experience, for absolute, trustful dependence.

The relation of the world to God required by this empirical approach to God's nature is not necessarily that suggested in Macintosh's metaphysics. The implications of Macintosh's thought on this point are further seen in his views on the problem of evil.<sup>19</sup> For experience, however, the important requirement is that God's nature be such that God is adequate:

... a God great enough and favourable enough to our true well-being to meet all our imperative religious needs.<sup>20</sup>

God's power in the world must be such that God has "adequate control in the interests of his relation to men." <sup>21</sup> Beyond this, Macintosh seeks to keep his statements free from logical contradictions. In relation to God's creative control in evolution, for example, he believes a vitalistic concept may be maintained as long

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18. Macintosh, PFW, 200.

19. See Chapter IX, *infra*.

20. Macintosh, PFW, 203.

21. Macintosh, TES, 195. Note how Macintosh hands the problems "over to metaphysics," *ibid.*, 195-204; cf. Chapter VII, *supra*.





as God's control is "sufficient to guarantee the ultimate emergence of beings with a capacity for unending spiritual progress." <sup>22</sup>

Moral and religious experiences mean not only that God is adequate in power and wisdom but also that his character is dependable. The God of experience must be moral. He is striving toward a definite moral end "favourable to the true well-being of humanity." <sup>23</sup>

In the Christian religious tradition Macintosh believes that this means the sufficiency of God's moral character takes the form of "realization of the personal moral ideal of Jesus," <sup>24</sup> who is an object of Christian faith because "he was himself a subject of faith and hope and love." <sup>25</sup>

Macintosh believes that there are two kinds of actual entities that offer possibilities when one seeks to state the metaphysical nature of this God of experience. They are minds and bodies. He believes that "God may be and (for faith) must be Mind." <sup>26</sup> The God demanded by experience, which logical may be and psychologically and religiously must be, is not possible if God is merely matter or body. The God empirically demanded and logically consistent with scientific knowledge for Macintosh is

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22. Macintosh, PFW, 251.

23. Ibid., 228.

24. Macintosh, Art.(1915), 197.

25. Macintosh, Art.(1930)<sup>2</sup>, 17.

26. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 318.





"an essentially personal God, adequate in wisdom, goodness and power." 27

Macintosh recognizes the implication of this concept of a personal God in his first empirical approach:

Indeed the essentials of personality in the religious Object have been either clearly implied or remotely indicated throughout practically the whole of our theological procedure, beginning with our first collation of the empirical data.<sup>28</sup>

In other words, for Macintosh a personal God is implicit in the very empirical approach and attempt to describe God. A personal God is necessary to explain religious experience.

Macintosh believes that the humanistic interpretation of the God-idea as an optional symbol for social values, or even the natural and human factors which support such values, illustrates the result of a slight modification of the "single all-inclusive conscious Experience" of absolute idealism, of "naturalism still wearing the halo of theism." 29 He seeks to avoid any positivistic prejudice in interpreting experience and believes that religious experience in particular cannot be explained adequately apart from a personal God.

The central meaning of personality for Macintosh is moral will. He describes religious experience not as

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27. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 103.

28. Macintosh, TES, 189.

29. Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, APR, 327.





emotions; it is:

... that moral conversion of the will which is no mere "subjective state of consciousness" but a principle of overt behavior, observable in the changes it makes in the objective human and natural world.<sup>30</sup>

He believes that personality is, "essentially, a being which is conscious, self-conscious, and consciously self-directing." <sup>31</sup> The God demanded by practical religion has these qualities. The way to discover God's will is:

... to find out through cultured appreciation the relative value of ends and through scientific observation, supplemented where necessary by experiment, the relative effectiveness of the various available ways and means.<sup>32</sup>

When practical religion becomes conscious of its relation to a personal God, it "becomes less and less magical and more and more moral." <sup>33</sup> A personal God and moral religion in the modern critical world, he believes, are logically the concave and convex sides of the same curve; one implies the other, and one develops as the other is expanded. Macintosh expresses this relation as a conclusion about the nature of God-- "the verdict of practical experimental religion is unambiguously for the essential personality of God." <sup>34</sup>

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30. Macintosh, Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 531.

31. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 151. See also Macintosh, PFW, 257, and TES, 189-190.

32. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>3</sup>, 165.

33. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>2</sup>, 41.

34. Macintosh, PFW, 253.





God as personal has a far-reaching meaning for experience. Macintosh sees in the personality of God that which enables one "to harmonize and hold together the ultimate values of morality and religion."<sup>35</sup> If one recognizes human values and explains them in relation to a God who is responsible for conserving them, God must be personal; as Macintosh agrees, it is hardly credible that "God should be a mere unconscious automaton."<sup>36</sup> Moral and religious experiences require a personal God for their most adequate explanation. This "reconciliation of religion and morality,"<sup>37</sup> in turn becomes an "extra" argument for the personality of God. The two go together.

Macintosh does not overlook the possibility that God may be superpersonal. However, he admits that he is "at a loss to make any further reasonable suggestion," when anyone attempts to go "beyond the concept of personality," because it is impossible to have a positive concept of a kind of reality higher than personality.<sup>38</sup> In this respect, he accepts the view of Lotze that only God is completely personal.<sup>39</sup> To those who point to the purposive aims beyond the comprehension of human intelligence as indicating that God is superpersonal Macintosh replies by asking why it is necessary "to

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35. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 299.

36. Ibid., 170.

37. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 151.

38. Macintosh, ROC, 77.

39. Macintosh, TES, 189. See also Brightman, POR, 368-369.





characterize purposive aims, which we human beings do not comprehend, as being superpersonal." 40 His central objection to the concept is that it is unintelligible; the meaning of "superpersonal" is not known. There is great danger that the attempt to describe God as qualitatively superpersonal may actually result in making God impersonal.<sup>41</sup>

His concept of God's truth further illustrates the relation of his idea of a personal God to adequacy for religious experience. Macintosh believes there is "no manifestly valid religious reason" why God's truth should not be essentially the same as man's.<sup>42</sup> Religious experience does not require a "timeless, changeless, absolute complete representation." If the content of one "eternally-complete immediate experience" is an "eternally-complete reality," representation is not needed. Religious experience supports only the view that God's truth is representation that is always sufficient for satisfactorily mediating whatever purposes God has in view. Macintosh believes that anything more results from dogmatism, and both he and empirical personalists seek to purge dogmatism from theology. Empirical personalists make a special effort to purge dogmatism from all knowledge.

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40. Macintosh, Art.(1923), 654.

41. See Macintosh, PFW, 254. Cf. Brightman, POR, 236-237.

42. Macintosh, POK, 456.





Macintosh gives his idea of a personal God religious application in what he calls right religious adjustment. Prayer, for example, instead of being merely a request that God do more than he is doing, means:

... serious individual self-examination in the presence of God, with a view to finding out whether everything that should be done by oneself is being done.<sup>43</sup>

Macintosh sees religious adjustment as relating oneself to a possible and reasonable interpretation of the facts and values of human experience, to a God who is "immanently ... a Higher Life, and socially ... an ever present Perfect Friend." <sup>44</sup>

Macintosh's idea of God as personal removes from his concept of right religious adjustment the mechanical and impersonal connotation that has arisen around "adjustment" in recent philosophy.<sup>45</sup> Notice the personal "elements" or "phases" he emphasizes in a right religious adjustment:

Spiritual aspiration ... concentration ... of attention and of religious adjustment toward God ... surrender ... absolute dedication of one's self to the spiritual idea and to God ... appropriation ... the deliberate and confident taking from God ... response ... removal of inhibitions ... persistence.<sup>46</sup>

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43. Macintosh, PR, 168.

44. Macintosh, Art.(1926)<sup>3</sup>, 471.

45. Macintosh describes prayer as right religious adjustment in which God's will may be done "not only to us and about us, but in us and through us," Macintosh, Art.(1930)<sup>2</sup>, 16.

46. Macintosh, PFW, 217-218. Cf. Macintosh's description of his own "right religious adjustment," in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 282.





This scientific description of his concept of right religious adjustment in connection with his idea of a personal God is indeed powerful dynamic for religious living. His idea of religious adjustment makes religious experience "an experience of moral and spiritual inspiration." The observation that such experience is not one "of primary religious knowledge" <sup>47</sup> points out a weakness in Macintosh's epistemological monism which enters into his religious epistemology.<sup>48</sup>

The application of Macintosh's idea of a personal God to right religious adjustment shows the empirical nature of Macintosh's thought. This sketch of Macintosh's idea of a personal God indicates various ways in which his idea of God is like the personalistic concept of God. Empirical personalists use a method very similar to Macintosh's in explaining God in relation to experience, but the relation of Macintosh's idea of God to his epistemological and his metaphysical conclusions raises problems that empirical personalists solve by seeking to be more coherently empirical. Some of these problems now demand attention.

## 2. A personal God and Macintosh's philosophical views

The relation of Macintosh's epistemology and metaphysics to his idea of a personal God is shown by

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47. Bertocci, Art.(1944), 55. See also Chapter IV, *supra*.

48. See Chapter VI, *supra*.





his ideas especially of revelation, the unity of God, and worship and God's physical body.

Revelation is a broad concept for Macintosh. It may or may not have direct religious significance. He speaks, for example, of the general revelation of the presence of "a functionally divine reality, working in many ways toward a unitary and ideal end." In relation to this general kind of revelation he observes reality functioning "as if intelligently and with moral purpose." <sup>49</sup> In his discussion of various kinds of revelation, he describes "general general" revelation as:

... the objective manifestation and subjective apprehension of existence and meaning, reality and value, without any reference to their religious significance being necessarily involved.<sup>50</sup>

In the more "special" kinds of revelation the distinctively religious significance of revelation and its relation to a personal God becomes clear.<sup>51</sup> The influence of his monistic epistemology on his idea of revelation appears especially in his discussions of the relation of experience to the ideas of various thinkers about God.

Hocking's idea of God, for example, an Absolute Mind known by an idealistic interpretation of the physical world, is for Macintosh "simply an idol, a

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49. Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, *APR*, 330.

50. Macintosh, *Art.*(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 23.

51. See *ibid.*, especially 23-38.





'concept without intuition,' a fiction of human thought," and not the true God known through critical, scientific religious experience.<sup>52</sup> Macintosh recognizes Hocking's argument only if it is an argument from values, an argument that where there is the right idea of God God may be known to exist, "because we cannot have the right idea of God except as it is based upon and legitimately derived from a genuine experience of God."<sup>53</sup>

Macintosh's reinterpretation of miracle also shows the significance of his idea of revelation. For Macintosh miracle is special providence; it is an event to which one can point as the purposive act of God. Macintosh's attempted monism, however, appears in the assertion that such events must "take place within our own experience,"<sup>54</sup> and are immediately known, are knowledge. Monism is replaced by epistemological dualism wherever immediate experiences are related to or interpreted as "the purposive acts of God," for anything can be known immediately and monistically as the purpose of God actually only if God's purpose is completely identified with the individual's present experience.<sup>55</sup> Macintosh's

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52. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>3</sup>, 80.

53. Ibid., 79.

54. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>4</sup>, 554.

55. Note that Macintosh suggests that anyone who has "a 'hunch' as to what God's will is" should test "his subjective impression" by the criterion given above, see supra, 161, Art.(1932)<sup>3</sup>, 165.





idea of a personal God permits neither subjective sopilsism, however, nor a denial of the reality of the experiencing self.

Yet Macintosh's distinction between historical knowledge and direct experience of God is very important. No amount of historical information can be substituted for experience of God. Religious faith withers and dies when abstracted from experience. But no amount of direct experience is knowledge, even if history is used "as a stepping-stone toward, not as a substitute for, direct knowledge of God." <sup>56</sup>

"Direct knowledge" is a contradiction of terms.<sup>57</sup> Only experience may be direct or immediate. All knowledge, including knowledge both of purpose and of God, must be mediated. Macintosh's idea of the nature of God as personal is not epistemologically immediate. He begins with immediate experience of values, but he cannot have knowledge until there is mediation, until there is interpretation and critical explanation. A deeper experience of reality may be important in seeking God and some of God's aspects may be "accessible, under certain conditions, to human experience," <sup>58</sup> but whether or not these are the religiously important aspects, they are never directly accessible to human knowledge.

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56. Macintosh, Art.(1914)<sup>4</sup>, 348.

57. See Chapter IV, supra.

58. Macintosh in King (ed.), HAB, 71.





Macintosh's idea of a personal God is derived from the relation of God to human experience, not from his epistemological monism. God as personal, especially the religious aspects of God, can never be immediately known; knowledge depends on reference, which is not epistemologically monistic. Macintosh's idea of the relation of a personal God to experience, however, will not be soon outdated. Empirical personalists, for example, agree with his assertion:

... there can be no ... valid theology which does not rest upon definite religious experience, such as requires an active adjustment to the religious Object, rather than a mere recognition of the existence, on grounds more or less philosophical, of an independent Spiritual Life.<sup>59</sup>

The significant difference between Macintosh and empirical personalists is in epistemology and metaphysics. Macintosh's idea of a personal God is not derived from his epistemological monism, from direct knowledge, but from direct and religious experience, which is interpreted. His knowledge of God's nature is based on interpretation, not merely the fact of religious experience.

Macintosh defends his idea of God from humanistic attempts to undermine it through showing that finding a practical motivation or a plausible psychological explanation for an idea does not mean that there is no

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59. Macintosh, Art.(1913)<sup>2</sup>, 316.





"objective reality to which the idea corresponds." <sup>60</sup> His recognition of the possibility of both subjective and objective bases of knowledge and his suggestion that religion and the idea of God "may well be an escape to reality" <sup>61</sup> resemble the epistemological dualism of personalism.<sup>62</sup> But when seeking to return to his epistemological monism, Macintosh points out that to conclude, because one's idea of God is a projection, that God is a projection is to commit "the same fallacy as underlies subjective idealism in general." <sup>63</sup>

A second major problem raised by the relation of Macintosh's idea of a personal God to his realistic monism concerns the unity of God. A personal God must be a unity, and Macintosh casts the hypothesis that there is more than one God or anything except unitary divine reality aside as unnecessary for providing sufficient reason for moral optimism.<sup>64</sup> He believes that it is at least a reasonable surmise that all the instances of a Divine Factor are "in some very real sense one and the same Divine Reality."<sup>65</sup>

Macintosh believes that God as the Father in Christianity is essentially identical, at least religiously,

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60. Macintosh in King (ed.), HAB, 60.

61. Macintosh, Art.(1930)<sup>1</sup>, 124.

62. See Chapter IV, supra.

63. Macintosh in King (ed.), HAB, 61.

64. Macintosh, ROC, 77.

65. Macintosh, Art.(1929)<sup>2</sup>, 168.





with the Divine Reality "so fully present in the historic Jesus" <sup>66</sup> and is the Reality on which one depends in religious experience. In other words, the God that logically may be (God the Father), the God that must be for moral optimism and Jesus's revelation to be valid, and the God that is discovered in religious experience are essentially identical. <sup>67</sup> Macintosh concludes that "the presumption ... is that the Conserver of Values, the God of moral optimism, is one and the same Divine Being as the God of revelation, of religious experience, of moral salvation." <sup>68</sup>

This "presumption" is related to Macintosh's idea of a personal God. The unity of divine reality, however, is not established by monistic epistemology. <sup>69</sup> Macintosh's empirical method, rather than his monistic epistemology, is the basis of this "presumption." In his epistemology there are factors, such as his representational pragmatism, also which tend to support the unity of God, but these factors are not logically a part of monism. <sup>70</sup>

Two other special problems arise in relation to Macintosh's metaphysics and his idea of a personal God. One concerns worship; the other is about Macintosh's

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66. Macintosh, *Art.* (1914)<sup>4</sup>, 566.

67. See Macintosh in Wieman and others, *ITG*, 297-298.

68. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), *MIG*, 154.

69. See discussions of God's transcendent aspects, for example, in Chapter VI, *supra*.

70. See *supra*, especially 81-82, 90-95, for discussion of the epistemological dualism of representational pragmatism.





idea of the physical world as God's physical body. The empirical approach through religious experience emphasizes the importance of worship. Macintosh's idea of the highest kind of worship is that which recognizes God as intrinsic value, the worth of God for his own sake. In fact, Macintosh's definition of worship as contemplation of God as end <sup>71</sup> suggests the ideal Spinoza expressed in his Ethica of the intellectual love of God, amor dei intellectualis.<sup>72</sup> Macintosh's empiricism is again illustrated in the recognition that this act of worship tends toward an immediate feeling of the reality and presence, as well as the religious sufficiency, of God. Even in worship, however, his empiricism does not actually mean epistemological monism, for worship does not require that experience be knowledge.

The relation of worship to Macintosh's philosophical position creates a further complication. Worship, as he recognizes, requires an object that is ideal.<sup>73</sup> This ideal and the moral and religious values come together in a morally perfect Will. God as such a will is a Person whose perfect will, his ideal, "is not yet fully realized in man and in the world."<sup>74</sup> This means that man must use his best scientific knowledge (in religion

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71. Macintosh, Art.(1930)<sup>3</sup>, 945.

72. See Spinoza, WOR, II, 263.

73. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 299-300.

74. Macintosh, PR, 179.





he must unite evangelical faith and vitality with rational self-control.<sup>75)</sup> to work "toward the end set by the will of God."<sup>76</sup>

Yet Macintosh's epistemological and metaphysical realism leads him to emphasize God as Absolute Reality as well as Absolute Ideal.<sup>77</sup> He says that religion comes to itself:

... in the recognition of and devotion to an object that is supremely ideal and supremely real, an Ideal Reality, an object at once of love and adoration and of dependence and trust.<sup>78</sup>

In fact, an overlapping of epistemological and metaphysical realism appears in his object of worship. For example, Macintosh believes that in worship the object of religious trust must be real and regards normal worship as pointing toward the union of ideality and reality in the idea of God as the Ideal Reality. The divine subsists as an ideal "in order that it may be made to exist as a progressively immanent reality."<sup>79</sup> One's philosophy of religion, he believes, must be an idealistic realism or realistic idealism:

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75. Macintosh in Krumbine (ed.), POR, 103.

76. Macintosh, SR, 130.

77. Macintosh, PFW, 255.

78. Macintosh, Art.(1933)<sup>3</sup>, 532. Note also the description of the "true idea of God" which Macintosh says "is derived from religious experience at its best," Macintosh, GWW, 12.

79. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 143. Cf. Macintosh, Art.(1931)<sup>4</sup>, 25, where the "good essence" of Christianity is described as "as objective and as universally valid as the spiritual ideal, as truth and the good-will and the brotherhood of man."





... rationally idealistic as to ideals and as to what God must be believed to be, but empirically realistic in its resolution to get from experience with reality whatever confirmation is possible as to the actual existence of an adequate Reality for our absolute devotion and trust.<sup>80</sup>

But he hastens to add that it is not in the sense "in which absolute idealism speaks of 'ideal reality' that we are committed to the use of that term."<sup>81</sup>

Worship as a religious experience supports Macintosh's idea of a personal God. When related to his epistemological and metaphysical thought, however, worship of a personal God emphasizes some of the problems in Macintosh's search for objectivity.

A second complex problem in relation to Macintosh's metaphysics and his idea of worship and a personal God is his activistic, dualistic description of the physical world as the physical body of God. The metaphysical difficulties were considered in the previous chapter. The present problem is the relation of this metaphysical view to the personality of God.

Macintosh's empirical approach severs his idea of the personality of God from any direct relation to speculative metaphysics. His method here, as in relation to the transcendent aspects of divine reality, is described as he suggests--by finding out from experience

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80. Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>2</sup>, 391-392. Cf. Macintosh, Art.(1931)<sup>4</sup>, 23-24.

81. Macintosh, PFW, 256.





whatever one can, then seeking to determine "what can be done toward thinking into unity these different aspects of divine reality." <sup>82</sup> In his attempt to follow this procedure Macintosh is more consistent than coherent. He seeks to avoid contradictions in his statements about the relation of the body to the personality of God. But his activistic metaphysics is without logical connection and coherent relation to his idea of God's personality. Macintosh arrives at his idea of a personal God empirically and not metaphysically. His empirical method is important for what he calls his "higher realism" or "personal realism and religious or theistic realism," the interpretation of human persons and a personal God as ultimately real. From this "higher" realism he moves to his metaphysics:

... there is nothing, so far as I can see, which requires us to give up the lower realism, namely physical realism, the view that the physical universe is also thoroughly real.<sup>83</sup>

All that he requires of metaphysics is consistency, that the statements not contradict experience or each other. He believes that God's body and his personality may be explained together (although they have no necessary relation):

The physical and vital factors constitute the Body, of which in experimental religion

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82. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 314.

83. Macintosh, Art.(1938)<sup>1</sup>, 173.





at its best man is aware of coming into contact with the immanent divine Spirit.<sup>84</sup>

Macintosh's idea of a personal God does not depend on his metaphysics, on his view of God's body as the physical universe.

However, if one is to employ the empirical method, as described in Chapter IV, *supra*, in his metaphysics as well as in his idea of God, these two areas cannot be separate so completely. Even if one claims to have independent religious data, this data cannot be overlooked in formulating his metaphysical views. On the other hand, Macintosh would never deny the metaphysical reality of the religious object. In fact, his thought is in part, at least, a search for objectivity, an attempt to defend the objectivity of the religious object, for example, which he believes that idealism regards as merely subjective.<sup>85</sup> If religious experience is experience of objects which have metaphysical reality, one's metaphysical views are not empirical if they fail to consider this kind of experience and religious experience itself is not adequately explained if divorced from one's metaphysics. For Macintosh,

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84. Macintosh, *Art.*(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 158.

85. Cf. especially his statement that objective idealism "substitutes a false God, the artifact of thought, for the true God which positive experience claims to discover as an independent Reality," Macintosh, *Art.*(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 139.





however, the idea of a personal God lacks coherent relation to his activistic, dualistic metaphysics.

Further implications of the relation of God's personality and his body appear in the discussion of the problem of evil which brings this study of Macintosh's criticism of personalism to its summary and conclusions.





## CHAPTER IX

### THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Evil is a persistent empirical fact. Sharp contrasts between the views of different personalists have resulted from their attempts to explain it philosophically. Macintosh's explanation of the problem of evil reveals the contrast between his metaphysical realism and his empirical concept of a personal God. The comparison of his and the empirical personalist's views of the problem of evil shows the relative lack of empiricism in Macintosh's metaphysics and the unique position of empirical personalists. This investigation of the problem of evil thus emphasizes certain characteristics which distinguish empirical personalists from the more rationalistic personalists. It also leads to certain distinctions between empirical personalists and Macintosh, which are brought together in the following chapter of summary and conclusions.

#### 1. Personalistic views of God and evil

The views of both Macintosh and personalists about God make this chapter on the problem of evil a





continuation of the discussion of the idea of God in the previous chapter of this dissertation. However, the problem of evil is distinct, although the idea of a personal God makes an explanation of the relation between God and evil imperative. Since Macintosh agrees with personalists in seeking to describe God as personal, his thought about the problem of evil and a comparison of his views of evil and the view empirical personalists hold are especially significant in his criticism of personalism.

The problem of evil has led to a sharp contrast between different personalistic concepts of the power of God. One view is that God's power is infinite. Bowne, for example, believed that God's power was infinite, although not arbitrary--that is, the infinity of God's power is not illustrated by any violation of the principles of reason. He concluded a discussion of the "metaphysical attributes of world-ground" with the affirmation that "God is absolute will or absolute agent, forever determining himself according to rational and eternal principles."<sup>1</sup> However, Bowne recognized that the idea of God's omnipotence was a special problem concerning which great care must be exercised:

We shall need to move warily and with great circumspection to escape falling a prey to the swarms of abstractions in which this realm abounds.<sup>2</sup>

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1. Bowne, POT, 170.

2. Ibid., 160.





The idea of a personal God infinite in power is extensively developed by other outstanding personalists. Knudson, for example, expresses it especially in his two outstanding volumes on Christian theology, The Doctrine of God and The Doctrine of Redemption. In the former, for example, he says that of omnipotence, omnipresence, and eternity, which are the three elements of metaphysical absoluteness, "omnipotence is the most fundamental." <sup>3</sup> By omnipotence he does not mean power to do the nondoable or to violate the principles of reason. Omnipotence means merely that God's power "expresses itself perfectly and completely in and through his nature." <sup>4</sup> For Knudson, omnipotence is essential to the moral and religious personality of God, for "without omnipotence there can be neither perfect unity nor perfect goodness." <sup>5</sup> For him, the personality of God implies God's omnipotence.

Knudson's thought also illustrates the view that many personalists hold of the relation of an infinite God to evil. In agreement with Bowne, Knudson thinks that divine reality is not passive substance but "a unitary and indivisible agent." <sup>6</sup> This means that an infinitely powerful God is responsible for all that is, except the free choices of other selves. God cannot be responsible of free choices without violating his

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3. DOG, 264.

4. See *ibid.*, 269-270.

5. *Ibid.*, 274.

6. Bowne, MET, 94.





moral character. Natural or surdevil and good alike, however, can spring only from the will of the Omnipotent Person.

The moral goodness of God, thus, imposes the task of explaining the suffering that results from these natural evils. Knudson refuses to remove the "rock of offense contained in the fact of suffering" by rejecting divine omnipotence, for he believes that would also remove "all ground for any profound faith in the divine providence." <sup>7</sup> He seeks to explain suffering as a means to a higher end, by the suggestion that there may be other than human ends and other than human standards of right and wrong and of animal suffering, by showing how pain warns against danger and contributes to the moral and spiritual life, and by admitting ignorance and pointing to the practical solution in faith.<sup>8</sup> While other personalists who believe that God's power is infinite add their suggestions to explain the relation of an infinite God to evil, Knudson's views are sufficient to illustrate personalistic thought about evil as related to the idea of an infinite God.

The problem of evil has led to another personalistic view of the relation of power to Divine Personality. Brightman explains the problem of evil by the idea of

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7. Knudson, DOG, 258.

8. Knudson, DOR, 215-221.





a personal God limited in power. This idea of God's power does not affect the moral perfection of God's will. In this respect, the adequacy of God for religious faith and worship is not altered.<sup>9</sup> God's will is just as real and just as good as if his power were infinite.

The element that limits God's power, however, is within his experience. This idea of a finite God differs from the Marcionitic dualism, and also from Macintosh's idea of God, in regarding this element not as in some way external to God but as a part of his experience. In addition to Divine Will, God's experience contains another element which is "Given," which the Divine Will accepts and uses for accomplishing its purposes. This element is not created by the will but is found; it is "Given." From the "Given," not from God's perfect will, natural and surd evils result. Divine Will controls this other element of Divine Experience and is able to use it in carrying out its ideals, although the "Given" may not be perfectly suited for ideal purposes. The "Given" thus operates as a limitation on God's power.

In this way evil is neither denied nor confused with good. Natural evils result from God's struggle with and use of the "Given," but God is not morally responsible for these evils. His will is perfect.

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9. Cf. worship and Macintosh's idea of God, *supra*, Chapter VIII. Note, however, Knudson's view of omnipotence and worship and goodness, DOG, 274; DOR, 206-207.





He is worthy of worship. He wills the best possible and accepts the "Given" as the best way available for accomplishing his purposes, although it may mean that these ideals will not be perfectly realized. There is no "outside" cause, no cause other than God's experience that explains the experienced fact of evil.

The empirical quality of this explanation of evil shows its relation to the empirical emphasis of Macintosh's thought. When the empirical personalist seeks to explain the problem of evil and the nature of God, he considers experience, searching for a clue to an explanation that will deny neither the experienced fact of evil, including unexplained (surd) human suffering, nor the experiences of religious values and the hypothesis of Divine Personality which they support. In one's own experience there is both will and resistance to will. Whatever explanation is given of experience and reality, these two elements are present in every experience.

Although the idea of divinity has long established a gulf between man and God, the empirical personalist sees no reason for an absolute qualitative differentiation if all experience may be explained more adequately without it. Faith is an element of each experience





and not a religious insight which begins where knowledge ceases to suffice. In every experience there is an element of faith. Why must there be a qualitative difference in one's knowledge about God? The empirical personalist can overlook neither the experience of evil nor the experience of worship. He sees the problem as a problem of good-and-evil. In the personal object of worship he finds no need for arbitrary ways of knowing that transcend what can be personally experienced. The experienced religious values, for example, are adequately explained by a perfect will; divine omnipotence is merely an additional concept that initially appears theoretically possible and that certain historical traditions tend to support. Religious experience is explained, however, by a moral will, not by omnipotence. To attribute to God "modes of knowing that we cannot comprehend," <sup>10</sup> for example, is possible, but it lacks any empirical basis.

The empirical personalist objects to the addition of omnipotence, which is never experience, to a perfect moral will, which is required by religion and is empirically adequate, not only because omnipotence is unnecessary but also because it tends to distort thought about the problem of evil. Much apparent evil may be explained as the rationalistic personalists seek to

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10. Knudson, DOG, 319.





explain it, but unless one admits that evil may be an actual fact logically he cannot affirm that good is a fact. Empirically the problem confronted is the problem of good-and-evil.<sup>11</sup> In the empirical personalist's attempt to explain this problem neither good nor evil can be ignored nor reduced to the other. The attempt to solve the entire problem brings the empirical personalist to the idea of a personal God whose experience is qualitatively similar to all experience he ever has and knowledge of whom is structurally no different from knowledge of objects in the physical world. Both knowledge of God and knowledge of the physical world contain an element of faith.

This concept of a personal God who experiences a "Given" which resists his will contradicts neither the experience of good nor than of evil. Likewise it provides an adequate explanation for the experience of religious values without following an historical will-o'-the-wisp which turns one aside from experience and all that is empirically essential. A personal God whose will accepts and controls the "Given" is the empirical personalist's solution of the problem of evil.

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11. This terminology is used in Brightman, POR, Chapter VIII, for example.





## 2. Macintosh's views of God and evil

The implications of the empirical personalist's solution become even clearer when one considers Macintosh's views about the problem of evil. Macintosh, like empirical personalists, uses the empirical method and believes in a personal God.<sup>12</sup> His empirical emphasis on worship and right religious adjustment is essential for his idea of a personal God. His concept of God as adequate for worship is also empirical, and his interest in the moral and religious character of God leads him to emphasize God as adequate rather than as omnipotent. In relation to right religious adjustment God is not necessarily omnipotent. Macintosh's empirical concept of God is that of "a Being perfect in character and supreme in power."<sup>13</sup> His empirical method causes him to emphasize a personal God as adequate and supreme rather than as omnipotent. So far he agrees with empirical personalists.

This empirical influence appears also in Macintosh's idea of evil:

... the world as we know it can be reasonably interpreted as the sphere of a divine purpose and adequate providential control.<sup>14</sup>

In fact, Macintosh's acceptance of the world as adequately

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12. See Chapter VIII, *supra*.

13. Macintosh, PR, 179. Cf. "absolutely adequate in power," in Macintosh, TES, 229.

14. Macintosh, ROC, 263.





controlled by divine will tends even to modify his distinction between good and evil. Macintosh's idea of creation as "real in the sense of self-transcending causality at the time, a becoming which is neither completely necessitated beforehand nor emerging without cause," <sup>15</sup> illustrated, for example, by our own responsible free agency, may appear to save his explanation; but it actually results either in a Marcionitic dualism or a confusion of the distinction between good and evil and a resort in his metaphysical monistic hypothesis of a "common denominator." He observes, for example, that God produces various things necessary "in order that the world may be the best possible kind of world to be the scene of the first stage of man's existence." <sup>16</sup> Macintosh thinks that as far as God is concerned this present world is reasonably explained as "the best possible kind of world for the present stage of man's development." <sup>17</sup> He emphasizes a God who might have founded and might be purposively at work in and constantly exercising adequate providential control over the world as "great enough and good enough for man's love and trust." <sup>18</sup>

Macintosh's religious interest in the problem of

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15. Macintosh, Art.(1940)<sup>1</sup>, 154.

16. Macintosh, ROC, 118. Cf. Macintosh, GWW, 30-31.

17. Macintosh, ROC, 117.

18. Ibid., 93.





evil <sup>19</sup> if further illustrated by his emphasis on the right religious attitude to reinforce the moral will so that "the destruction of evil will be assured." <sup>20</sup> His view of God's method of dealing with evil also indicates that his interest in the problem of evil is largely religious and moral. He believes that "the 'general providence' of the school of experience in general and the 'special providence' of the experience of saving grace" is a better method than "any substitute that could be devised." <sup>21</sup>

The application of this thought to immortality, by which he, like Paul, understands "the triumphant entrance of the whole personality of the Christian into the full measure of eternal life," <sup>22</sup> also illustrates his interest in evil as a religious and moral problem. He believes that, if the essential values of individual personality may be conserved in spite of bodily death, the world in which physical death is inevitable may be "still the best possible kind of world in which to have the individual pass the first stage of his development." <sup>23</sup> Macintosh's belief in man means to him the faith that "man's value, actual and potential, is such that his existence ought to be continued indefinitely in spite

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19. See Macintosh, TES, 216-229.

20. Macintosh, Art.(1919)<sup>1</sup>, 160.

21. Macintosh, ROC, 114.

22. Macintosh, Art.(1910)<sup>4</sup>, 374-375.

23. Macintosh, TES, 225.





of physical death." <sup>24</sup> He finds this faith strengthened by the depths of moral and personal religion sounded, for example, by Jesus's assurance of God as a perfect Father who "would not suffer the moral personality of any of his human children to pass into nothingness." <sup>25</sup>

Macintosh's moral and religious interest in the problem of evil minimizes his concern with it as a strictly philosophical problem. In relation to the philosophical problem of evil Macintosh's idea of the physical world as the physical body of God is again significant. If God's physical body is an activity (and its results) of a reality more than matter and less than mind, <sup>26</sup> then that which undergoes transformations as God's active and potential energy "under the unifying control and guidance of the Divine Will" <sup>27</sup> must be external to Divine Personality. Thus, Macintosh's metaphysical view of the problem of evil illustrates his relative metaphysical dualism. One of the significant statements he makes about this problem shows clearly this metaphysical dualism:

... it would seem that a considerable measure of independence has been given to physical

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24. Macintosh, Art.(1920), 570.

25. Macintosh, Art.(1915), 201. See also Macintosh in Roberts and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 249-250. Cf. his interpretation of Jesus as "the highest we know," Macintosh, Art.(1907)<sup>1</sup>, 651.

26. See supra, 148-149.

27. Macintosh, ROC, 276.





reality as well as to the human will, so that it would be unsafe to infer that all that happens to human individuals through the ruthless operation of mechanical and chemical law or through the activities of living organisms is an intentional happening so far as God is concerned.<sup>28</sup>

The independence of physical reality and of human wills reveals a qualitative metaphysical dualism that makes the problem of evil a philosophical as well as a moral and religious problem. The moral and religious problem relative to the independence of human wills and to right religious adjustment leaves untouched the real philosophical problem of natural and surd evils.

Macintosh's explanation of this problem involves his realistic metaphysics, the independence which he gives to physical reality. Since he also recognizes persons, both human and divine, as real, his metaphysical position is actually dualistic rather than a critical monistic realism, which he seeks to retain in his metaphysics as well as his epistemology.<sup>29</sup>

### 3. Comparison of Macintosh's and the empirical personalist's views

The metaphysical implications of this dualism, which seems to be basic in relation to God but which is relative in that the mental and the material are both activities of a common denominator more than matter and

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28. Macintosh, Art.(1942)<sup>2</sup>, 43.

29. See supra, 147. Cf. Macintosh, TES, Appendix, and ROC, Chapter XIII.





less than mind, have already been considered.<sup>30</sup> They reappear in the comparison of Macintosh's and the empirical personalist's solutions of the problem of evil. Macintosh's opinion that the idea of a personal God with a perfect will limited by the "Given" is a step from traditional personalism to realism also has already been seen.<sup>31</sup> His charge that the empirical personalist "assumes" that when one recognizes the reality both of God and of evil and the perfection of the divine will "the only alternative left is to ascribe such extra-human evil to something in the Spirit of God himself" <sup>32</sup> reveals Macintosh's own realism. His view ascribes evil to reality outside the nature of God, but his empirical method does not support his realistic metaphysics <sup>33</sup> nor account for the origin of this external evil.

Macintosh criticizes the empirical personalistic solution of the problem of evil because he believes this idea of a finite God is religiously inadequate-- "is this not destructive of the complete worshipfulness and trustworthiness of Deity." <sup>34</sup> If this charge were valid, it might reveal an empirical shortcoming of the idea of a finite God. Religious values are not to be

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30. See Chapter VII, *supra*.

31. See *supra*, 102.

32. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 304.

33. See Chapter VII, *supra*.

34. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 305.





overlooked; any theory of the nature of Divine Reality that arbitrarily rejects any kind of experience needs careful re-examination.

The idea of a personal God with a perfect will although limited by what it accepts and uses but does not create, however, is not religiously inadequate. The experiences of religious values require God's good will, but not his infinite power. Worship depends on God's moral character, not on his omnipotence. The empirical demands of both faith and reason do not even require omnipotence; infinite power to do the conceivable is called for only by a rationalistic concept of reason and faith.<sup>35</sup> For the empirical personalist, the finite, personal God has a perfectly good will.<sup>36</sup> The Divine Will which controls the "Given" is morally perfect, although that which it accepts and employs to accomplish its purposes may limit its power. Evils result from the "Given," not from the Divine Will.

While God's experience contains various factors, for example, his Will and the "Given," the moral quality of God's will is not less perfect because it accepts and uses what is "Given" as the best means available for accomplishing its purposes. God is not "albeit a person,

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35. See Knudson, DOG, 269-270.

36. Note that Macintosh also speaks of a God whose will is perfectly good, although his "good will is not yet fully recognized in man and in the world," in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 406.





a complex of God and devil in one." <sup>37</sup> Since God's will is perfectly moral and a devil has an evil will, this finite God cannot be a complex of both. God's good will is not made imperfect by his use of the best means available, merely because they are imperfect.

In fact, Macintosh's metaphysical solution of the problem of evil makes God less adequate for religion and worship than is the God of the empirical personalist. If God is limited not by what he accepts as a part of his own experience and uses to fulfill his purposes adequately and as perfectly as possible but by what is other than his experience and for which his will is ultimately responsible, such a God is certainly less worthy of worship than the God who is involuntarily limited from within. The empirical personalist conserves the religiously adequate, perfectly moral will of God; Macintosh has sacrificed it.

Macintosh believes that the personalist faces the following dilemma:

... everything that happens in addition to the free acts of human agents is either the direct conscious creation of God at the time, or else the necessary outcome of the struggle of a finite, thwarted God against eternal opposition in his own personal nature.<sup>38</sup>

In his realism Macintosh seeks to relegate evil to

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<sup>37</sup>. Macintosh, Art.(1932)<sup>4</sup>, 304. Cf. Ross, PPE, 38-51.

<sup>38</sup>. Ibid., 305.





reality as God's past creation and habits and thus to minimize the Creator's responsibility for his past creation. He suggests that the reign of law be understood as like established physical habit rather than "the present consciously willed activity of the ever-creative God." <sup>39</sup> God's present creative activity, he believes, is largely in the spiritual sphere.

However, placing creation in the remote past indeed "does not alter the fact that creation creates." <sup>40</sup> The omnipotent moral will is responsible for both the immediate and the remote consequences of its creative acts. If any of the consequences from the activity of Divine Will alone are surd evils, there is no way that this will can be morally perfect.

In Macintosh's idea of "independently real" physical reality he no longer follows the empirical method which leads to his idea of a personal God. In neither the empirical method nor the idea of God as personal is there any evidence for Macintosh's metaphysical view of the problem of evil, for example. Brightman observes that Macintosh's solution leaves him with "two Givens." <sup>41</sup> Empirically the natural evils of the created cosmos are eventually "Given" to Macintosh's personal God. This "Given" results from his realistic metaphysical dualism.

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39. Macintosh, Art.(1939)<sup>3</sup>, 34.

40. Brightman, Art.(1932)<sup>2</sup>, 462.

41. Ibid., 462.





The idea of a personal God ultimately responsible for his physical body (and habits) also means that there must be a second "Given," that within God which is responsible for such a cosmos, unless one wishes to invite a Marcionitic dualism into the framework of Macintosh's ultimate metaphysical (qualitative) monism of a "common denominator."

Macintosh's metaphysical view of evil, thus, merely complicates the problem; if God is creative and personal, his experience must explain everything. Although the theoretical fault of emancipating God from time may be a source of revolt against the existence of evil,<sup>42</sup> time neither alters nor abolishes the responsibility of the Divine Will for its creative acts. A personal God is morally perfect and supported by the empirical method completely apart from the idea of any "independently real" physical reality. The relation of Macintosh's idea of a personal God to his metaphysical view about evil depends on his realism, which is less thoroughly empirical than his idea of a personal God.

The empirical personalist's solution of the problem of evil by the idea of a personal God limited in power by a "Given," which the Divine Will accepts and uses as the best means available for accomplishing

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42. Alexander, STD, II, 420.





its purposes, offers a religiously adequate explanation of all experience without reducing evil to good or good to evil.

The problem of good-and-evil leads to an empirical view of God as a perfectly moral will accepting and controlling what is also a part of Divine Experience but what it does not create, which is "Given," and with which it adequately, although not perfectly, strives to accomplish its purposes. This solution of the problem of evil is empirical in its concepts of personality, of purpose, of evil, and of religious values.

The empirical explanation of personality is as a will striving against factors which it does not create, but which are "Given" to it, in the attempt to realize values. The metaphysical quality of the "Given" may be explained in various ways; for the empirical personalist it is most adequately understood as qualitatively like mind and an organization of the Divine Consciousness. Divine Personality is not qualitatively different from human personality.<sup>43</sup> The problem of good-and-evil supports the belief that the "Given" is also a part of Divine Experience which is accepted and used by the Divine Will in seeking to accomplish its purposes and

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43. See Brightman, Art.(1945).





to experience values.

The empirical concept of purpose is illustrated in the idea of a finite God who accepts and controls the "Given" and strives toward ideals. Purpose is empirically explained as an ideal toward which one strives and which is realized as value. Purpose is experienced as a value; it is sought as an ideal. The empirical personalists understand God's purpose as something toward which he also strives. One is consciously aware of his purposes as ideals; they are realized as values only as he strives toward and experiences them.

The empirical concept of evil is the experienced fact that evil is evil. Empirically the distinction between good and evil cannot be obscured by reducing one to the other, or by seeking to explain either completely as means to the other. The empirical personalist believes that both good and evil are real and that both result from Divine Experience. However, the Divine Will is good; evil results from the necessity that, if any values are to be realized, the Divine Will, like the human will, must accept and use the "Given" in accomplishing its purposes. Like good, evil is an experience, and no experience can be discarded or arbitrarily neglected in the attempt to explain





any and all experience.

The concept of a finite God who controls the "Given" sufficiently for values to be experienced is also empirical in explaining the experiences of religious values. Empirically values are realized ideals or norms. They are realized and experienced by persons, both human and divine. The experiences of religious values, like all other experiences, must be considered critically and explained as reasonably as possible. For the reasonable explanation of religious experience, the moral will of the finite God is both necessary and adequate. The experience of values is evidence that this Divine Will controls the "Given" so that its purposes may be adequately, although not necessarily perfectly, realized. The empirical personalist does not believe that this control is absolute, that God is omnipotent, but only that it is adequate to produce values.

The empirical method is illustrated in the idea of a personal God accepted by both Macintosh and the empirical personalists. In their views of evil, however, the more systematic use of the empirical method by empirical personalists throughout their epistemology and metaphysics results in a more coherent and more adequate interpretation of all experience





than characterizes Macintosh's epistemological and metaphysical views. In this way the implications of the empirical personalist's metaphysical views and of Macintosh's metaphysics are emphasized by their solutions of the problem of evil.

Certain significant distinctions between Macintosh's thought and empirical personalism are brought together in the following chapter as summary and conclusions of this study of Macintosh's criticism of personalism.





## CHAPTER X

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Macintosh's criticism of personalism is a part of his religious realism and shows certain points of fundamental difference, as well as certain points of agreement, between his thought and personalism. The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine and evaluate these points.

#### 1. Summary

Macintosh's interest in religious values and the Christian faith results in a similarity between his religious realism and the historical development of the realism of universals (Chapter II). The relation of his thought to common sense, his special interest in science, and the influence of certain psychological factors and his "realistic" escape from them show also a similarity between his realism and other forms of anti-idealistic realism. Certain distinctive features of his realism in religion (Chapter III) are illustrated by his doctrine of values, his doctrine of the self, and the influence of religion on his realism and of realism on his religion. Through Macintosh's teaching at Yale University and his extensive writing, his





distinctive realism has had considerable influence on both philosophy and theology.

The epistemology of the philosophical position from which Macintosh criticizes personalism both resembles and differs from personalistic epistemology. The empirical method characterizes both Macintosh's epistemology and personalistic epistemology (Chapter IV). Unlike personalists who accept dualism in epistemology, however, Macintosh attempts to be critically monistic in his epistemology and to avoid the agnosticism in dualism, the subjectivity of the various forms of idealism, and dogmatism in realism (Chapter V). Special problems arise in his views of mediate and immediate knowledge, of qualities and values, of the relation of epistemology to metaphysics, and of monism to critical pragmatism. An evaluation of Macintosh's arguments against dualism (Chapter VI) reveals that his thought, like dualism, depends on practical certainty, not immediate, monistic certainty. A critical investigation reveals likewise that his interpretation of idealism as necessarily subjective in the sense of denying objectivity is arbitrary, because idealism may be metaphysical as well as epistemological. Also his views about coherence and his dependence on mere consistency show more irrationalism in critical monism than there is in epistemological dualism.





The metaphysics of Macintosh's thought also differs from personalism (Chapter VII). Personalists are qualitatively monistic in their metaphysics; they deny nonmental reality. Macintosh objects to this denial. His own view, however, is that the relation between metaphysics and theology is merely consistent, rather than coherent. Also he is inclined to interpret certain psychological factors as authoritative for metaphysics, for example, his view of faith as ontological and doubt as psychological. The criticism he makes of the rationalistic view that regards reality as completely rational shows how important is the metaphysical methodology of empirical personalism, which seeks the most reasonable explanation of all experience. Although Macintosh's epistemological realism leads him to criticism of idealistic metaphysics, his statements of epistemological monism show an attempt to maintain both the activity of consciousness and metaphysical realism, which he seeks to explain as the physical body of God. Actually his metaphysical position is an activistic, qualitative dualism in which mind and matter are both activities, although differing activities, of a common denominator, which is "less than mind and more than matter."

Although Macintosh criticizes the epistemological and metaphysical views of personalism, his and the





personalist's ideas of God are very similar (Chapter VIII). Macintosh's empirical method is the avenue by which he reaches his idea of a personal God, spiritually experienced and spiritually and religiously adequate, a "Higher Life" and a "Perfect Friend" to which the right religious adjustment is made. However, Macintosh's empirical method and his idea of a personal God are organically related neither to his epistemological monism nor to his relative metaphysical dualism. One never has "direct knowledge," even of the God of experience. A unity of a personal God also is no conclusion of epistemological monism. Macintosh's idea of a personal God is independent also of his metaphysical interpretation of the physical universe as God's physical body.

Differences among personalistic solutions of the problem of evil show the differences between empirical personalism and a more rationalistic form of personalism. Macintosh's emphasis on God as religiously adequate and his view of empirical method both reveal similarity between his idea of God and the empirical personalistic position, although Macintosh's interest in evil as a moral and religious problem and the relation of his metaphysical views to the problem of evil minimize the philosophical problem of evil for him and modify his empirical method. A critical comparison of Macintosh's ideas about evil and of the empirical personalist's





view of the problem of evil (Chapter IX) reveals that an internally limited personal God is more religiously adequate than a personal God externally limited. This comparison also reveals that Macintosh is more personalistic than monistically realistic in his empirical method and his idea of a personal God.

## 2. Conclusions

The conclusions of this investigation of Macintosh's criticism of personalism may be stated as distinctive characteristics of empirical personalism. Empirical personalism differs both from Macintosh's thought and from the more rationalistic forms of personalism. The differences between empirical personalism and Macintosh's thought are both epistemological and metaphysical.

An important epistemological distinction is the difference between the epistemological dualism of personalism and Macintosh's attempted epistemological monism. Personalists rest their epistemological dualism on faith in reason to interpret all experience. Macintosh seeks to establish knowledge by immediate experience. However, immediate experience cannot actually be knowledge until there is mediation; mediated knowledge depends on immediate experience plus mediation, not on immediate knowledge. Hence a concealed dualism lurks in Macintosh's reasoning.





Personalistic dualists seek to be as reasonable as possible; Macintosh claims immediate certainty. Macintosh's immediate certainty, however, is critical and is replaced in his thought by practical certainty. Macintosh's ideas of verification and representational pragmatism in both general and religious knowledge, for example, show not immediate, monistic certainty but practical certainty, which requires purpose and is epistemologically dualistic. Thus his thought implies the inadequacy of epistemological monism and the need for epistemological dualism. Especially Macintosh's knowledge (or faith) of the transcendent aspects of God is neither monistic nor immediately certain.

The dualistic epistemology of personalism differs from Macintosh's thought also in recognizing that idealism may be objective. For Macintosh, idealism is a denial of objective reality. He believes that idealism is subjectivism; much of his thought may be understood as a search for objectivity. His descriptions of personal idealism as merely a stage in the disintegration of logical-psychological idealism into mere psychological idealism, and of logical idealism as abstracting from the abstraction of psychological idealism illustrate his interpretation of all idealism as epistemological idealism. Personalistic epistemology does not require that idealism mean subjectivism; idealism as a theory





of the nature of reality implies, rather than denies, the reasonableness of objectivity of reality. For the personalist, the subjective residence of knowledge does not deny its objective reference and validity. The epistemology of empirical personalism is the attempt to give as reasonable an explanation of all experience as possible.

Personalistic epistemology also differs from Macintosh's epistemological thought in the recognition of the coherence criterion of truth. The eclecticism of Macintosh's thought illustrates his interest in consistency. His hostility to coherence and "system" show why he attempts to be consistent rather than coherent. However, epistemological monism and mere consistency are inadequate to explain the unity of divine reality, for example. Here even Macintosh's criticism of personalism implies the ideals of inclusiveness and system as well as consistency.

Metaphysical differences between Macintosh's thought and personalism are related to Macintosh's objection to the personalistic denial of nonmental reality. His metaphysical methodology is based on consistency between metaphysics and theology, the acceptance of certain psychological conditions as objective and others as subjective, and his interpretation of emphasis on reasonableness to mean that only the





completely rational is real. The metaphysical methodology of personalism requires, however, a coherent relation between metaphysics and theology (and of all knowledge), a critical evaluation of all psychological conditions of each experience, and an attempt to give the most reasonable explanation of all factors of experience, both rational and nonrational.

Macintosh's metaphysical conclusion is a relative qualitative dualism of objective reality and the object as experienced, a relative dualism of matter (God's physical body) and mind, which are "differing activities and their products," activities of "a common denominator" which is more than matter and less than mind. Personalists believe that mind must be actually less than mind and matter more than mere matter if both are activities of a common denominator "less than the one and more than the other." They also believe that the most reasonable way to explain all experience is not to give up reason but to consider experience and not leap to something qualitatively different from mind.

Their ideas of a personal God show the influence of the empirical method in the thought of both Macintosh and personalists. However, Macintosh does not have "direct knowledge" of a personal God; his epistemological monism does not give him the unity of a personal God; and worship of a personal God does not require that the





physical world be God's physical body. In fact, Macintosh's idea of God is more personalistic than monistically realistic.

The empirical method in Macintosh's thought also makes it important to distinguish between empirical and more rationalistic forms of personalism. One sees the distinctive features of empirical personalism especially in relation to God and the problem of evil. Rationalistic personalists believe in an omnipotent God and emphasize the disciplinary value of evil, leaving unsolved the philosophical problem of natural and surd evils. Macintosh also deals with evil as a moral and religious problem, although he does emphasize a personal God as adequate rather than as infinitely powerful. For empirical personalists God is personal and has an absolutely good will. Thus God is religiously adequate, although limited in power by the acceptance and use of that which is also a part of his experience, but which is "Given" not created by him, in the accomplishment of his purposes. Since God, like human persons, accepts and uses what is "Given," ideals are not perfectly realized as values; and evils result.

God's will, however, is not responsible for evil; thus a personal God internally limited by his acceptance and use of the "Given" is more religiously adequate than the infinite God of more rationalistic personalists.





If God's power is infinite, he must be responsible for all that is, except the free choices of other selves for which he may not be responsible without sacrificing his moral character. A personal God internally limited is also more religiously adequate than Macintosh's idea of a God whose physical body is the physical universe, for if God is thus externally limited and his Will is ultimately responsible for his body and habits, this God is less adequate religiously than a personal God whose will is morally perfect but limited involuntarily by another factor within his experience.

The empirical method by which Macintosh arrives at the idea of a personal God is used by empirical personalists to explain not only the nature of God but also the relation of God to evil and to formulate their personalistic epistemological and metaphysical views. Thus, a more thorough application of the empirical method is made by empirical personalists than Macintosh makes in his thought and in his criticism of personalism.





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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with the criticism Douglas Clyde Macintosh, a religious realist, makes of personalism. His religious realism is related to both the medieval realism of universals and more recent anti-idealistic realism. Its distinctive contribution, however, is the view of the empirical method and its combination of religion and realism.

Although Macintosh criticizes personalism, his thought agrees with personalism on empirical method and belief in a personal God. For Macintosh, unlike many other realists and empiricists, the empirical method is inclusive of experiences of all values. In this respect, his empirical method is like the empirical method of personalism (Chapter IV). For both Macintosh and empirical personalists the word "empirical" denotes an appeal to experience as distinguished from abstract logic. One must be "vitally experiential" to keep his thought from becoming rationalistic. Empirical for both also means an appeal to all kinds of experience, an impartial examination of experiences of all values as well as of sense data. Experiences of religious values, for





example, are as empirical as the sense experiences on which physical sciences are based.

A second point of agreement between Macintosh and empirical personalists results from this similarity between their views of empirical method. Both believe in a personal God (Chapter VIII). For both, God must be related to experience; an abstract, absolute, impersonal God has no logical place in the thought of either. God is spiritually experienced. Both his existence and his nature are interpreted on the basis of empirical data. For Macintosh and empirical personalists experiences of religious values require a personal, religiously adequate God. In seeking to explain all experience a personal God is necessary.

Despite these agreements, Macintosh criticizes personalism extensively. He believes personalism, like all other forms of epistemological dualism, lacks certainty (Chapters V and VI). He holds that since epistemological dualism makes immediate experience of independent reality impossible, epistemological dualism is necessarily agnostic. Whether or not dualists recognize their agnosticism, Macintosh believes it a necessary defect of all epistemological dualism.

Macintosh also criticizes all forms of idealism, including personal idealism (Chapter V). In fact, personal idealism, he believes, is just a stage in the





disintegration of logical-psychological idealism into mere psychological idealism. To him "idealism" means denial of objective reality (i. e., denial of objects which do not belong to subjects); hence all forms of idealism are dogmatic. However, he recognizes in logical idealism (Platonism) a tendency of idealism to become realism, Platonic Ideas being a discovery rather than a construct of human thought.

Macintosh believes that the dualistic epistemology of personalism lacks certainty and that the idealism of personalism is dogmatic. Thus personalism is irrational (Chapter VI). He believes other indications of irrationalism in personalism are its coherence (an artificial "sticking together" of subject and predicate) and "system," which he understands as abstract, nonempirical, and not inclusive.

Examination of his criticism of personalistic epistemology reveals that the certainty which actually characterizes Macintosh's thought is practical certainty, not the immediate certainty of epistemological monism (Chapter VI). He requires that subjective certitude be "sufficiently critical." Criticism implies reference, and reference implies epistemological dualism. Especially his idea of representational pragmatism and his knowledge of the transcendent aspects of God illustrate practical certainty, not immediate monistic certainty.





But actually no immediate experience may be knowledge until mediated, until criticized and evaluated (Chapter IV). Verification, relation, and criticism involve processes of purposive reference beyond any single present experience. Only present experience is immediate. All knowledge requires mediation. Any situation criticized is no longer "Situation Experienced" but "Situation Believed-in." Actually epistemological dualism is compatible with empirical knowledge of the objective world, the world "discovered, not created." Scientists do not maintain that empirical knowledge requires absolute logical necessity.

Macintosh's criticism of idealism reveals that he regards idealism a development of epistemology rather than a metaphysical view. However, holding knowledge to be subjective (as idealists do) does not necessarily deny its objective reference (Chapter VI). Epistemological realism is a theory that there is objective reality; metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism are theories about the nature of objective reality. In fact, both metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism imply epistemological realism, imply objective reality, a reality other than the present experience of the knowing subject, unless one accepts solipsism or denies his own consciousness. Metaphysical idealists do not deny objectivity of





reality by describing it as qualitatively like consciousness. Much of Macintosh's theological metaphysics is itself idealistic. His God is like human consciousness in many respects. It is arbitrary to regard all idealism as subjectivism, all idealism as a subjective theory denying the existence of objective reality, merely because all knowledge must be subjective in being present to a conscious subject (Chapter VI).

Macintosh's objection to the personalistic denial of nonmental reality illustrates his failure to distinguish metaphysical from epistemological idealism. Personalists do not deny that there is objective reality; they merely assert that there is no nonmental reality, that all reality is qualitatively like consciousness (Chapter VII).

Macintosh's view of the relation between theology and metaphysics illustrates his attempt to avoid inconsistency. Mere consistency and epistemological monism, however, provide no basis for unity of divine reality, for example (Chapter VI). Rational thought requires not merely consistency but coherence, which is more adequate because it presupposes consistency and adds inclusiveness and system. Macintosh's loyalty to mere consistency, without regard to coherence, results in metaphysical as well as epistemological difficulties





(Chapter VII). This is the source of much of Macintosh's objection to personalism. The ideal of coherence means seeking the most adequate explanation of all factors of experience (both rational and nonrational).

The empirical personalistic view of the problem of evil is based on such a search for the most adequate (most coherent) explanation of experience. It emphasizes the difference between Macintosh's metaphysics and the more thorough application of empirical method in the metaphysics of empirical personalism (Chapter VII). The experience of evil is a fact which no philosophical explanation of experience can overlook. Although Macintosh considers evil principally as a moral and religious problem, his emphasis on a religiously adequate God (Chapter VIII) shows the relation of his empirical method to the empirical personalistic solution of the problem of evil.

Experience always contains will and that which resists will (Chapter IX). Empirical personalists believe these two elements characterize both human and divine experience and attempt to take empirical method seriously in the realm of good and evil. Since experiences of evil cannot result from Divine Will (for God's will is good; it is both religiously and rationally adequate), empirical personalists believe that they come from unwilled elements of Divine Experience (not from independently real, nonmental reality





or God's habits). God, like human persons, experiences that which is "Given" and resists his will. He accepts and uses the "Given," which he does not create but finds within his own experience, as the best means available for accomplishing his purposes. Experiences of value indicate God's control of the "Given," although this control is not absolute, for the "Given" which God accepts and uses limits his power to accomplish his purposes. Evils result. God's will, however, is not responsible for these evils. They result from his acceptance and use of a "Given" not perfectly suited for the realization of values.

Thus the empirical personalistic explanation of evil does not impair God's religious adequacy. His will is perfectly good. In fact, a personal God internally limited by that for which his will is not responsible, but which he accepts and uses as best he can to accomplish his purposes, is more worthy of worship than a God limited by that for which his will is responsible either immediately or at some past time, since such a God would be a doer of evil, even if long ago. Macintosh's view of the physical world as God's physical body makes God ultimately responsible for evil, although creation be relegated to the remote past (Chapter IX). Actually neither his empirical method nor his idea of a personal God has any necessary logical relation to Macintosh's





view of "independently real" physical reality and his activistic, dualistic metaphysical realism (Chapter X).

This study of Macintosh's criticism of personalism reveals how the empirical method used by empirical personalists in treating epistemological and metaphysical as well as religious problems is like Macintosh's method. Macintosh is empirical in his idea of a personal God and in most of his religious thought. Empirical personalists seek to be empirical, regarding reason as coherence instead of mere consistency, throughout their epistemological, metaphysical, and religious thought. Thus they carry out certain of Macintosh's presuppositions more completely than he does.

The chief contributions of this dissertation on Macintosh's criticism of personalism are:

1. The proof of the importance of Macintosh's empirical method and the similarity between his method in arriving at an idea of a personal God and the method of empirical personalism.

2. The use of the distinction between experience and knowledge in comparing the empirical method in epistemology and metaphysics with Macintosh's monistic epistemology and activistic, dualistic metaphysical realism.

3. The distinction between empirical and more rationalistic forms of personalism and the illustration





of the empirical method in the empirical personalistic solution of the problem of evil.

4. The application of empirical personalism to the idea of a personal God internally limited by the "Given" and the proof of the religious adequacy of a God who voluntarily accepts and uses the "Given" for which his will is not voluntarily responsible in contrast to Macintosh's idea of a God whose physical body and habits are the physical universe.







Morris Jonathan Morgan, the oldest son of Armour and Leah Beckelhymer Morgan, was born on December 21, 1917, at Perrysville, Indiana. He graduated from the Perrysville High School in 1936, valedictorian of his class. The following September he entered DePauw University; in May, 1940, he received the A. B. degree with distinction. In September, 1940, he entered Boston University School of Theology; in May, 1943, he received the S. T. B. degree cum laude. In October, 1943, he became a candidate for the Ph. D. degree in Boston University Graduate School and studied in Boston University during the following year as a Roswell R. Robinson fellow. During the summer term of 1944 and the first semester of 1944-1945 he was an assistant in the department of philosophy in Boston University.

On Christmas Day, 1941, he and Ruth Lucile Faucett were married. He is a full member of the Northwest Indiana Conference of the Methodist Church, ordained elder in June, 1943. While a student, he has served as minister of churches in Indiana and Rhode Island and as assistant minister at Copley Methodist Church in Boston, Massachusetts.



















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